A Critique of the Situation Ethics Debate in the Light of Man's Sociality

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INTRODUCTION

In the present study, we shall deal with the dispute between the two opposing ethical positions in recent theological ethics: the ethics of situations which John A. T. Robinson, Joseph Fletcher, and Paul Lehmann represent and the ethics of norms of which Paul Ramsey is a major figure. The heated dispute between these conflicting ethical views is called the situation ethics debate or the norm-context debate. We shall pursue two major tasks. One is a critical analysis of the principal problems inherent in the debate which make it contribute little to social ethics. The other is to develop constructively these problems and to reformulate the norm-context relationship so that the legitimate ethical issues raised by the debate can contribute to social ethics.

The ethics of situations seeks moral innovation to cope with the rapidly changing social situation of our time. This leads the situationists to place weight upon the unique claim of each concrete situation in order to overcome traditional legalism. This situational approach to ethics is important since it seeks to overcome the defects of legalism which cannot respond creatively to social change. Despite this merit, the ethics of situationism reveals some serious defects in its treatment of situation, moral norms, and the social dimensions of ethics.

The situationsists' overemphasis upon the demand of the concrete situation leads them to fall into a narrow concept of the situation which tends to take the situation as the decision-making moment rather than the larger set of social conditions. They are passionate in their antilegalism because they do not want the moral agent to avoid personal responsibility by taking recourse to moral norms. But their overemphasis upon creative, free decision makes them neglect the significance of the sustaining function of norms for corporate moral life. These two defects of the situationists' treatment of the situation and moral norms lead them to neglect or insufficiently deal with the social dimensions of ethics which depend on the function of social systems and policies. The situationists do not take seriously the truth that God's love or his humanizing work brings us a new sense of freedom, but he also enriches and fulfills humanity through human community which is maintained by the sustaining function of moral norms and social systems and policies.

The situationists' neglect of moral norms has called forth the counter position of ethics of norms which Ramsey represents. He insists on the importance of norms for morally ordered social life. It is the merit of Ramsey's ethics of norms that it takes seriously the significance of moral norms for the maintenance of corporate moral life. However, Ramsey's critique of situation ethics goes too far in the opposite direction when it does not

accord due appreciation to the situationists' legitimate insistence on creative moral decision. Moreover, he falls into the same trap in which the situationists are caught. He also tends to neglect the social aspect of the situation and the function of moral norms. His critique of situationism does not provide any corrective to the situationists' neglect of the social dimensions of ethics. Indeed, the dispute between the ethics of situations and the ethics of norms has tended to become so preoccupied with the internal methodology of choice that it has created a new scholasticism which pays no serious attention to social ethics. This new scholasticism is a departure from the tradition of American theology and ethics which is characterized by its concern for public questions.

The situation ethics debate has raised important ethical issues, but their significance is unfortunately overshadowed by the aforementioned defects of the debate. This situation requires us to seek an adequate approach to the debate which can make its legitimate issues contribute to social ethics.

It is our contention that the principal problems of the situation ethics debate are due to the fact that the debate does not give sufficient attention to the ethical significance of man's fundamental sociality. Man's sociality can provide a foundation for the exposition of the social aspect of the situation, the social function of moral norms, and the positive ethical function of social systems and policies. This implies that man's sociality is a useful conceptual model to develop constructively the issues raised by the debate so that they can contribute to social ethics. However, an adequate appropriation of man's sociality for social ethics requires an assessment of the limit of its function. The moral agent is the I-subject as intentionality who brings about social change by introducing new meanings to routinized social process. No matter how the individual is conditioned by society, he is by no means a mere product of social forces. The moral agent as the intentional self chooses and decides according to communal values. This function of intentionality necessitates setting due limits on the function of man's sociality.

The foregoing consideration of sociality and intentionality suggests that an adequate ethical approach must treat properly both intentionality and sociality. It is our contention that an adequate ethical approach must be based on a balanced relationship between intentionality and sociality. These two conceptual models can function well as tools not only for a constructive development of the principal problems of the situation ethics debate but also for a reformulation of the norm-context relationship.

We shall expound man's sociality and its ethical implications in the light of Peter L. Berger's sociology of knowledge and Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of the social world. The former provides a penetrating analysis of the effect of social conditions upon the individual's moral knowledge and conduct. The latter gives a thoroughgoing analysis of

the complex social process which conditions the knowledge and judgment of the individual. Their exposition of sociality suggests that no ethical study can be complete without taking into consideration the moral agent's relation to the larger community. This necessitates taking seriously the social aspect of the situation and the important ethical function of social systems and policies. Schutz's notion of "typification" and Berger's application of typification to the analysis of man's "nomizing" activity in the process of his world-building illuminate the significance of the positive social function of moral norms.

An adequate appropriation of man's sociality for social ethics requires setting due limits on its function in terms of intentionality, since an adequate ethical approach must be based on a balanced relationship between intentionality and sociality. Gibson Winter's critical-affirmative reconstruction of George H. Mead's triadic structure of the social self is a useful exposition of a balance between intentional self and social self or human creativity and social conditioning. Winter's balance between intentionality and sociality enables us to assess adequately the sustaining function of man's sociality and moral norms.

In the first chapter, we point out three principal problems inherent in the situation ethics debate and critically analyze these problems by investigating the situationists and Ramsey's critique of them. Next, we expound man's sociality in the light of Berger's sociology of knowledge and Schutz's phenomenology of the social world. The third chapter is an analysis of the dialectical relationship between human intentionality and sociality to seek a balance between these two aspects of human existence and its impact upon the limits of their function. Chapter four deals with a critique and a constructive development of the principal problems of the situation ethics on the basis of man's sociality and the balance between intentionality and sociality. The last chapter reformulates the norm-context relationship in the light of these two conceptual models. Finally, we summarize the major points of our study and assess their contribution to the solution of the initial goals of the present study.

I. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION ETHICS DEBATE

The emergence of "situation ethics" and responses to it has created a controversial dispute between its advocates and opponents. Emotional and reactionary responses to it have often muddled the debate, particularly in its early phase. Even the academic debate has tended to be a polemic involving stuffy quibbling. It seems that the debate is now

coming to an end without making any noticeable constructive contribution to Christian ethics, especially to social ethics. The heated debate unfortunately overshadows the situationists' legitimate concern for moral innovation.

There are some principal problems inherent in the situation ethics debate which have prevented the debate from making constructive contributions to ethics. These problematic points need to be examined in order to make use of situationists' creative insight for the development of constructive social ethics. The works of a number of theologians include some elements of situationism. Many theologians have engaged in the discussion of situation ethics from various viewpoints. However, it seems fair to say that the situation ethics debate has come to a full academic discussion in Paul Ramsey's critique of John A. T. Robinson, Joseph Fletcher, and Paul Lehmann. In the present study our critique and transformation of the situation ethics debate will focus on these four dominant figures.

In this chapter we shall first point out the principal problems of the situation ethics debate and delineate their features. We shall then consider in detail the features of these principal problems by analyzing the three situationists and Ramsey respectively.

A. Some Principal Problems Inherent in the Situation Ethics Debate

1. A Tendency to Overemphasize the Decision-making Moment Neglecting or Insufficiently Treating the Social Aspect of the Situation

Situation ethics starts with strong emphasis upon the impact of the situation upon ethics. Considered from this initial departure, it is strange that none of the situationists is careful enough to designate explicitly what constitutes the situation. As Roger L. Shinn rightly points out, "there is a curious strain in situational ethics that seems to assume that the situation is self-defining."[1]

It is precisely the definition of the situation which is the most perplexing of ethical questions. On the one hand, there may be occasions where we have to make ethical decisions within the context of a given situation. On the other hand, there may be occasions where we have to fight the situation to respond to the unique claim of the immediate moment. We may come to a time when we have to change the total situation of the society in order to create a better social condition which can realize a more human society. Conversely, we may have to destroy the existing social order (say a totalitarian or seriously corrupted government) in order to restore a social situation in which man's rationality can work relatively smoothly. Furthermore, the effect of decision upon the society as a whole also must be taken into consideration since any moral decision has ripple effects that go beyond

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1) Roger L. Shinn, "The New Wave in Christian Thought," *Encounter,* 28, No. 3 (Summer, 1967), 253.

its immediate concrete situation. All these perplexing problems are neither fully considered by the situationists nor by Ramsey.

What is most problematic in the situationists' notion of the situation is that they tend to take the situation as an isolated decision-making moment divorced from the social situation. Situationism stresses the decision-making moment since it frees the moral agent from legalistic insistence upon obedience to moral norms without independent reflection. There is no denying that moral action is ultimately a personal decision within one's own responsibility. Seen in this respect, Shinn is quite right when he assails situationists' one-sided emphasis upon the situation asserting that "the situations do not dictate decisions; persons in situations make decisions."[2] It is true enough that the unique content of the concrete decision-making cannot be deduced from the universal and, therefore, that moral action is ultimately personal.

However, the emphasis upon the decisional moment must not lead to the false notion that the claim of a concrete, individual moment is the only determinant of moral decisions. As James Sellers rightly points out, "an existentialist moment may be the *occasion* of decision, but it cannot be the basis of decision."[3] No moral decision can be considered apart from the moral agent's relation to the larger community to which he belongs. The situationists fail to do justice to this impact of the larger community upon moral decisions.

James T. Laney criticizes quite clearly this failure of the situationists in his essay "Norm and Context in Ethics: A Reconsideration." He contends that the problem of norm and context must be reconsidered in terms of the double nature of moral obligation: "on the one hand an obligation to respond to the claim of the 'situation' as one confronts it, and on the other to account for one's response in terms accountable and intelligible to the communities of which one is a part."[4] He goes on to say that "if either aspect of this 'double obligation' is neglected, serious and even tragic distortion of personal and corporate moral life occurs."[5] According to him, the serious defect of situationists is that they emphasize one-sidedly the importance of the unique claim of the concrete situation in making moral decisions while overlooking the "injunctive demand or claim which is ingredient in the situation itself."[6]

Thus considered, an immediate moment may be an occasion of decision, but it is not the only determinant. To be sure, moral action is to be approached in response to the demand of

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2) *Ibid.*, 254.
3) James Sellers, *Public Ethics* (New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 207.
4) James T. Laney, "Norm and Context in Ethics: A Reconsideration," *Soundings*, 42, No. 3 (Fall, 1969), 311.
5) *Ibid.*, 312.
6) *Ibid.*

a given moment. Yet this same situation in which one has to decide what to do is more than an isolated immediate context. Man's moral decision has to do not only with his responsibility to the immediate imperative of the concrete situation but with his accountability to the larger community to which he belongs. Preoccupied with the unique claim of the concrete situation, the situationists do not give any careful consideration to the social aspect of the situation and its impact upon moral decisions. This defect, along with their neglect of moral norms, has allowed their opponents to assail their unstructured freedom.

The foregoing critique of the situationists' narrow concept of the situation also holds true for Ramsey. The governing concern of his criticism of the situationists is to investigate and correct their neglect of the necessity and significance of moral norms. He neither gives any serious attention to the social aspect of the situation nor examines the situationists' notion of the situation.

2. A Tendency to Understand Moral Norms in Negative or Abstract Terms Neglecting or Insufficiently Treating Their Positive Social Function

The reason for the situationists' emphasis upon each concrete situation lies in their strong antilegalism. They are passionate in their distress at obedience to moral rules without independent reflection. Their reason for this is sound enough: They do not want the moral agent to avoid personal responsibility in his moral decision by taking recourse to rules. But they go too far in the other direction: Their insistence upon independent moral decision leads them to neglect the importance of moral norms, especially their positive function.

It is true that the situationists do not totally disregard the need of moral norms. They all recognize, at least formally, the need of moral norms although they differ in their emphases. But their preoccupation with free creative response to unique claims of the concrete situation leads to a concern more for the relative validity than the positive function of moral norms. Although their ethical discourse shows some awareness of the positive function of moral rules, they basically tend to take the function of moral norms negatively as preventing the moral agent from free independent moral decisions. Due appreciation of the positive function of moral norms is accorded by none of the situationists. This has allowed their opponents to assail their normless freedom.

To be sure, moral norms can prevent the moral agent from making independent moral decisions when they dictate actions as absolute rules. This is particularly true when existing moral norms stand in conflict with the new demands of a changed social situation. But this is only one side of the truth. Another side is that moral norms can also function positively. They play an important part in the moral agent's moral discernment. One can discern

clearly and quickly prohibited limits and required actions in normal instances by relying on moral norms. Although they reveal some awareness of this positive function of moral norms, the situationists are never very careful to develop it fully.

The reason for the situationists' neglect of the positive ethical importance of moral norms is quite clear: They are most cautious of the traps of legalism and heteronomy. But the truth is that the recognition of the positive function of moral norms does not necessarily lead to legalism and heteronomy. Therefore, what is needed is to find a way in which the necessity and useful function of moral norms can be retained without falling into legalism and heteronomy.

What is most problematic in the situationists' understanding of moral norms is their neglect of the social function of moral rules. Man's moral conduct always takes place within community. Life in community is also life in common responsibility as H. Richard Niebuhr's "ethics of responsibility" expounds.[7] This common responsibility implies mutual obligations of persons to each other and their coexistent obligation to the community to which they belong. The achievement of man's obligations to other men and his community cannot be carried out with success without relying on some structures or rules which clearly define obligations.[8]

Neither the situationists nor Ramsey takes seriously the positive social function of moral norms. This leads them to neglect or insufficiently treat the importance of the continuity and generality in corporate moral life that moral norms provide for. Life in community is maintained by the "ordering" of human life that provides for the continuity and generality of life although its particular forms are changing. An ordering of human life is carried on through civil laws and moral norms as well as institutions, customs, and manners. Corporate moral life also is maintained by the continuity and generality of morality secured by these "sustaining patterns of life," as well as by the constant creative reassessment of them.[9] Among these patterns, what is most significant for communal moral life is moral norms.

Neither Flecher nor Lehmann gives any serious attention to the ethical importance of the continuity and generality of morality secured by moral norms although they are not totally

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7) See H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1963).

8) For a succinct account of the ethical significance of man's common responsibility and obligation for life in community, see James M. Gustafson, "A Theology of Christian Community," in his *The Church as Moral Decision-maker* (Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1970), pp. 63–80.

9) For an account of the ethical significance of the continuity of life for communal life, see Gustafson, "A Theology of Christian Community," in *The Church as Moral Decision-maker*, pp. 63–80. He uses "ordering" instead of "order" since the latter has been often identified with the divine absolute order. He uses "ordering" to designate the continuous formulation and reassessment of historical sustaining patterns of life.

unaware of it. Robinson shows more concern for it than Fletcher and Lehmann, but he also stops short of a full grasp of it. Only Ramsey grasps clearly the significance of the continuity and generality of morality for morally ordered social life, but his argument for it remains a formal theological concern.

There may be occasions when the existing moral norms stand in conflict with new claims of a changed social situation. Indeed, it often happens that concrete imperatives arising out of a changed social situation are so urgent as to reassess the validity of existing moral norms. But the existence of such instances can hardly annul the need and usefulness of moral norms for life in community. There is both the opportunity and the obligation for an extended rethinking of the social function of moral norms.

The foregoing criticism of the situationists' neglect of the social function of moral norms also holds true for Ramsey. He is an ardent critic of the situationists' act-agapism which relativizes all moral norms except the principle of love or God's humanization (Lehmann). Against the situationists Ramsey insists on the necessity of moral norms for the actualization of love and the maintenance of morally ordered social life. But he does not go into any substantial discussion of the social function of moral norms. His argument for the need of moral norms is carried on basically in terms of logical discussions of the general validity of moral rules and principles although he allows some logical room for act-agapism.

3. The Negative or Insufficient Treatment of the Social Dimensions of Ethics

We have examined the defects of the understanding of the situation and moral norms inherent in situationism and Ramsey's criticism of it. These defects lead them to neglect or insufficiently treat the social dimensions of ethics. These dimensions can be summed up in two major points: the ethical impact of social systems and structures, and social policy. Let us consider these two points in greater detail.

We have mentioned that the situationists tend to take the situation as an isolated decision-making moment and that Ramsey's criticism of them also does not give any serious attention to the social aspect of the situation. Their tendency to neglect the social aspect of the situation makes them fail to accord due appreciation to the significance of social systems and structures for corporate moral life. The consistent and equal or proportionate actualizations of moral ideas and values on the social level are rendered possible only through adequate social systems and structures. It follows that no adequate study of social ethics can be complete without considering the positive ethical function of social systems and structures in corporate moral life as well as the critical examination of their limits. Neither the situationists nor Ramsey goes into any exposition of the ethical impact of social systems and structures.

The defects mentioned above lead the situationists and Ramsey to neglect the ethical importance of social policies insofar as the situation ethics debate is concerned. The dynamic operation of social systems and structures must rely on the formulation and practice of social policies. Therefore, any adequate approach to social ethics should take the matter of social policies as seriously as social systems and structures. Robinson claims that situation ethics is by no means individual but has come to be formulated through engagement in the problems of social ethics. But he seems to take social ethics simply as engagement in social issues without considering the impact of social systems, structures, and policies upon their treatment. In his works before *Situation Ethics*, Fletcher gives serious concern for social problems and social policies, but his ethical discourse in this book moves away from this concern. Even his earlier concern for social policies does not take account of their relation to social systems and structures. Lehmann's ethics seeks the unity of church and society in terms of God's humanizing activity in the world. Moreover, his theology of God's humanization of whole humanity seeks an ethics of revolutionary social change. But his ethics does not take account of the ethical importance of social systems, structures, and policies.

Ramsey's criticism of the situationists also fails to correct the situationists' insufficient treatment of social policy and ethics. The governing consideration of his critique is given to the situationists' neglect of the role of moral norms arguing for the validity of moral rules and principles. This has narrowed down the dispute between situation ethics and norm ethics to the "norm-context debate" which disregards the social dimensions of ethics. Edward Leroy Long, Jr. puts it this way:

> The consequent discussion of differences between ethics of norms and ethics of situations has tended to become preoccupied with the internal methodology of choice rather than with the external questions of social policy.[10]

We can go so far as to say that the situation ethics debate has created a "new scholasticism" to use Sellers' expression. He puts the seriousness of this new scholasticism this way:

> The new scholasticism is not only a pity, it is a departure from a great tradition in American theology and ethics. In past eras, American divines were more venturesome, more ready to address themselves to large public questions. To cite only recent examples, we may mention the liberal theology and the Social Gospel at the end of the nineteenth century, and the American version of neo-orthodoxy as it was shaped by Reinhold Niebuhr, a profound public ethicist.[11]

Our foregoing criticsm of Ramsey does not mean that there is no concern for social pro-

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10) Edward Leroy Long, Jr., "Soteriological Implications of Norm," in *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics*, ed. by Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 268.
11) Sellers, *Public Ethics*, p. 183.

blems and policies in his ethics. He discusses the theories of the just war in the Christian tradition and the prevention of war in an atomic age in his work on war.[12] These issues are no doubt social problems and related to social policies. Moreover, his earlier book, *Basic Christian Ethics*, includes a chapter in which he discusses implications of Christian love for the formulation of social policies, although he does not account for their relation to social systems and structures.[13] But his criticism of situationism moves away from his earlier concern for social issues and policies in the book mentioned above.

We are living in an age which calls for radical change in ethical thinking. We are experiencing radical social change, the decline of ethical absolutism, and the erosion of all authorities. All these are challenging us not only to reassess the validity of existing moral norms but also to seek a fresh ethical approach. There is no doubt that situationism is a new thrust in the search for a new ethical approach. Despite its creative insights, those problems discussed thus far prevent it from making a contribution to the elaboration of constructive social ethics. In order to overcome these problems, it is necessary to grasp them clearly because we are ruled by them until we possess them in awareness. In what follows we examine in detail these problems by investigating the four theologians concerned.

B. A Further Exposition of the Principal Problems of the Situation Ethics Debate in Terms of an Analysis of the Major Theologians Related to the Debate

1. John A. T. Robinson

Robinson advocates situationism against legalism in a chapter entitled "The New Morality" in his *Honest to God*.[14] The many responses to that chapter led him to write three more lectures which form *Christian Morals Today*. He argues for an ethic of the spirit rather than of the letter. What matters, he says, is love and not laws. Love is more flexible and more demanding than any code of laws. Only love can meet the unique need of the particular person in the particular situation without losing its absolute validity. Robinson states:

> Love alone, because, as it were, it has a built-in moral compass, enabling it to 'home' intuitively upon the deepest need of the other, can allow itself to be directed completely by the situation. It alone can afford to be utterly open to the situation, or rather to the person in the situation, uniquely and for its own sake, without losing its direction or unconditionality.[15]

Thus Robinson tends to stress situational decisions under the direction of love alone

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12) See Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1961).

13) See Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), Chapter IX.

14) John A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), Chapter 6.

15) *Ibid.*, p. 115.

without mentioning any use of moral norms. This ethical posture can be categorized as "act-agapism" in William K. Frankena's terms.[16] Indeed, Robinson's ethical discussions reveal a strong impulse to "act-agapism." Love "is able to embrace an ethic of radical responsiveness, meeting every situation on its merits, with no prescriptive laws".[17] Or he holds that "if our eye is single, then love will find the way, its own particular way in every individual situation."[18]

But this is one side of Robinson's ethics. Another side is that he recognizes the need for moral norms and laws. In his earlier book he refers to the "guiding norms of love's response" regarding them as "the dykes of love in a wayward and loveless world".[19] Moreover, he goes so far as to say: "Such an ethic [the new morality] cannot but rely, in deep humility, upon guiding rules."[20] This view is stressed even more in his later book. He readily grants that any society needs laws, which Christians must help to formulate and reassess continuously. "A moral net there must be in any society. Christians must be to the fore in every age in helping to construct, criticize it, and keep it in repair."[21] Individuals likewise need such a net. "It [the new morality] does not in the least deny the need for a 'net'. No person, no society, can continue or cohere for any length of time without an accepted ethic."[22]

Thus Robinson recognizes the need for and the useful role of moral norms. But he refuses the absolute validity of all moral norms except the law of love. In his later book he says: "The deeper one's concern for persons, the more effectively one wants to see love buttressed by law. But if law usurps the place of love because it is safer, that safety is the safety of death."[23] This ethical posture can be categorized as "summary rule agapism" in Frankena's terms.[24]

The foregoing consideration of Robinson's ethics leads us to the conclusion that his ethical position is a mixture of "act-agapism" and "summary rule agapism." Thus Robinson's "new morality" turns out to be closer to the ethical tradition than it first appears to be. Indeed, he claims that the "old" and "new" morality are not antithetical but complementary in the first lecture of *Christian Morals Today*.[25] This ethical position of Robinson

16) William K. Frankena, "Love and Principle in Christian Ethics," in *Faith and Philosophy*, ed. by Alivn Plantinga (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Erdmans Publishing Co., 1964), p. 211.
17) Robinson, *Honest to God*, p. 115.
18) *Ibid.*, p. 112.
19) *Ibid.*, p. 118.
20) *Ibid.*, p. 119.
21) John A. T. Robinson, *Christian Morals Today* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), p. 18.
22) *Ibid.*, p. 12.
23) *Ibid.*, p. 26.
24) Frankena, "Love and Principle in Christian Ethics," in *Faith and Philosophy*, p. 212.
25) Robinson, *Christian Morals Today*, p. 10.

is to be taken seriously. He seeks a way in which the traditional ethics of norms and the ethics of situations can become complementary. On the one hand, he tries to overcome the legalism of the traditional ethics. On the other, he wants to retain the need for and the useful role of moral norms although he accords merely relative validity to them.

Despite its constructive insight, Robinson's ethics contains some problematic or insufficient points which should be corrected or extended. Moreover, these defective points make him fail to treat adequately the complementary relationship between the old and new morality. We shall examine these points in line with the principal problems of the situation ethics debate which we have already considered.

Let us examine first the problems of Robinson's understanding of the situation. The principal problem is that his strong emphasis upon the situational decision leads him to take the situation basically as the decision-making moment while giving insufficient attention to the social aspect of the situation and its impact upon man's moral life. Robinson apparently takes the situation as a decision-making moment when he says that love "is prepared to see every moment as a fresh creation from God's hand demanding its own and perhaps wholly unprecedented response."[26] The same view is expressed when he asserts that the guiding norms of love's response "must be defended . . . in terms of the fact that persons matter, and the deepest welfare of these particular persons in this particular situation matters, more than anything in the world."[27] This view of the situation is predominant in his ethical discourse.

But there is another aspect of Robinson's notion of the situation. His ethical discourse sometimes reveals his awareness of the social aspect of the situation although he tends to lay stress upon the decision-making moment. In his later book he often takes the situation as that of a society at large or a certain age. He writes:

The *content* of Christian morals has over the centuries changed considerably. And I believe that Christians should not have too troubled a conscience about the fact that *what* their brethren have believed to be right and wrong in different situations has differed, and still differs, widely.

He continues:

There is no one Christian social ethic, and even a short move in space or time reveals how limited is the reference even of the greatest moral theology. I yield to no one in my admiration for Dr. Emil Brunner's contribution to Christian ethical thinking, yet in his *Justice and the Social Order* an Englishman cannot help seeing peeping out from time to time the presuppositions of conservative, somewhat complacent *petit-bourgeois* Swiss Society.[28]

26) Robinson, *Honest to God,* p. 115.
27) *Ibid.,* p. 118.
28) Robinson, *Christian Morals Today,* p. 13.

In the quotation above, it is evident that Robinson's notion of situation implies that of an age or a society at large. He sometimes takes the situation also as ethos. "There is no such thing as *a* Christian ethic. The raw material of an ethic is provided by the ethos of a society or a century or a group."[29]

As the foregoing observation shows, Robinson sometimes takes the situation broadly as the social situation, which takes into consideration even the ethos of a society. But his consideration of the impact of the social aspect of the situation upon ethics is limited merely to his claim that the validity of morality and moral norms is relative to spatial and temporal change. He is never careful enough to account for the dialectical relationship between the moral agent's accountability to the larger community and his obligation to the demand of each concrete situation. He places stress one-sidedly on the importance of the latter.

Let us turn to Robinson's notion of moral norms. His concern for moral norms is focused upon their relative validity. In order to emphasize situational decisions against legalism, he stresses the relative nature of all moral norms except the principle of love. This view is expressed when he understands the moral precepts of Jesus as "parables of the Kingdom in its moral claims":

> The moral precepts of Jesus are not intended to be understood legalistically, as prescribing what all Christians must do, whatever the circumstances, and pronouncing certain courses of action universally right and others universally wrong. They are not legislation laying down what love always demands of every one: they are illustrations of what love may at any moment require of anyone. They are, as it were, parables of the Kingdom in its moral claims.[30]

The same view also can be found in his understanding of the Commandments as "God-given paradigms of love":

> The Sermon on the Mount does not say in advance, 'This is what in every circumstance or in any circumstance you must do', but 'This is the kind of thing which at any moment, if you are open to the absolute unconditional will of God, the Kingdom, or love, can demand of you' . . . 'The Commandments—both of the Decalogue and of the Sermon on the Mount—are God-given paradigms of love.[31]

But there is another aspect of Robinson's notion of moral norms. As we have already observed, he takes moral norms as "guiding norms" which function as the dykes of love. He also regards moral norms as "working rules" which function as guides to Christian conduct.[32] These definitions of the function of moral norms reveal his awareness of the social

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29) *Ibid.*, p. 14.
30) Robinson, *Honest to God*, pp. 110–11.
31) Robinson, *Christian Morals Today*, p. 30.
32) *Ibid.*, p. 16.

function of moral norms. His awareness of the social function of moral norms is explicitly expressed in these words: "Such an ethic [the new morality] canno but rely, in deep humility, upon guiding rules, upon the cumulative experience of one's own and other people's obedience."[33] The same view is expressed when he understands moral norms as the "bank of experience which gives us our working rules of 'right' and 'wrong,' and without them we could not but flounder."[34] Here Robinson is aware of not only the guiding function of moral norms but also the historical continuity of morality although he does not develop it further.

Despite his considerable awareness of the social function of moral norms, Robinson stops short of its full development. His notion of "guiding norms" or "working rules" delineates the social function of moral norms. But the formal delineation falls short of a full grasp of their positive social function. A full development of Robinson's notion of guiding norm or working rule requires a thoroughgoing analysis of the continuity and generality of morality that moral norms provide for. To be sure, this task must include the critical examination of the validity of norms. The problem of Robinson's understanding of moral norms is that he tends to become preoccupied with the demonstration of the relative validity of norms, neglecting the exposition of their positive social function. If he had paid careful attention to the continuity and generality of morality, he could have reassessed the validity of norms in such a way that the role of norms could be built into the elaboration of a constructive social ethics without falling into legalism. This could have led him to a successful development of the complementary approach to the old and new morality.

Finally, Robinson's insufficient account of the ethical implications of the social aspect of the situation and the function of moral norms leads him to fall short of a full grasp of social ethics. He defends the new morality against the charge that the new morality is individualistic. He argues that "moral decisions are inextricably corporate and social" as understood in terms of Christian ethics.[35] Moreover, he goes so far as to say that "most of those who are concerned with the emphases now labelled 'the new morality' have come to them through engagement in the problems of social ethics." He continues: "This is particularly true of professor Joseph Fletcher."[36] In the footnote Robinson indicates that his reference to Fletcher means his *Morals and Medicine*. However, the issues dealt with in the book are no doubt social problems, but he does not treat them on the level of social policies. Indeed, Fletcher himself says that his concern in this book "is deliberately held to the level of personal morality, insofar as it may be realistically abstracted from social

33) Robinson, *Honest to God,* p. 119.
34) *Ibid.,* p. 120.
35) Robinson, *Christian Morals Today,* p. 33.
36) *Ibid.*

justice and public morality.''[37] Only in his discussion of ''preventing sterilization'' he in passing goes into a brief account of a social policy, the compulsory sterilization by laws.''[38] Social problems are not sufficiently treated in terms of social ethics until they are considered on the level of social systems, structures, and policies.

2. Joseph Fletcher

Fletcher's formal definition of situation ethics is close to Robinson's position, the mixture of act-agapism and summary rule agapism. He regards love as the only absolute norm of ethics while according only relative validity to all other norms. He, like Robinson, recognizes, at least formally, the need for moral norms. In the first chapter of his *Situation Ethics* he distinguishes his situation ethics from both legalism and antinomianism. He says: ''A third approach, in between legalism and antinomianism, is situation ethics.''[39] Whereas legalism ''enters into every decision-making situation encumbered with a whole apparatus of prefabricated rules and regulations,'' antinomianism is ''the approach with which one enters into the decision-making situation armed with no principles or maxims, to say nothing of *rules*.''[40] He then goes on to define situation ethics as:

> The situationist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, and treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems.[41]

Thus Fletcher's formal definition of situation ethics no doubt recognizes the need for moral norms. Moreover, he refers to the function of moral norms as ''illuminators'' of moral problems as his above definition of situationism shows. In some other places he takes the role of moral norms as ''advisers'' for moral judgment.[42] But he is never very careful to expound the actual function of moral norms as ''illuminators'' or ''advisers.'' Furthermore, his actual ethical discourse tends to move away from his initial recognition of the need for moral norms. His strong emphasis upon the situational decision leads him to neglect his initial commitment to the need for moral norms. The governing concern of his ethical discourse is the demonstration of the relative validity of moral norms rather than the exposition of their positive function. Thus his ethics falls very close to act-agapism.

The initial purpose of Fletcher's situation ethics is to make ethics relevant to the new social situation of our time by overcoming the legalism of traditional ethics. But the strong

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37) Joseph Fletcher, *Morals and Medicine* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), p. 162.
38) *Ibid.*, p. 169.
39) Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 26.
40) *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 22.
41) *Ibid.*, p. 26.
42) Joseph Fletcher, ''Reflection and Reply,'' in *The* Situation Ethics Debate, ed. by Harvey Cox (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), p. 252.

tendency of his ethics to act-agapism fails to develop constructively his concern for moral innovation. We might go further and say that the predominance of act-agapism in his *Situation Ethics* leads him to move away from his interest in social ethics as shown in his earlier essays on sex, business management, taxation, and stewardship.[43] In order to extend the creative insight of Fletcher's situational ethical approach to constructive social ethics, the problematic points which lead his ethics to act-agapism need to be corrected. The first task of the corrective work of these defective points is to analyze them with greater clarity. We shall examine them in line with the three principal problems of the situation ethics debate.

Let us consider first Fletcher's notion of the situation. His situationism begins with passionate antilegalism asserting that the absolute validity of moral norms prevents the moral agent from making situational decisions in response to what love demands for the particular person in each concrete situation. To justify his insistence on situational decision, he is eager to demonstrate that moral norms can be changeable or breakable according to the unique demand of love in the particular situation. This leads him to take the situation as the decisional moment rather than the larger social situation.

In *Situation Ethics* Fletcher enumerates various exceptional cases: patriotic espionage by means of sex; the practice of abortion in a Nazi concentration camp; a Scottish woman who killed her crying baby to save the lives of a whole company; the abortion of a raped patient in a state hospital; and telling a lie out of pity and espionage in wartime. He wants to demonstrate that moral rules are breakable in such boundary situations. There is nothing wrong with his arguments as far as these cases are concerned. The problem is that his notion of the situation is too narrow and the time and space of relationships are extremely limited. This means that he tends to take the situation as an isolated particular moment and, therefore, does not develop the ethical impact of the larger social situation. Let us consider these two matters in more detail.

Fletcher's emphasis upon exceptional cases tends to take the situation as an isolated decision-making moment with limited interpersonal relationship. Doubtless there may be specific boundary situations in which we have to respond to the utterly unique demand of a specific moment. However, it is also true that in most occasions our ethical decisions are interwoven with and responsible for broad and social human relationships. James M. Gustafson puts it this way:

If the situation is to determine what love requires, it is terribly important how one understands his situation. Is it boy plus girl between 1 A.M. and 3 A.M. after a number of drinks in a motel

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43) These essays are collected in Joseph Fletcher, *Moral Responsibility* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967). Most of his essays in this book were published before *Situation Ethics* came out.

room who feel affection for each other stimulated by proper knowledge of erogenous zones? Or is it boy, responsible to others than the girl, and responsible to and for over a long period of time under a covenant of some sort, plus girl concerned not only for the present moment but for the past and future relationships as well, in a human community for whose vitality and order they have responsibility and which in turn has to seek its common good?[44]

Let us now turn to Fletcher's neglect of the larger social situation. Taking the situation as a decisional monent, he overlooks the significant impact of the social aspect of the situation upon ethics. For instance, it may be inevitable to tell a lie in boundary situations in wartime. However, this does not necessarily have to destroy the validity of "Thou shalt not lie"[45] in ordinary moral life. In other words, his argument for the breakability of "Thou shalt not lie" tends to destroy the necessity and effective role of the commandment in ordinary life. This holds true of all the exceptional cases mentioned above. The problem of Fletcher is that he tends to destroy affirmative generalities in ethics by negative particulars.

Fletcher's neglect of the impact of the social aspect of the situation upon ethics is expressed also in his identifying love with justice. Fletcher says: "Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else."[46] His simple identification of love with justice reveals that he fails to see the importance of social systems, structures, and policies for the realization of justice. The realization of "love distributed" calls for taking seriously the impact of social systems, structures, and policies upon the realization of justice. John C. Bennett says:

> In one chapter he [Fletcher] says: 'Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else.' What does it mean to speak of the distribution of love? Fletcher sees clearly that love must be prudent in seeking justice but I doubt if it is helpful to go on to say that justice is nothing else than love. If we do not accept Fletcher's simplification, we could have a more obvious place for ethical guidelines concerning structures of justice that would provide correctives for the judgments of the most loving.[47]

This is by no means to say that Fletcher totally disregards the prudence of seeking the distribution of love. He contends that he seeks this by a coalition of love with utilitarianism. He writes:

> Justice is love coping with situations where distribution is called for. On this basis it becomes plain that as the love ethic searches seriously for a social policy it must form a coalition with utilitarianism.[48]

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44) Harvey Cox, ed., *The Situation Ethics Debate* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), p. 80.
45) We shall develop further the validity of moral norms in ordinary moral life in Chapter V.
46) Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, p. 87.
47) Cox, ed., *The Situation Ethics Debate*, pp. 67–68.
48) Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, p. 95.

But he does not expound what he means by "a coalition with utilitarianism." He simply asserts it with no further explanation. Gustafson puts it this way: "When Fletcher moves from the interpersonal to social ethics he becomes a straight utilitarian. He does not argue his point; here, as elsewhere, he simply asserts it."[49]

The foregoing critique of Fletcher's understanding of the situation by no means implies that there is no social notion of the situation in his ethics. In the above mentioned essays in *Moral Responsibility*, he tends to take the situation as the larger social situation rather than the narrow decision-making moment. Let us examine this by considering his discussions of sex and Christian stewardship in those essays.

Fletcher asserts that the social reality of our time urges us to replace the old outmoded negative sex ethics with a new positive approach. He states:

> Our danger is that while technology (medical and industrial) makes intercourse easier, our moral *ability* to serve our ideals has not kept pace. The ideal no longer finds support in the "facts of life." This is what is called the moral lag, a religious and moral (not scientific) problem.[50]

He claims that in our time social competition penalizes early marriage and that "the postponement required by a lengthening period of training for career roles and functions pushes marriage farther and farther away from the biological pressure following puberty."[51] Here Fletcher's sex ethics does not simply seek to relativize moral rules for the reason of exceptional cases but he proposes to reconsider the traditional sex ethics itself in order to make it relevant to the social situation of our time.

Fletcher expresses the same view in his discussion of Christian stewardship.[52] According to him, American society today has graduated from scarcity to abundance. American affluent society has brought about increasing consumerism which is creating a ominous gap between private prosperity and public poverty. The development of technology has increased the gap between the growth of American gross national product and her employment capacity. Fletcher contends that the notion of Christian stewardship should be reconceived and reoriented to wrestle with these problems. This leads him to propose to reinterpret Christian stewardship in terms of "macroethics" not "microethics."[53] Considered in terms of macroethics, Christian stewardship no longer means merely private

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49) Cox, ed., *The Situation Ethics Debate*, p. 80.
50) Fletcher, *Moral Responsibility*, p. 91. The quotation is cited from his essay "A Moral Philosophy of Sex," published in 1953.
51) *Ibid.*, pp. 126–27. The quotation is cited from his essay "Ethics and Unmarried Sex" published in 1966, the year when *Situation Ethics* came out.
52) *Ibid.*, pp. 182–214.
53) Fletcher adopts these terms "macroethics" and "microethics" suggested by John Kenneth Galbraith's terminologies "macroeconomics" and "microeconomics" in *The Affluent Society*. See Fletcher's *Moral Responsibility*, p. 163.

offering, which for Fletcher is the old mode of stewardship in the age of economic scarcity. He contends that Chrstian stewardship as understood in terms of macroethics means an adequate taxation system, the just distribution which can solve the problem of distributing purchasing power and funding aimed at the balance between private and public expenditures.

But Fletcher's ethical discourse in *Situation Ethics* moves away from this earlier concern for the impact of the larger social situation on ethics. His essays after *Situation Ethics* do not show any change in his earlier position. At the end of *Moral Responsibility*, he wrote an essay entitled "Moral Responsibility." Here he refers to a "radical socialism."[54] But his socialism simply means "solidarism," a Buberian "personalism" which implies the treatment of the other as a person in I-Thou relationship. Even in his reflection on and reply to critical responses to his situationism, he still sticks to his earlier position held in *Situation Ethics*.[55]

Let us now turn to Fletcher's understanding of the moral norm. His arguments focus on his thesis that moral norms are not absolute but breakable in any situation if love can be realized better by doing so. Considered from his basic premise that love is the only ultimate norm, it is quite understandable that he lays stress upon the relativity of the validity of moral norms. But the problem is that he does not expound the function of moral norms while indulging in his arguments for their relative validity. As we have already observed, he holds that the situationist is "fully armed with ethical maxims of his community and its heritage." However, he hastens to add that "just the same he is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set them aside *in the situation* if love seems better served by doing so."[56] In "The New Morality" in *Commonweal*, his recognition of moral norms is expressed even more strongly. "The situationist enters into every decision-making situation armed with principles, just as the legalist does."[57] But he immediately says that the situationist is ready in any concrete case to "suspend, ignore, violate any principle" without any reference to the function of moral norms.[58] Fletcher does not correct his neglect of the positive function of moral norms even in his reflection on and reply to the criticisms of his situation ethics. In his "Reflection and Reply" at the end of *The Situation Ethics Debate*, Fletcher states:

I personally would adopt nearly all the norms or action-principles ordinarily held in Christian

54) Fletcher, *Moral Responsibility*, p. 233.
55) Fletcher, "Reflection and Reply," in *The Situation Ethics Debate*, pp. 249–64.
56) Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, p. 26.
57) Joseph Fletcher and Herbert McCabe, "Love is the Only Measure," *Commonweal*, 83 (January, 1966), 428.
58) *Ibid.*

ethics. I refuse, on the other hand, to treat their norms as idols—as divinely finalized. I can "take 'em or leave 'em," depending on the situation. Norms are advisers without veto power.[59]

Here he simply insists on the relative validity of moral norms without expounding what he means by the role of ethical maxims as "advisers." It is not at all clear how he makes use of moral norms for moral judgment and decision.

Fletcher's failure to underscore the necessity for moral norms could very well weaken the useful function of norms in ordinary moral life. To take the case of telling a lie, he states:

> But what if you have to tell a lie to keep a promised secret. Maybe you lie, and if so, good for you if you followed love's lead. . . . *The situationist holds that whatever is the most loving thing in the situation is the right and good thing.*[60]

Here he does not refer to the need for moral rules as guidelines as Robinson does. There is no foreseeable course to follow from one situation to another except the direction of love. It would appear at times that Fletcher attempts to justify his insistence on the relative validity at the expense of the useful function of moral norms in ordinary moral life. If one follows Fletcher's words regarding a lie, one has to decide whether to tell a lie from situation to situation by directly applying *agape* to each particular case.

The problem of Fletcher's understanding of moral norms is his neglect of their social function which provides for the continuity and generality of morality. He does not give any serious attention to the importance of the sustaining function of norms in corporate moral life. In a chapter of his *Morals and Medicine*, Fletcher deals with the problem of euthanasia.[61] Here he refers to the proposal of the United Nations for an amendment to the Declaration of Human Rights which would include "the right of incurable sufferers to voluntary euthanasia," which refers to "Article Five of the Declaration, which states that no one shall be subjected to torture."[62] His discussion no doubt involves the social function of moral norms that provides for normative prescription applicable to all. He is never very careful to develop it further. One looks in vain for this view of the function of moral norms in his *Situation Ethics*. Even in "Reflection and Reply," Fletcher shows no concern with this matter at all. Here he is simply obsessed with preventing his situation ethics from slipping back into legalism. He states: "To 'fill up' love with rules or laws is to slip back into a new form of legalism."[63] This view is expressed even more strongly with reference to Nicolas Berdyaev:

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59) Fletcher, "Reflection and Reply," in *The Situation Ethics Debate*, p. 252.
60) Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, p. 65.
61) Fletcher, *Morals and Medicine*, Chapter 6.
62) *Ibid.*, p. 188.
63) Fletcher, "Reflection and Reply," in *The Situation Ethics Debate*, p. 252.

The gospel morality of grace and redemption is the direct opposite of Kant's formula; . . . you must *not* act so that the principle of your action could become a universal law: you must always act individually, and everyone must act differently, the universal law is that every moral action should be unique and individual, i.e., that it should have in view a concrete living person and not the abstract good. Such is the ethics of love. [64]

Finally, Fletcher's defects in the understanding of the situation and moral norm prevent him from developing social policy and social ethics. We might go further and say that these defects lead him to move away from even his earlier concern for social policy and social ethics. In his discussion of euthanasia he refers to a law of the Euthanasia Society which defines the practice of legal euthanasia. [65] Here he is aware, consciously or unconsciously, that social issues are inextricably related to social policies. In his discussion of taxation and stewardship in *Moral Responsibility*, he touches on the ethical impact of social systems, structures, and policies when he says:

We cannot fulfill our stewardship any longer in the outmoded terms of scarcity or by any classical policy of sharing on a private offering basis. The human needs that cry aloud for stewardship are on the social scale and require socially structured and socially administered forms of response—chiefly, I suggest, a tax on opulence. Anything less than this is microethics, petty moralism. [66]

Fletcher is never very careful to develop further these ideas. In *Situation Ethics* his earlier concern for social problems are left untouched. In his essays after *Situation Ethics* he still adheres to the position held in that book, as we have already observed.

3. Paul Lehmann

Lehmann's ethic begins with the recognition of a social notion of the situation. He seeks an ethic that takes the church community seriously as the matrix of the Christians' moral life. He defines his Christian ethics as the ethics of *koinonia* which means the church community. For him, *koinonia* is the reality which "denotes the concrete result of God's specifically purposed activity in the world in Jesus Christ." [67] The fundamental thesis of his Christian ethics is the Christian's continuous living response to the divine activity, the purpose of which is "what God is doing in the world to make and to keep human life human." [68]

It is noteworthy that Lehmann's definition of the purpose of God's humanizing work includes not only the church community but also the society as a whole. His *koinonia* ethics

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64) *Ibid.,* p. 255.
65) Fletcher, *Morals and Medicine,* p. 199.
66) Fletcher, *Moral Responsibility,* p. 202.
67) Paul Lehmann, *Ethics in a Christian Context* (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 47.
68) *Ibid.,* p. 14.

is not directed exclusively to Christians. It calls for obedience to "God's activity to make men not Christians, but human."[69] This view is expressed even more explicitly in his discussions of the "political" implication of Christology and an ethical double standard between believers and unbelievers.

Thus Lehmann's *koinonia* ethics not only begins with the church community as the social matrix of the Christian's moral life but also seeks the common ground between church and society. Moreover, his theology of God's humanization shows a strong impulse to an ethics of social change for the realization of a more human society. From a theological viewpoint, these views are highly illuminating. However, we must point out that his interest in the social dimension of ethics, on the whole, remains a formal theological concern. His concern for social ethics does not seriously analyze the impact of social structures and systems upon ethics. No consideration of the social dimension of ethics is complete without taking into account social conditions including social structures and systems. To extend Lehmann's invaluable insights to a constructive social ethics, they need to be developed further taking into consideration social systems and policies.

The task of a full exposition of Lehmann's ideas requires filling gaps and extending insufficient points. There are several categories of the situation in his ethics. They are to be unified and developed further on a more adequate ground for social ethics. As we have often emphasized, the consideration of social policy and social ethics inextricably involves the social function of moral norms. Considered from the perspective of social ethics, it can be regarded as a noticeable flaw of his ethics that he tends to neglect the positive function of moral norms. We shall examine these matters in line with the three principal problems of the situation ethics debate.

We shall examine first Lehmann's understanding of the situation. The investigation of his notion of the situation may well be done in line with Gustafson's three distinctions of Lehmann's ethical context: (1) The context of what God is doing as the largest and most determinative theological one; (2) The context of *koinonia* or the Christian community; and (3) The particular situation in the world in which God is acting, and in which the Christian acts.[70]

The first context is that of what God has done and is doing in the world to make and to keep human life human. As we have already seen, Lehmann's notion of God's humanizing work is not directed exclusively to the Christian but to humanity as a whole. This is expressed even more explicitly when he understands God's humanizing work in terms of

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69) Shinn, "The New Wave in Christian Thought," p. 250.
70) James M. Gustafson, "A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," in *New Theology No. 3*, ed. by Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), pp. 78–79.

"political activity." Considering God as "politician" he defines God's humanizing activity as "making or doing politics."[71]

The second context is, as we have already seen, confined to the Christian community, namely the *koinonia*. It is the community of people of God from and in which Christians discern the answer to the question: "What am I, as a believer in Jesus Christ and as a member of his church, to do?"[72] He understands the Christian *koinonia* as a "laboratory, of maturity" or "the foretaste and the sign in the world that God has always been and is contemporaneously doing what it takes to make and to keep human life human."[73]

These two categories of Lehmann's context raise the question, how to relate his *koinonia* to society. That is to say, there remains to be solved the question of how to relate the foretaste and sign to society as a whole. He seeks the solution of this problem in terms of a "theology of messianism" which includes three Christological affirmations: "the doctrine of the trinity, of the threefold office of Christ, and of the Second Adam and the Second Advent."[74] In his discussion of the threefold office of Christ, he expounds its bearing upon God's humanizing activity in the world. Here he maintains: (1) The doctrine of the three offices of Christ has a directing bearing upon the life of the believer; (2) The doctrine unites the church and the world in the ongoing story of salvation; (3) The doctrine safeguards a *koinonia* ethics against the peril of a double standard.[75]

He develops further the third view in a chapter entitled "The Crucial Difficulty of 'a Double Standard' " of *Ethics in a Christian Context*. He suggests two provisional possibilities to overcome an ethical double standard between believers and unbelievers. The first suggestion is the common involvement of believers and unbelievers in striving for the fullfilment of the authentic humanity of every human being.[76] The second suggestion is that unbelievers also can be included in the whole panorama of God's divine economy. Lehmann argues for this possibility by taking recourse to John Calvin's notion of "general power of the Spirit" and Luther's idea of the *"deus absconditus*, the hidden character of the divine activity."[77] Thus Lehmann's suggestions for overcoming an ethical double standard between believers and unbelievers remain formal theological considerations.

The third context is narrower than the former two. His notion of God's dynamic activity leads Lehmann to put weight on man's freedom and independence to decide and act in the particular situation. Lehmann emphasizes so strongly the importance of the unique im-

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71) Lehmann, *Ethics in a Christian Context*, p. 85.
72) *Ibid.*, p. 25.
73) *Ibid.*, p. 101.
74) *Ibid.*, p. 105.
75) *Ibid.*, pp. 116–17.
76) *Ibid.*, pp. 154–55.
77) *Ibid.*, pp. 155–59.

peratives of the particular situation that his ethical discourse tends to take the situation as a momentary decision-making one. His emphasis on the particular situation will become clearer as we consider his understanding of moral principles.

This does not mean to say that Lehmann's notion of man's creative response to God's ongoing work of humanization is limited merely to the unique claim of each concrete situation. As his political concept of God reveals, his notion of man's creative participation in God's ongoing humanizing work includes the change of society as a whole. This view is expressed even more explicitly in his essay "Christian Theology in a World in Revolution."[78] Here he contends that theologians should shift from "looking at life" to "living it," urging Christians to become God's messianic people in their commitment to the messianic presence of Christ.[79] Thus he calls for Christians' participation in the dynamics of social change. Despite the theological significance of Lehmann's calling for Christians' participation in revolutionary social change in their response to God's humanizing work, we must point out that the humanization of the world cannot be achieved apart from the useful function of social systems and structures, and social policies, although their validity needs to be reassessed continually.

Let us now examine Lehmann's notion of moral norms. Like Robinson and Fletcher, he is also passionate in his distress at any sign of legalism. For Lehmann, what matters is God's humanizing work, not moral principles. He contends that legalism is incompatible with the freedom of God's dynamic humanizing activity in the world and man's freedom to respond to it depending on the concrete present. His emphasis on the dynamics of God's activity and man's response to it in the particular situation leads him to characterize Christian ethics as a contextual one which is, he insists, essentially different from legalistic ethics or "absolutist ethics." He holds that what is determinative of moral decision is the context and not principles. His contextual ethics "leads relentlessly to highly particularized response and actions, always sensitive to the historical present rather than to generalizations about what ought to be."[80] This leads him to be more concerned for the relative nature of moral norms than their positive function.

He is not unaware of the significance of moral principles for moral life. He recognizes the role of moral principles or laws when he sees their function in "exposing crucial danger spots affecting human relations" or "the direction of humanization." He states:

The ethical significance of law, however, is functional, not normative. No law can be the

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78) Paul Lehmann, "Christian Theology in a World in Revolution," in *Openings for Marxist-Christian Dialogue*, ed. by Thomas Ogletree (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1969), pp. 98–139.
79) *Ibid.*, pp. 99–101, 137.
80) Gustafson, "A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," in *New Theology No. 3*, pp. 79–80.

norm or criterion of action in accordance with the will of God. Law orders human relations by exposing crucial danger spots affecting human relations and also indicates the direction of humanization.[81]

He also understands the function of moral principles in terms of "maxim."[82] These definitions of moral norms seem to reveal his awareness of the social function of norms that provides for the generality of morality. But he does not expound this sustaining function of moral norms and their significance for corporate moral life. He instead emphasizes that Christian behavior cannot be generalized because of God's ongoing humanizing activity. He writes:

> The fact is that the dynamics of the divine behavior in the world exclude both an abstract and a perceptual apprehension of the will of God. There is no formal principle of Christian behavior because Christian behavior cannot be generalized. And Christian behavior cannot be generalized because the will of God cannot be generalized.[83]

Moreover, his statement at times seems to withdraw his recognition of the significance of moral principles. For instance, he maintains:

> For the Christian, the environment of decision, not the rules of decision, gives to behavior its ethical significance . . . consequently Christian ethics in the tradition of the Reformation seeks to provide an analysis of the environment of decision in which the principal foundations and perceptual directives of behavior are displaced by *contextual foundations and parabolic directives.* In a word, *the environment of decision is the context for the ethical reality of conscience.*[84]

The problem of Lehmann's understanding of moral norms is that he fails to accord due appreciation to their sustaining function, while stressing one-sidedly their relative validity. The truth of the matter is to seek a balance between the sustaining function of norms and the relativity of their validity. If Lehmann had taken seriously the ethical significance of the continuity and generality of morality secured by moral norms, he could have drawn an adequate conclusion in line with his awareness of the social function of norms mentioned above.

Finally, let us examine Lehmann's ideas of social ethics. We have earlier observed his two suggestions for overcoming the problem of a double standard between believers and unbelievers. Before proposing his own suggestions, he criticizes and rejects theological attempts to relate the behavior of Chriistians to that of non-Christians in terms of natural

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81) Lehmann, *Ethics in a Christian Context,* pp. 146–47.
82) *Ibid.,* p. 77.
83) *Ibid.*
84) *Ibid.,* p. 347.

law and middle axioms (John C. Bennett). [85] He refuses the attempt to overcome the problem by means of natural law for the reason that it obscures or surrenders the Christian factors. On the other hand, he rejects Bennett's theory of middle axioms for the reason that it unduly seeks to solve the problem by means of the clarification of common moral principles which Christians share with non-Christians and their application to concrete situations. He claims that such an attempt is ethically unreal because "ethics is a matter not of logic but of life." [86] This leads him to argue that the formation of social policy is to be sought in terms of man's response to God's humanizing work in the world, not generai moral principles.

> 'The good of the neighbor' and 'the world as we know it' acquire *ethical* significance not from the attempt to formulate, to clarify, and to apply ethical principles but from what God is doing in the world to make and to keep human life human.

He continues:

> Circumstances are the instruments of ethical behavior. Whether circumstances serve behavior in the aggregate form of a social policy or as *ad hoc* actions, the *ethical* factor in behavior is provided not by a rational principle but by the *sign character* of the behavior. [87]

Lehmann thus contends that social policy must be established by man's sensitivity to God's humanizing work. There is no question that his idea of God's humanization can function as the symbol of the humanization of the world insofar as Christians are concerned. Nevertheless, we err if we fail to see the significance of some fundamental moral principles such as the principles of justice for the formulation of social policy. It is improbable to shape just social policies by drawing directly on the principle of love without the guide of the principles of justice.

The foregoing criticism of Lehmann's view on the formation of social policy holds for his ethics of social change. Even an ethics of revolutionary social change does not seek the absence of social structures and systems since man's corporate life cannot be maintained without them. Older systems and structures pass away, and new systems and structures come into being. This implies that we cannot do away with these systems and structures although they alter as the social situation changes. The creation of new social systems and structures cannot be considered apart from the principles of justice. It follows that even an ethics of social change should take seriously social systems and structures as well as such fundamental moral principles as the principles of justice and freedom.

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85) *Ibid.*, pp. 148–54.
86) *Ibid.*, p. 152.
87) *Ibid.*

4. Paul Ramsey

Ramsey is one of the most ardent critics of situation ethics. But his earlier position in *Basic Christian Ethics* appears to come very close to that of situationism. In a chapter entitled "Christian Liberty: An Ethics Without Rules," he strongly emphasizes Jesus' and Paul's freedom and independence from legalism. But in the years since writing that volume, he has reconsidered the place of rules in ethics. He is clear that only love is the source and power of Christian ethics, not rules. But he insists that love requires rules. Against situationism he argues for the necessity and useful role of rules.

Ramsey's emphasis on the role of rules can be seen already in his work on war.[88] In the first chapter of the book he insists on the requirement of principles in socio-political ethics. He contends that right means to the goals which love demands are to be sought in accordance with some fundamental principles. In the *agape*-ethics in Protestant ethics today political decisions, Ramsey says, are made on the basis of calculation which merely takes account of future consequences seeking the lesser evil or the greater good. This leads him to require "an ethics precipitating some principled judgment about means that are permitted or prohibited."[89] He proposes to describe such an understanding of Christian morality as "faith effective through in-principled love."[90] Thus, he takes the position of rule-governed love-ethics.

Ramsey's concern for the significance of moral norms is fully developed in his work on the critical study of situation ethics. In this book he assails Robinson, Fletcher, and Lehmann, arguing for the necessity of rules and principles in ethics. Adopting William K. Frankena's four logical types of agapism, he defines Robinson's ethics as modified agapism, Fletcher's ethics as an extreme act-agapism, and Lehmann's ethics as act-*koinonia* ethics. Defining thus their ethics as act-agapism or modified act-agapism, he attacks their neglect of the role of the moral norm. He holds that theologians who neglect rules in their ethics are thoughtless and emotional.[91] He goes so far as to say that theologians who neglect rules are "simply deceiving themselves and playing tricks with their readers."[92]

As for his own position, Ramsey says that it belongs to Frankena's fourth type of agapism, a combination of act-agapism and rule-agapism. He also suggests that he would not refuse even "mixed agapism," the combination of agapism and non-agapism, if it would contribute to elaborating a better system of Christian ethics. His position can be defined as "combination-agapism" or "mixed-agapism." His combination-agapism allows a place for act-

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88) Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience*, Chapter One "Protestant Ethics Today," pp. 3–14.
89) *Ibid.*, p. 14.
90) *Ibid.*
91) Paul Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 5.
92) *Ibid.*, p. 4.

agapism. Indeed, he upholds "the freedom of *agape* both to act through the firmest princi-ples and to act, if need be, without them."[93] Although his governing concern is to em-phasize the necessity of rules and principles against the stream of an act-only method, he recognizes exceptions to rules.

Ramsey's ethical position is a counterpart of that of Robinson. We have observed that Robinson profits very little from the old morality although he claims that the old and new morality are complementary. On the contrary, Ramsey's combination-agapism profits very little from the new morality, according undue appreciation to the old morality. As we have already mentioned, Ramsey allows a place for act-agapism. But his overemphasis upon the importance of moral norms tends to disregard even the constructive aspect of situationism. His strong stress upon the validity of moral norms fails to accord due appreciation to the situationists' ideas for moral innovation. His ethical approach may well work in the normal situation, but it is not so helpful in coping with the changing social situation.[94]

What leads Ramsey to this failure is that he falls short of a full understanding of the im-pact of the larger social situation upon ethics and the social function of moral norms. We might go further and say that Ramsey falls in large measure into the same trap in which his foes are caught in his understanding of the situation and moral norms. His criticism of situationism moves away from his earlier concern for social issues and ethics. We shall examine these defective points in line with the three principal problems of the situation ethics debate.

Let us consider first Ramsey's notion of the situation. He criticizes Fletcher's momentary notion of the situation insisting on the generality and continuity in moral conduct.

> Since there are only instantaneities, there can be no generalizations from moral choices made in the past that might be helpful to future decisions. One lives wholly within the momentary situa-tion. Therefore moral decisions must be impromptu if they are to accord with actual life.[95]

Ramsey's criticism of Fletcher's momentary notion of the situation is sound. Moreover, his insistence on the importance of the continuity and generality in moral con-duct should be taken seriously. But Ramsey also fails to develop fully these instructive ideas which are significant for communal moral life.

Ramsey discusses further his insistence on the ethical importance of the generality and continuity in moral conduct in terms of the structures and practices of life.

> There are structures of life into which we are called; and practices into which every man is born who ever was born. Into the rightfulness of these things and the specifiable requirements of love,

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93) *Ibid.,* p. 107.
94) We shall develop further the notion of the normal situation in Chapter V.
95) Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics,* p. 146.

if anything ever counts for love, must be our inquiry.[96]

Furthermore, Ramsey argues for the requirement of these structures and practices in terms of the "Law," "Ordinances," or "God's covenant." He states:

> The idea that one has at his disposal only summary principles is a mistake one makes while doing ethics. It is a mistake one makes while preaching the gospel without preaching the gospel contained in the Law and Ordinances.[97]

Furthermore, he says:

> What are we to be as the creatures of God's ordinances, to be in being-with one another in the communities *we live*? not What are we to do occasionally, frequently, or "generally"? There may be in our creation traces of our creation toward *steadfast* covenant, toward the image of Christ.[98]

These ideas of Ramsey are theologically very illuminating. However, we must point out that the full exposition of the generality and continuity in moral conduct requires a thoroughgoing analysis of the sustaining function of moral norms in corporate moral life and a critical assessment of the limits of their validity. Seen in this perspective, Ramsey's idea of the continuity and generality in moral conduct still remains a formal theological concern.

Let us now turn to Ramsey's understanding of moral norms. In *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics*, he investigates the situationists' notion of moral norms by taking recourse to Frankena's four categories of agapism as we have already observed. Since Frankena's concept of rules as related to these four categories is purely logical, Ramsey's criticism of the situationists' notion of moral norms is also carried on in purely logical terms. Consequently, Ramsey does not give any serious attention to the social function of moral norms.

Ramsey's neglect of the social function of moral norms can be seen also in his discussion of exceptions to rules. In his essay entitled "The Case of the Curious Exception," in *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics*, he discusses in detail exceptions to principles and rules. In *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics*, he makes the distinction between the general rule and the summary rule. But his distinction here is purely formal. In the essay mentioned above he discusses the nature of the moral norm with greater clarity. He makes clearer the difference between the general rule and the summary rule by distinguishing between "principles" and "rules." He says: "In contrast to principles governing or regulating conduct, rules would be particular *directives* of an action prescribing or proscribing a *definite* action."[99] This distinction is a relative one. The same case can be considered in terms of "principle"

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96) *Ibid.,* pp. 164–65.
97) *Ibid.,* p. 165.
98) *Ibid.,* p. 164.
99) Paul Ramsey, "The Case of the Curious Exception," in *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics,* ed. by Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 74.

as well as "rule." To take the prohibition "Ye shall not commit adultery" as an example, he takes it as "principle" as well as "rule."

To make this distinction clearer, it seems to be useful to mention that Ramsey proposes to use the expression "defined-action principle (or moral-*genus*-terms) for the "principles" and "definite-action rule" (or moral-*species*-terms) for the "rules."[100] From this distinction, it follows that he must presuppose more general principles. In fact, Ramsey distinguishes moral norms into four categories: ultimate norms (agape, utility, self-realization, etc.); general principles (the principle of benevolence, the fidelity or faithfulness of human relationship, etc.); defined-action principles; and definite-action rules. He does not go into any further discussion of the first two categories. He simply holds that our moral judgments and decisions pass from the most general principles to the more specific rules. His governing concern is to clarify the last two categories in order to seek a further analysis of the meaning of exceptions to principles and rules.

Let us pursue further Ramsey's discussion of exception. His discussion is quite complicated. To avoid repeating his lengthy discussion, we shall try to summarize it changing considerably the order of his argument. But we shall be careful to keep our summary in line with what his argument asserts and implies. We shall use the prohibition "We shall not commit adultery," to summarize his argument with greater clarity. According to his discussion, the prohibition can be taken as either "defined-action principle" or "definite-action rule." To relate the distinction between "defined-action principle" and "definite-action rule" to exceptions, their meaning can be taken differently according as whether they are considered in terms of the former or the latter. Considered in terms of the former, exceptions can be regarded as a qualification of the meaning of marital fidelity. Considered in terms of the latter, on the other hand, the *adultery* of the prohibition can be taken to have a precise, literal, physiological meaning.[101]

In line with the foregoing distinction between "defined-action principles" and "definite-action rules," Ramsey investigates Fletcher's case of Mrs. Bergmeier's "sacrificial adultery."[102] She was confined by the Russians in a concentration camp in the Ukraine. She was needed by her husband and their children to reknit them as a family in that dire situation of hunger, chaos, and fear. There was a regulation that a woman inmate "would be returned to Germany as a liability" if she was pregnant or became pregnant. There was no other way she could rejoin her family unless she became pregnant. She asked a friendly guard to impregnate her, so that she could be released to rejoin her family in Berlin. She did

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100) *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75.
101) *Ibid.*, pp. 87–88.
102) Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, pp. 164–65.

that and happily rejoined her family. When little Dietrich was born, "they loved him more than all the rest, in the view that little Dietrich had done more for them than anybody."[103] Fletcher uses this case to justify an exception to the prohibition of adultery.

Ramsey's investigation of this case can be roughly summarized as follows. Mrs. Bergmeier's action can be justified in three different ways: (1) as an exception falling outside the prohibition; (2) as a specific case exempted from the prohibition; and (3) as a qualification within marital fidelity. The first, taking the prohibition as definite-action rule, holds that the prohibition is a "maxim" or "guideline" to which there are unique, unrepeatable cases justified in each case by direct appeal from the prohibition to one's ultimate norm (the principle of *agape* to take the case of Fletcher's). What must be noted in this first justification is that one sets aside the prohibition by making exceptions falling outside it. This is the view which act-agapists or summary rule agapists take.

The second, taking the prohibition as definite-action rule, agrees that her action can be justified, but as a case falling under a further or closer definition of the prohibition by admitting a class of actions exempted from the rule that has up to now been known to govern the marriage practice. What must be noted in this second justification is that an exception is a kind of action theoretically repeatable and perhaps actually repeated, not unique, unrepeatable. This implies that making an exception is not arbitrary but deciding a principle that we must do the same thing under similar circumstances. This means that allowing an exception to a rule is to define it more closely by incorporating an exempting class of actions into it. To take the case of the prohibition of adultery, we can define it more closely by incorporating the exempting case of Mrs. Bergmeier's action as follows: We shall not commit adultery unless a woman is in a concentration camp where regulations are that only pregnant women are let go, when her family imperatively needs her, and there is no other recourse.

The third, taking marital fidelity as a defined-action principle, regards her action as implied already in the meaning of marital fidelity. That is to say, her violation of the prohibition is taken as a specification of the meaning of the general principle governing the marriage relationship, i.e., marital fidelity. Considered in this third justification, her action is not taken as committing adultery, but it is justified as a qualification within the meaning of marriage fidelity. In this case, "adultery" is not taken as the literal, physiological sexual intercourse outside the marriage partner, but as a fundamental violation of the marriage fidelity.[104]

Our foregoing consideration of Ramsey's analysis of exception shows that he argues for

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103) *Ibid.*, p. 165.
104) Ramsey, "The Case of the Curious Exception," in *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics,* pp. 83–92.

the validity of moral norms clearly and convincingly. By a penetrating analysis of the meaning of exception he wants to demonstrate that creative ethical thinking does not necessarily fall into an act-only method, and that reasoning in ethics does not necessarily entail legalism. He writes:

> This explains our contemporary penchant for escape-clauses or exception-generating criteria as the only way to introduce creativity and sensitivity into the moral life. If the breadth and depth and flexibility of good moral reason is lost from view, then all that once passed for rationality is bound to seem a cruel master. Anyone antecedently persuaded that rationality entails "managerial" spirit will dismiss the logic of good moral reasoning as a straitjacket, or anyway a "legalism." Anyone antecedently persuaded that orderly reasoning means only an external technical reason or that this must inevitably result in forcing flesh-and-blood human decisions into pre-arranged categories is bound to reject rationality as such and to replace it by some form of voluntarism. Such a mind has simply lost touch with the full range of moral reason.[105]

Despite these merits, there is no noticeable change as far as Ramsey's neglect of the social function of moral norms is concerned. It is true that his distinction of moral norms into four categories is helpful for clarifying further how general rules and summary rules are related. But his analysis of exceptions stops short of a grasp of their full implication. Certainly, exceptions can imply more than Ramsey's analysis of them. No analysis of exceptions can be complete without considering the validity of moral norms in its relation to the larger social situation.

Finally, let us examine the elements of social ethics in Ramsey's ethics. As we have already mentioned, his critique of situationism shows his awareness of the importance of the generality and continuity in moral conduct. But the defects in his understanding of the situation and moral norms prevent him from developing further these constructive ideas. Moreover, these defects lead his critical study of situationism to move away from his earlier concern for social issues and ethics. Let us consider these matters in more detail.

Ramsey discusses the impact of Christian love upon social policies in a chapter entitled "Christian Love in Search of a Social Policy," in *Basic Christian Ethics*. Here he argues that Christian love already possesses certain definite implications for social policy and an adequate social ethics can in large measure be drawn from within the norm of love alone. But this does not mean that one can draw social policies directly out of this norm alone without need of searching elsewhere. On the contrary, he contends that Christian love can make use of non-Christian ethics founded on philosophical insights or the findings of social science since "social policy has to be formulated in any case in realistic adjustment to the concrete factors in any given situation."[106] But he takes this position with the condition

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105) *Ibid.*, pp. 92–93.
106) Ramsey; *Basic Chairtian Ethies*, p. 342.

that love remains the controlling partner in its alliance with non-Christian ethics. He says: "while Christian love cannot get along without seeking to find from any source the best possible social ethics, such love remains *dominant* and *free* in any partnership it enters."[107]

He extends the same view to the impact of Christian love upon the "just ordering" of human life.[108] He holds that "biblical justice" when it begins to establish some order, can make use of any of ideas or norms for determining "worldly justice" which happen to be convincing.[109] But he admits the alliance of Christian love with non-Christian ethics only insofar as love can remain dominant and free. He makes this point clearer by distinguishing between "alliance" or "coalition" and "concordat." "While Christian love makes alliance or coalition with any available sources of insight or information about what should be done, it makes *concordat* with none of these."[110]

In his work on war Ramsey analyzes the conduct of war in the light of the doctrine of the just war, the Christian understanding of war in terms of Christian *agape*. We have already observed that he takes the position of "in-principled love" ethics. Policy decisions are to be made in accordance with some fundamental principles which enable them to adopt right means to the goals. The same holds true for his analysis of the just conduct of war. He argues that the just conduct of war is never correctly understood "through prudence teleologically oriented toward ends only."[111] He contends that there must be the criteria drawn from Christian faith and love according to which the conduct of warfare is taken as right or wrong in itself. He proposes that policy decisions on war must find the principles in the Christian doctrine of their just war. Thus he deals with the impact of Christian love upon the just conduct of war.

In his criticism of situation ethics Ramsey's earlier concern for social issues and policies is reduced to the formal insistence upon the importance of the generality and continuity in moral conduct. At time he uses terminology which reveals his concern for the social elements of ethics. For instance, he often refers to "social morality" of "social ethics." He states:

> This suggests that only some form of rule-agapism, and not act-agapism, can be consistent with the elaboration of a Christian's social responsibilities. No *social morality* ever was founded, or ever will be founded, upon a situational ethics.[112]

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107) *Ibid.*, p. 343.
108) *Ibid.*, p. 345.
109) *Ibid.*
110) *Ibid.*, p. 344.
111) Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience.* p. 8.
112) Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics,* p. 20. Italics mine.

The quotation above is the conclusion of Ramsey's criticism of the "essay by a group of Friends" entitled "Towards a Quaker View of Sex" in his *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics*. Here Ramsey merely contends that social morality can be elaborated only on some form of rule-agapism.

In another place in the book mentioned above Ramsey says:

> The possibility of securing the minimum moral foundations of a *social ethics* (if these do not devolve from love itself) by recognizing some God-given structures amid the relationship into which we are called is likewise passed over.[113]

This quotation is Ramsey's criticism of Robinson's agape-situational assertion that we can discern what we ought to do in every individual situation with the direction of love alone. Here he simply asserts that the significance of God-given structures for social ethics is to be noted.

It is most unfortunate that his critique of situationism moves away from his earlier concern for social ethics and policy. It seems that his departure from his earlier concern for social ethics is no accident but due to the neglect of the ethical impact of the social aspect of the situation and the function of moral norms. The seriousness of this defect seems to show up in his more recent work on medical ethics. Here he provides many useful points to deal with the problems of medical ethics, but one looks in vain for any critical examination of the present medical system in America. One may wonder why he does not apply his earlier instructive ideas of the policy of social justice to his study of medical ethics.[114] One of the major themes of Ramsey's study of medical ethics is to treat the patient as a person. It is to be noted that the treatment of the patient as a person is in greater measure affected by a given medical system and its operation.

II. AN EXPOSITION OF MAN'S SOCIALITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD

In the critical analysis of the three major situationists and their critic Ramsey, we have observed that they neglect or insufficiently grasp the social aspect of the situation and the function of moral norms. We have also observed that their understanding of the situation

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113) *Ibid.,* p. 33.
114) See Paul Ramsey, *The Patient as Person* (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1970).

and the norm prevent them from extending the elements of social ethics in their ethical thoughts to a constructive development. Thus it is necessary to seek a way in which these defects can be corrected and the social elements of their ethics can be developed constructively. It is our contention that man's sociality is a useful conceptual instrument for this corrective and constructive task.

In this chapter we shall expound man's sociality and its effect upon his moral conduct as a groundwork for a further critique and a constructive development of the three principal problems of the situation ethics debate. In order to do these tasks, we shall introduce first the necessity and usefulness of the consideration of man's sociality for a critique and constructive reformulation of these problems. Secondly, we shall expound man's sociality and its effect upon the moral agent including his moral knowledge, judgment, and decision in the light of Peter L. Berger's sociology of knowledge. Finally, we shall develop further the effect of society upon the moral agent by analyzing the process of social effect upon the knowledge and judgment of the individual in the light of Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of the Social World.

A. The Failure to do Justice to Man's Sociality in the Situation Ethics Debtae

1. The Significance of Man's Sociality for Ethics and the Insufficient Treatment of It in the Situation Ethics Debate

We have earlier mentioned that moral action is ultimately a personal decision in a given moment, but the decision-making moment is a component part of the larger social situation[1] This matter has touched on a fundamental problem of moral decision: the relationship between man's intentionality and sociality or between human creativity and social conditioning. This problem is one of the most perplexing ethical questions which any adequate ethical approach should account for. We shall discuss this problem in greater detail in Chapter III. At this point, let us simply mention that an adequate ethical approach should be based on a balance between man's sociality and intentionality. In the present chapter our governing concern is an exposition of man's sociality and its impact upon moral judgment and decision.

Before going into an analysis of man's sociality and its ethical implications, let us consider the significance of man's sociality for ethics and the neglect or insufficient treatment of it in situation ethics. Man's existence is a paradox of human initiative and social determination. On the one hand, human existence is in a large measure socially determined. On the other hand, human initiative constitutes new meaning and possibility in social process,

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1) See above, pp. 6–7.

although man's creative work is related to a given cultural and social milieu. The para-doxical relationship between creative self and social self can very well be a temptation to be preoccupied with one of the two neglecting the significance of the other. When an ethi-cal approach lays stress on man's intentionality, it may tend to neglect the impact of man's sociality upon ethics as is the case with Kantian ethics based on the autonomy of man's free will. On the other hand, when weight is placed upon man's sociality, society is taken as moral reality as is the case with Emil Durkheim. In the situation ethics debate due appreciation is not accorded to the ethical importance of man's sociality. Let us consider this matter in more detail.

Man's moral action always takes place within a social sphere. Even man's creative work, which breaks through the old with radical novelty, takes place through participation in a human community. Gustafson puts it this way:

> Human creative achievement takes place within the patterns of life in which persons are related to each other, whether one is thinking of biological procreation, development of new forms of social organization, novel patterns of art and music or scientific and technological developments. Creative work is related to the past in dependence upon it, as well as in rebellion against it.[2]

It is true that the creative act is achieved through the rejection and transformation of old patterns, but this by no means implies that creativity takes place out of nothing. "Novel forms are not de novo forms; they are creative responses to patterns that have been given."[3] In a word, creative activity is a communal enterprise. This leads Gustafson to stress the ethical importance of the continuities of life in man's communal life. "The continuities need to be stressed in an age that is preoccupied with finding discontinuities and with celebrating the novel."[4] He goes further and says theologically that "communal life is a means by which God sustains human existence in the world."[5]

Man's moral life within a social sphere also implies that the moral subject is in a large measure shaped by communal values and ideas, and the form of his action is greatly governed by the social structure in which action takes place. Moral action is also governed by the patterns of human relationships which are relatively set by the contemporary social structure.[6] We may rebel against existing patterns of life when they are oppressive, functioning counter to human life. But the rejection of the oppressive patterns does not mean that it seeks the absence of patterns. It seeks new and better patterns.

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2) Gustafson, *The Church as Moral Decision-maker*, p. 67.
3) *Ibid.*, p. 68.
4) *Ibid.*, p. 67.
5) *Ibid.*, p. 68.
6) For an account of the impact of the social structure upon moral action, see Gustafson's essay "Patterns of Christian Social Action," in his *The Church as Moral Decision-maker.*

Neither the situationists nor Ramsey pay any serious attention to the ethical implications of man's sociality as understood in terms of our foregoing observation. Robinson's notion of the social origin and function of moral norms reveals certain awareness of the ethical implication of man's sociality, but he does not develop it further. Fletcher's discussion in *Situation Ethics* does not pay any attention to this matter. His earlier concern for social ethics does not account for it either. Lehmann's discussion of a double standard between believers and unbelievers remains a theological concern, as we have observed earlier. His ethics for social change is concerned with the change of society rather than an analysis of the impact of society upon ethics. Ramsey's insistence on the ethical importance of the generality and continuity in moral conduct touches on the ethical implications of man's sociality, but he is never very careful to develop these ideas. His earlier concern for the implications of Christian love for social policies takes seriously the impact of the concrete factors in a given social situation upon the formulation of social policies. Moreover, his discussion of human rights argues that "human rights cannot be fully analyzed as if they pertained to the individual apart from society."[7] But he does not extend these instructive ideas to the analysis of the ethical implications of man's sociality as understood in our own terms.

Wilford O. Cross gives some important suggestions which are helpful for the reconsideration of situation ethics in the light of the ethical implications of man's sociality. He points to the need for developing the social implications of situationism to overcome its personalistic tendency. He says: "The social implications of situationism call for development, for it tends to a one-to-one personalistic basis."[8] According to Cross, "moral attitudes determining decisions are bundles entwining opinions, habits, and attitudes."[9] He understands the social elements determining moral decisions in terms of two sorts of structures: "one objective and external, the whole fabric of the moral law, and the other internal, subjective, and psychological, the inherent values that motivate and guide in their decisions."[10] For Cross, the moral law stands for the past experiences of a society in generalized form. He claims that situationism "fails to understand that law is an analogical summation of a generalized, historic, moral experience."[11]

As for the interior structure, he understands it in terms of the product of biographical history as a whole. He writes:

Moral values are always the product of biographical history. They accumulate in us from infancy

7) Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics,* p. 358.
8) Cox, ed., *The Situation Ethics Debate,* p. 169.
9) *Ibid.,* p. 163.
10) *Ibid.,* p. 169.
11) *Ibid.*

forward by the impressions made by parents, siblings, schools, church, law, teen-age peer group, customs, movies, television, novels, and a hundred other sources of influence. Finally self-reflection and moral examination render, in some cases, these values personal and our own. We digest the inherited, heteronomous derivation of values, and interiorize and personalize them, making them intimately our own. This is the meaning of conscience: a personalization of derived and institutional moral guidance.[12]

What is important about Cross' critique of situation ethics is that it touches on two crucial elements of man's sociality: the control of society as the external reality over the individual's existence; and the effect of society upon the individual's internal consciousness through the internalization process. Any ethical approach which takes seriously the ethical implications of man's sociality requires a thoroughgoing analysis of these two facets of the social conditioning of man as well as their ethical impacts.

B. An Exposition of Man's Sociality in the Light of the Sociology of Knowledge and the Phenomenology of the Social World

1. An Analysis of Social Control over Man and His Socialization

It seems useful to begin our exposition of man's sociality with an analysis of the social world as the paramount reality of the everyday life as expounded by Schutz. The central task of his phenomenology of the social world is the analysis and interpretation of the "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*) which he calls variously the "common-sense world," the "world of daily life," or the "everyday working world." His governing concern is to investigate and interpret the meaningful structure of the lifeworld or the world of everyday life, although his studies and writings cover a vast range of problems of philosophy, sociology, and social philosophy. The chief task of his phenomenology of the social world is to see the mundane world in its massive complexity, to outline and explore its essential features, and to trace out its manifold relationships. Above all, the lifeworld is the everyday working world in which we carry out our day-to-day affairs. It is the world of physical things including our own body; it is the spatial realm of our locomotive and bodily operations. It offers resistances which require our efforts to overcome them and it places tasks before us to be done. It is the setting in which we carry out the plans which we succeed or fail to achieve. The lifeworld is also the primary locus in which I work together and communicate with my fellow men. I share this world and its objects with others. I work with my fellow men in manifold social acts and relationships.[13] In short, the lifeworld is the pregiven common

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12) *Ibid.*, p. 163
13) Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Vol. I: *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. by Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 226–27.

sphere into which each of us is born, and within whose limits alone our existence unfolds. Even during our dreams, we cannot get out of it. We can transcend it completely only in our death. Schutz uses the term the "paramount reality" to describe the nature of the life-world. He says: "The outer world of everyday life is a paramount reality."[14]

For Schutz, the lifeworld is not only the paramount reality of our everyday life but the final ground of social sciences. He goes so far as to assert that any human social science must ultimately come to terms with the everyday world. He recognizes the qualitative difference between the objects of natural sciences and those of social sciences. The objects of the natural sciences are, however complex, merely the facts, data, and events within the world of the observer. On the other hand, the objects of the social scientist are not merely objects for his objective observation, but they are fellow men and their conduct caught up in social reality. Their behavior is affected by social reality since they live, act, and think in it. Despite this distinctive quality, the social sciences, Schutz says, are to be built on the ground of the lifeworld as the fundamental common sphere of everyday life. "The *starting point* of social sciences is to be found in ordinary social life."[15]

The importance of Schutz's analysis of the lifeworld as the paramount reality is that any adequate ethical approach must take seriously man's sociality. Ethics has its distinctive quality in the sense that the objects of ethics are man's relations to others in the social context, the treatment of which involves both normative imperative and man's intentionality. Despite this unique quality, no adequate ethical study can be achieved without considering man's fundamental sociality.

Thus far, we have observed that man's existence cannot be considered apart from his relation to the social world. What is more, the self itself emerges out of social reality. Perhaps the most penetrating theoretical account of this process is the one given by George H. Mead, in which the emergence of the self is understood as being one and the same event as the discovery of social reality. Let us consider this matter in more detail. Traditionally it has been regarded as the distinctive characteristic of the self that it can make itself an object to itself. Mead interprets this in terms of the relation of the self to others in the social context. Mead says:

> He [the individual] becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved.[16]

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14) *Ibid.,* p. 342.

15) Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 141.

16) George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 138.

The individual becomes an object to himself only by taking toward himself the attitude of other selves, that is, by seeing himself as seen, hearing as heard, speaking to himself as spoken to. This means that the self "becomes a self in so far as he can take the attitude of another and act toward himself as others act."[17] For Mead, the self is not given intrinsically but socially formed. Mead states:

> The self is something which has a development, it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experiences and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process.[18]

In the period of the childhood the individual's relation to the other is relatively limited to those with whom he stands in intimate relationship. Later, his relation to the other goes beyond these intimate circles to the expectations directed toward him by society at large. On this level the expectation of society becomes general and abstract. This is what Mead calls "the generalized other." Mead defines it as:

> The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other." The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community.[19]

For instance, a ball team is the generalized other insofar as it enters, as an organized process or social activity, into the experience of any one of its individual members.[20] Seen in this way, self not only emerges out of society but in a social structure. In fact, Mead himself maintains this view, although with some reservation in that there is room for a solitary self.

> The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience. After a self has arisen, it in a sense provides for itself social experience, and so can conceive of an absolutely solitary self. But it is impossible to conceive a self arising outside of social experience.[21]

If the self emerges out of the experience of social process and if the nature of the self is essentially social structure, the realization of a given human individual also cannot be considered apart from the generalized other. Mead holds that the individual is capable of developing his self in the fullest sense only insofar as he takes the attitudes of the whole community toward himself by generalizing as a whole. He puts it this way:

> This getting of the broad activities of any given social whole or organized society as such within

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17) *Ibid.*, p. 171.
18) *Ibid.*, p. 135.
19) *Ibid.*, p. 154.
20) *Ibid.*
21) *Ibid.*, p. 140.

the experiential field of any one of individuals involved or included in the whole is, in other words, the essential basis and prerequisite of the fullest development of that individual's self: only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, cooperative social activity, or set of such activities in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self or possess the sort of complete self he has developed.[22]

Here it deserves to be noticed that the individual can take toward himself the attitudes of a society or social group only by generalizing them. That is, it is in the form of the generalized other that the individual can take toward himself the attitude of society. It is, Mead says, only through taking the attitude of the generalized other toward himself that one can think at all. He goes further and holds that it is the generalized other that makes the universe of discourse possible. Mead writes:

> Only through the taking by indivudals of the attitude or attitudes of the generalized other toward themselves is the existence of a universe of discourse, as that system of common or social meaning which thinking presupposes at its context, rendered possible.[23]

This leads Mead to relate the generalized other to social control over the individual. He maintains that it is in the form of the generalized other that social process affects its members. He states:

> It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members; for it is in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual's thinking.[24]

Thus far, we have considered the general question, how the self emerges out of the social reality. Let us now examine in what way society affects the individual's existence including his moral life. This can be well pursued by considering Peter L. Berger's analysis of the social conditioning of the individual in terms of the sociology of knowledge in his early work, *Invitation to Sociology*. There have been various definitions of the nature and scope of the sociology of knowledge. ''Nevertheless, there has been general agreement to the effect that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises.''[25] Berger extends this notion of the sociology of knowledge to a penetrating analysis of the effects of the various textures of society upon the individual's existence.[26]

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22) *Ibid.,* p. 155.
23) *Ibid.,* p. 156
24) *Ibid.,* p. 155.
25) Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), p. 4
26) See Peter L. Berger, *Invitation to Sociology* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), Chapters 4 and 5.

Berger analyzes first the external control of society upon the individual. Then he moves on to the socialization of the individual through the internalization process. His analysis of social control includes the various means by which a society impels its members to conform to the existing social order. The instrumentalities of social control vary according to the social situation. Methods of control also differ according to the purpose and character of the group in question. Social control ranges all the way from physical and political violence to morality, custom, social stratification, occupation and family relationships, and even ridicule or shunning. All of these kinds of various external controls of society over the individual are well summed up in his words "man in society."

Let us consider in more detail Berger's analysis of social control over the individual. The morality, custom, and manner of a society exert their pressure on its constituents. The most urgent of them are endowed with legal sanctions. In addition to these broad coercive systems that all members of the society share, there are other and less extensive circles of control to which the individual is subjected. One's occupation and social stratification in a great measure determine his mode of life. The individual's choice of occupation inevitably subordinates him to a variety of controls. One's occupation determines one's socio-political relationships which greatly affect one's aesthetic taste as well as socio-political view. The same holds true for one's place in the system of social stratification. All spheres of the individual's life are enormously influenced by the milieu of his social status and class.[27]

The circle of one's family also constitutes a control system. The control of the family should not be considered weaker than those of other systems for the reason that it is private life. The individual normally has his important social tie in family. The relationship in this intimate group has far more serious psychological consequences than any other relationship.[28]

Even ridicule, gossip, and shunning are potent instruments of social control. Children are impelled to conform to the generally accepted ways of behavior and manners of society in order not to be laughed at. The same holds even for grown men in our daily life. Gossip can exert considerable pressure on the individual especially in small communities where people live in a high degree of social visibility in relation to their neighbors.[29] With regard to shunning, Berger uses a very interesting example. Among the American Mennonites, an individual who breaks one of the principle taboos of the group is shunned: not a single one will speak to him, while at the same time he is permitted to work and

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27) *Ibid.*, pp. 78–81.
28) *Ibid.*, p. 77.
29) *Ibid.*, p. 72–73

live in the community.[30]

So far we have considered the relationship between the individual and society in terms of the external control of society over its constituents. That is to say, we have approached the individual and society as two confronting entities viewing society as external reality which exerts coercion over the individual. This is merely one side of the truth. Another side is that the social world penetrates and structures human consciousness. This means that society not only exerts external pressure on the individual but shapes his identity, thought, and emotions through the internalization of external conditions. In summary, the structures of society become those of interior consciousness through the internalization process.

The internalization of social structure provides a new thrust to our approach to the relationship between the individual and society. The social world does not merely confront the individual as the external coercing reality but becomes an inner constituent of his own being, thus making him desire to be that which society expects of him. The socialization of the individual makes him want to do what the society demands of him. This implies that society not only controls the individual by coercion but determines his being itself. Berger puts it this way:

> We want to obey the rules [of society]. We want the parts that society has assigned to us. And this in turn is possible not because the power of society is less, but because it is much more than we have so far asserted. Society not only determines what we do but also what we are. In other words, social location involves our being as well as our conduct.[31]

Berger uses the expression "society in man" to describe the internalized social structures in human consciousness. To put this another way, it is man's "socialization."

Berger again provides a penetrating analysis of man's socialization in terms of "role theory," "sociology of knowledge," and "reference-group theory." Let us consider these matters in more detail. We shall consider first his role theory. Man is born into a society and destined to play the roles assigned to him in the social scene as the actor plays his role in the theatre. The role provides the pre-defined pattern according to which the role-player is to act. The role-player may at first be embarrassed to carry out the role assigned to him. But this attitude is not likely to last very long. The role-player eventually takes his role for granted. That is to say, he is identified with what he plays in the course of playing his role. This means that the role-play comes to shape an "identity" in the role-player since every role in society has attached to the role a certain identity.[32] To relate this to what has been said regarding the control of society over the individual,

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30) *Ibid.*, p. 73
31) *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94.
32) *Ibid.*, pp. 94–98.

"the individual locates himself in society within systems of social control, and every one of these contains an identity-generating apparatus."[33] This means that external social systems become the constituents of his internal consciousness which control his behavior unless they are put into question.[34]

Let us turn to the implication of the sociology of knowledge for the socialization of men. As we have already alluded to, the sociology of knowledge is primarily concerned with the relations between human knowledge and the socio-cultural context. Thus the discipline deals with human knowledge always on the assumption that there is some sort of relationship between thought and existential factors in the society and culture.[35] Berger's analysis of the socialization of man is carried on in line with this basic thesis of the sociology of knowledge, especially Karl Mannheim's notion of "ideology."[36]

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33) *Ibid.*, p. 102.

34) Berger's analysis of identity does not disregard the individual's inborn characteristics which are to be developed in the social environment. He, however, wants to emphasize that the room for the social formation of identity within those genetic limits is very large. Furthermore, he contends that identities can be sustained only in a social context in which others are willing to recognize one's identity since one can not hold onto any particular identity all by oneself. For a further consideration of this matter, see William Isaac Thomas' theory of social personality in *Social Behavior and Personality*, ed. by Edumnd H. Volkart (New York: Social science Research Council, 1951), Chapters 8 and 9. Moving from a theory emphasizing internal dynamics to one emphasizing external dynamics, Thomas develops a dynamic theory of personality. On the subjective side he recognizes the individual's "temperament" (original nature) and his four "desires" (fundamental tendencies): "new experience," "security," "response," and "recognition." On the objective side he takes account of the demands of society embodied in social rules attached to situations. Out of the interaction of these two factors individuals attain their own "definitions of situation" and accordingly different kinds of "character" (conscious attitudes) and different forms of "life organization" (rules organizing character). His dynamic theory of personal evolution specifies these "constants" in the formation of personality and then treats them developmentally.

35) For a concise introduction of the intellectual genealogy of the sociology of knowledge and the fundamental theses of the major figures of the discipline, see Peter L. Berger's introduction to his *The Social Construction of Reality*.

36) For Karl Mannheim's analysis of "ideology," see his *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963). Mannheim maintains that "ideologies" always include certain elements of "falsities," "deceptions," or "distortions," whether they are conscious, semi-conscious or unconscious. He distinguishes between the "particular" and "total" ideology and between the "special" and "general" ideology. The particular ideology constitutes only a segment of the thought of the asserting subject. This sort of ideology is implied when the asserting subject's idea and representation are tainted with a more or less conscious disguise of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests. The particular ideology takes place on a purely psychological level. On the other hand, the total ideology is implied when the terms denote that the asserting subject's total *Weltanschauung*, thought-system, is under the influence of the age. Thus the particular ideology refers to the isolated cases of the thought-system, while the total ideology has to do with the fundamentally different thought-system itself (*ibid.*, pp. 55–58). The distinction between the particular and total ideology is also made "whether the thought of all groups (including our own) or only that of our adversaries is recognized as socially determined" (*ibid.*, p. 77). The special conception of ideology is related to a sociological analysis of the opponent's ideas; whereas the general form of the total conception of ideology subjects "not just the adversary's point of view but all points of view, including his own, to the ideological analysis" (*ibid.*, p. 77).

Berger argues that "ideas as well as men are socially located."[37] According to him, no thought occurs in isolation from the social context within which particular men think about particular things. The same holds true even for the abstract ideas that seemingly have little social connection. The social effect upon ideas can be seen most easily when thought serves to legitimate a particular social situation. Berger demonstrates this in terms of Mannheim's notion of "ideology" which serves to explain, justify, and sanctify vested interests of a social group or class.[38]

Berger illustrates this nature of ideology by investigating such concrete examples as the ideology of "free enterprise," the Marxist ideology, and the private virtue-oriented ethics of Protestant fundamentalism in the American South. The ideology of free enterprise serves to justify the monopolistic practices of large American corporations which defraud the public. The Marxist ideology serves to legitimate the dictatorship practiced by the Communist Party. Protestant fundamentalism in the American South places strong emphasis upon the wickedness of private moral offences--such as fornication, drinking, dancing, gambling, and swearing--neglecting the larger issues of social justice. This betrays the fact that American Southern Protestant fundamentalism concentrates its system of attention on these areas of conduct that are not harmful to the maintenance of the social system of the American South while diverting attention from those areas where ethical inspection would create tensions, thus affecting the smooth operation of the system. Thus the Protestant fundamentalism is functional in maintaining the social system of the American South.[39]

Finally, Berger moves on to "reference-group theory." At the outset of the discussion, he refers to the distinction between reference groups of which one is a member and those towards which one orients one's actions.[40] Then he mentions that it is the latter variety

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37) Berger, *Invitation to Sociology*, p. 110.

38) *Ibid.,* pp. 110–11.

39) *Ibid.,* pp. 113–14.

40) For a further discussion of reference-group theory, see Robert King Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Revised and enlarged edition, New York: Free Press, 1957), Chapters VIII and IX. The first kind of reference group, which Berger leaves out, involves some other problems to be clarified. Let us consider these matters in line with Merton's reference-group theory. The concept of reference group theory presupposes some knowledge of the norms and values obtaining in the group. But there are differences in the knowledge of group norms and values among members of the group. Such differences do not merely happen to vary empirically among these individuals; the availability and extent of such knowledge is presumably patterned by the group structure. This requires analyzing the ways in which the group structure affects the distribution of knowledge about the values and norms of the group(*ibid.,* p. 337). Reference-group theory must also account for non-conformity which may be regarded as remote conformity. One sometimes takes the values and standards of other individuals with whom one is merely in remote relations—those whom one has known through books, or perhaps seen and heard for a few moments (*ibid.,* p. 358). Moreover, the group taken as a point of reference by the individual is not invariably the group of which he is a member. Men frequently orient themselves to groups other than

that serves the analysis of the socialization of man. Reference-group theory indicates that one's group affiliation carries with it specific cognitive commitments to the opinions, socio-political stances, and the view of the world of the particular group as well as the adoption of its behavior patterns. In choosing a specific group one shares the ethical, aesthetic, and socio-political views of the group.[41]

Berger's foregoing analysis of social control over and the socialization of the individual self shows that man's existence including moral life is in a great measure determined by the structures and institutions as well as the customs, manners, and moral values of the larger community. But Berger's analysis does not account for the processes through which the tradition, structures, institutions, and values of society affect the individual's existence including moral life. In other words, his analysis focuses on the classification of the various textures of the social world and their effects upon the individual's socio-political stances, concept of values, and behavior patterns. But the processes through which the textures of the social world affect the individual remain to be investigated further. The same holds true for Berger's analysis of the internalization process. His analysis of the internalization process digs into the effect of the external social reality upon the internal structures of man's consciousness. But a full analysis of the internalization of social reality needs to account for the processes through which the whole social world ranging all the way from the past to the present and future affects the individual's consciousness. Indeed, Berger's analysis of the social conditioning of man in his *Invitation to Sociology* touches on the effect of the past experiences of society upon the individual with reference to Schutz. But his concern remains a simple assertion that each social situation is defined not only by contemporaries but also pre-defined by our predecessors.[42] We shall analyze the processes of the external and internal social conditioning of the individual including his moral life, as our discussion proceeds.

2. An Analysis of the Process of Social Effect upon the Knowledge and Judgment of the Individual

It is Schutz's phenomenology of the social world that gives the most penetrating theoretical analysis of the process through which the effect of society upon the knowledge and

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their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations. This leads Merton to assert that reference-group theory "must be generalized to the point where it can account for both membership and non-member-ship-group orientation" (*ibid.*, p. 234). The non-membership-group orientation requires the treat-ment of such questions as "positive and negative reference groups," "the selection of reference groups," and the psychological treatment of the perception of the values and norms obtaining in a non-member-ship-group as well as the social treatment of channels of communication through which this knowledge is gained.

41) Berger, *Invitation to Sociology*, pp. 118–20.
42) *Ibid.*, p. 85.

judgment of the individual takes place. In his later work, Berger also develops further his earlier analysis of the social conditioning of man in line with Schutz. We shall analyze the process concerned in line with Schutz and Berger's later work. Our analysis will be carried on by considering: (a) the process of man's perception and manipulation of the lifeworld in terms of Schutz's notion of "typification" and "taken-for-grantedness"; (b) the process by which the present and past experiences of society affect the individual in terms of Schutz's concept of the "intersubjective" nature of the lifeworld and the "stock of knowledge at hand"; (c) the process by which society as a whole system of social conditions affects the judgment and decision of the individual in terms of Schutz's analysis of the "problem of relevance."

(a) According to Schutz, the beings and objects in the outer world are perceived typically and within a horizon of familiarity. "None of these objects is perceived as insulated. From the outset it is an object within a horizon of familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship."[43] For instance, we do not perceive each individual dog, or mountain as a unique object dispersed in space and time, but as one of "dogs," "trees," or "mountains." I may have never seen an Irish setter. But if I see one, I know that it is an animal and in particular a dog since it has all the familiar features and the typical behavior of a dog.[44] Certainly I do not think it is a cat. I experience the events and fellow men I encounter as a "conference," "sit-in demonstration," "music concert," or "strangers," "postmen," "soldiers." Thus these events and fellow men are experienced by us as "things of such and such a kind" or "types." This implies that our perception of the beings, objects and events is patterned by typificatory schemes. Schutz calls these schemes "typifications."

Let us illustrate further the function of the typification by a concrete example of a face-to-face interaction. Suppose that I am trying to sell my product and deal with a buyer. I apprehend him as "a man," "a European," "a jovial type," and so on. My interaction with him will be ongoingly patterned by all these typifications as long as they do not become problematic through interference on his part.[45] These schemes are more vulnerable to the interference of the partner in the face-to-face interaction than in the remote form of relationship. That is to say, it is comparatively difficult to impose rigid patterns on the face-to-face interaction in which the other's thoughts are directly experienced in a vivid present as they are built up step by step. But even the face-to-face relationship is patterned by typification when it takes place within the routines of everyday life.[46]

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43) Schutz, *Collected Papers,* I, 7.
44) *Ibid.,* p. 8.
45) Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality,* p. 31.
46) *Ibid.,* p. 30.

As my relation to others moves from the direct to the indirect, my knowing of the other is possible only by means of the typification. In other words, my knowing of "contemporaries" and "predecessors" is possible only by means of the typification of them acquired by my direct experience of my "consociates," my consociates' experience of their consociates, or my own consociates' experience of the products of contemporaries such as tools, handicrafts, cultural objects, institutions, and so on.[47] Take a "postal clerk" for an example. I know a "postal clerk" merely as one of my contemporaries who performs a specific function. That is, I apprehend him by means of typification.

The reality of everyday life contains typificatory schemes in terms of which the beings, objects, and events are apprehended and dealt with. We can go further and say that "social structure is the sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them."[48] We were born into our socio-cultural world and matured in it. Growing up in our world and society we continually acquire knowledge. The store of our knowledge and experience is built up from tradition, habits, and education as well as our own reflection. Our lifelong intercourse with consociates and contemporaries is a continuous process of the acquisition of knowledge. All of this acquisition is carried on by means of typifications. As in the case of our perception of the beings and objects of the outer world, we acquire information, not as isolated, but as interpreted in typical ways.

The lifeworld is from the outset an organized and interpreted world. It is interpreted and organized by our contemporaries as well as predecessors and is given to our own interpretation and organization. We have been told and shown by our parents and teachers what things mean and how they are to be used. This implies that we are told and shown how they are interpreted and typified in our society. Now it is given to our experience and interpretation. It will be interpreted and organized by our successors as well. Thus the continuous process of the acquisition and transmission of information is carried on by means of typifications.

Typifications come into play also in our manipulation of practical affairs in everyday life. We do not perform each action as isolated from other actions but as belonging to a typically interpreted pattern. That is, each action we take is performed according to a pattern of action which comes to be socially approved and accepted, although we can

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47) Schutz makes the distinction between "contemporaries" (*Mitwelt* or *Nebenmenschen*) and "fellow men" (*Mitmenschen*), "associates" (*Umwelt*) or "consociates." The former implies those who are outside of the range of the face-to-face situation, whereas the latter means those whom I directly experience in the face-to-face relationship. "Predecessors" (*Vorwelt*) are those who existed before me, and "successors" (*Folgewelt*) are those who will exist after me. See Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, pp. 142–43; *Collected Papers*, I, 15–16, 134. Schutz's "contemporaries" often includes "consociates" as well.

48) Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 33.

reestablish distance from it as we reflect upon our conduct afterward. The typical patterns of action function as rules of thumb which are socially shaped. Their validity has never been verified. We take them from our parents, teachers, and consociates as a matter of course. We regularly use them with success to handle day-to-day affairs. They worked well formerly and still work efficiently. Although they are rules of thumb, they are sufficient for us to handle things and events in everyday life. We act in a reasonable way by relying on this sort of typical pattern of action which has proved to be valid up to now. Schutz proposes to call this "cook-book knowledge":

> This kind of knowledge and its organization I should like to call "cook-book knowledge." The cook-book has recipes, lists of ingredients, formulae for mixing them, and directions for finishing off.[49]

The typical knowledge and the types of action are recipes and formulae for practical affairs in our daily life. They are "typical ways of dealing with the demands of personal as well as public life: ways of assessing, gauging, interpreting, and orienting toward the problematic elements in mundane existence."[50] They are general and routine ways which enable us to handle in a typical way similar problems under similar circumstances. By relying on these recipes we can handle problems in our everyday life with an economy of effort. There may be cases where none of the typifications available is adequate to handle the problem concerned. In such a case we must improvise and extrapolate a new type. But even the improvision of a new type must be done within the limit of the stock of knowledge at hand which is in turn formulated through and involved in typifications. The common sense world is so deeply rooted in typifications that our everyday life cannot be considered apart from them.

A typical pattern of action presupposes, as Schutz writes, "the assumption that I may under typically similar circumstances act in the typically similar way that I did before in order to bring about a typically similar state of affairs."[51] This is what Husserl calls the idealization of "I-can-do-it-again."[52] This notion of "I-can-do-it-again" leads us to another of Schutz's crucial notions, "taken-for-grantedness" in everyday life. Let us consider in greater detail the "taken-for-granted" nature of the lifeworld.

The lifeworld is the everyday working world in which we carry on day-to-day affairs. The everyday working world is the common sense world where the ways of understanding and doing are "taken-for-granted." First of all, we take it for granted that the outer world

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49) Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Vol. II: *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. by Arvid Broderson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 73.
50) Maurice Natanson, *The Journeying Self* (California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), p. 19.
51) Schutz, *Collected Papers*, I, 20.
52) *Ibid.*

exists as a reality. In our everyday life we believe in the reality of the world, in its being there, its having a past and the likelihood of a future. For instance, in catching the bus to go home from work, we do not question the existence of the bus and the driver. Their existence is taken for granted. We also take it for granted that the bus will come on the scheduled time and will bring us to our destination by running its routine course.

This "taken-for-grantedness" has to do with a distinctive element of Schutz's phenomenology in the sense that it starts with the taken-for-grantedness of the everyday world. This presupposition is a contrast to Husserlian phenomenological reduction. Husserlian phenomenology suspends our belief in the existence of the outer world for analytical purposes, although it does not deny the reality of the outer world. That is, it refrains intentionally from all judgments related directly or indirectly to the existence of the outer world. This is what Husserl calls "putting the world in brackets" or "performing the phenomenological reduction." On the contrary, Schutz's phenomenology of the social world takes for granted the reality of the outer world by suspending doubt in its existence. In other words, he takes the attitude of "suspended doubt" in the everyday world. Schutz calls this the "natural attitude." He describes it in terms of the "*epoche* of the natural attitude":

> Phenomenology has taught us the concept of phenomenological *epoche*, the suspension of our belief in the reality of the world as a device to overcome the natural attitude by radicalizing the Cartesian method of philosophical doubt. The suggestion may be ventured that man within the natural attitude also uses a specific *epoche*, of course quite another one than the phenomenologist. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets is the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him. We propose to call this *epoche* the *epoche of the natural attitude*.[53]

Schutz's notion of the "epoche of the natural attitude" is the philosophical foundation of the common sense world. The paramount reality of the common sense world is founded on the taken-for-granted truth of the natural world. The routines of everyday life are grounded in this "taken-for-grantedness." It is true that we may drop the attitude of taking for granted occasionally and suspect that the bus comes on time or even question whether the bus and the driver really exist. However, these are not usually intended as serious doubts, although we do have doubts occasionally in the course of everyday life. Some particular mundane existences may occasionally become doubtful, but never the common sense world as a whole. It is true that we in our daily life periodically bring into question one or another taken for granted segment or construct of the lifeworld. But the "taken-for-grantedness" itself goes on to function as the fundamental thesis in the

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53) Schutz, *Collected Papers*, I, 229.

context of our daily life.

The significance of Schutz's notion of "taken-for-grantedness" is that it makes the lifeworld a common intersubjective sphere. We have observed that the lifeworld is an organized and interpreted world. This organization and interpretation is carried on by means of principles and generalities, i.e., typificatory schemes. My conduct and perception take place in accordance with these typifications. Furthermore, I expect that my fellow men perceive the world and act within it in the same manner as I do. That is, I can expect that my fellow men in the context of everyday life think and act in the same way as I do because they and I alike follow the same typificatory schemes. In sum, each will be able to predict the other's actions. This relieves both individuals of a considerable amount of tension. Thus "taken-for-grantedness" enables us to act in the common intersubjective world with an economy of time and effort.[54] In other words, typifications function as the channels through which we gear into social process.

(b) Our analysis of "typification" and "taken-for-grantedness" has already referred to the intersubjective nature of the lifeworld. Let us analyze further this nature to demonstrate that the individual's existence is related to the whole social world including the present, past, and future of society. For Schutz, the world of daily life is not a private world but a pregiven intersubjective world with and upon which the individual acts as a man amidst his fellow men. To use another expression, it is a "public world" common to me and my fellow men. The lifeworld is experienced by the individual as a common public world shared by his fellow men in which he lives and works together with others communicating with and influencing each other. Schutz puts it this way:

> In analyzing the first constructs of common-sense thinking in everyday life we proceeded, however, as if the world were my private world and as if we were entitled to disregard the fact that it is from the outset an intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being understood by them.[55]

Schutz's exposition of the intersubjective structure of the social world ranges all the way from the "general thesis of the alter ego's existence" and the "pure We-relationship" to the "We-relationship" and the "They-relationship." The general thesis of the alter ego's existence denotes my immediate experience of the other's stream of consciousness in vivid simultaneity.[56] Whereas I can experience my own self as an object of consciousness only in a reflective act, I participate in the ongoing process of your consciousness in

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54) Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 57.
55) Schutz, *Collected Papers*, I, 10.
56) *Ibid.*, p. 174.

its vivid present. In an I-Thou relationship a synchronism of the two streams of consciousness takes place.[57] In short, we "grow older together."[58]

Schutz proceeds from this establishment of the alter ego's existence to the "pure We-relationship." The pure We-relationship is the mere reciprocal awareness of another person in the face-to-face relationship of I and Thou. The pure We-relationship involves merely our awareness of each other's presence and the knowledge of each that the other is aware of his presence.[59] On the other hand, the We-relationship occurs with varying degrees of concreteness, i.e., with different degrees of immediacy, intensity, and intimacy. In addition, the partner may be experienced from different points of view. For instance, there is an obvious difference of intimacy and immediacy between the relation of husband and wife and that of a man and a woman in a Sunday School class. The pure We-relationship refers to the simple givenness of the other, whereas the We-relationship implies a greater or lesser degree of concreteness. The We-relationship is implied when the pure We-relationship as a formal concept of the relation of I and you is filled with different degrees of concreteness and specificity.[60]

Schutz proceeds further from the We-relationship to the They-relationship, i.e., from the direct I-Thou relationship to the indirect anonymous relationship. The They-relationship is my relation to those who are outside the range of the We-relationship, although I and they coexist in the same age. Some of them I experience in a face-to-face relationship since they live in the same spatial segment of the world. Schutz calls them "fellow men," "associates," or "consociates."[61] Others I do not directly experience but instead infer them on the basis of indirect evidence involving my previous direct experiences as well as all my knowledge of the social world. Schutz calls them "contemporaries."

The intersubjective world includes not only my relations to contemporaries but also my relations to "predecessors" as well as "successors." My contemporaries and I are alive and I share a temporal reality with them. Therefore, a mutual interplay of action and reaction can be established with them. On the other hand, predecessors lived before my time and are known to me only through indirect evidence. Therefore, I cannot act upon them, but their past actions, as well as the outcome of these actions, are open to my interpretation and may influence my thinking and decision. Finally, successors are those who will exist after I die and necessarily remain unknown to me during my lifetime. I know nothing of them as individuals and there is no way I can have personal acquain-

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57) Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, pp. 102–03.
58) *Ibid.*, p. 103.
59) *Ibid.*, p. 168.
60) Schutz, *Collected Papers*, II, 24–25, 27–28.
61) Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 142; *Collected Papers*, I, 16, 134.

tance with their subjective experiences. But I may orient my action toward them in a certain anticipation. Thus the intersubjective world includes as its essential components not only the social world of contemporaries and predecessors but that of successors. This implies that our lifeworld is constituted of the whole contemporary socio-cultural world in the spatial dimension and connected to the past and future of the society in the temporal dimension.

We have already seen that the lifeworld is handed down to us from the past history and continues to exist in the future. We have also observed that the intersubjective world covers the whole social world including the present, past, and future of society. It is the function of the "stock of knowledge" that it enables the individual to relate himself to these spatial and temporal dimensions of the social world. Let us consider this matter in greater detail by considering Schutz's notion of the "stock of knowledge."

It is through the functioning of the stock of knowledge that the acquisition and transmission of experiences take place in the intersubjective social world. In more common language, the stock of knowledge is memory. It is made up of "sedimentations" of my previous experiences which are stored in my memory. Included in the stock of knowledge are not only what I have myself experienced but also my socially derived knowledge involving the experiences of contemporaries and predecessors.

The notion of the stock of knowledge reveals that our knowledge is deeply rooted in the past experiences of our predecessors and the previous experiences of our contemporaries and ourselves. In other words, the greater portion of our knowledge is socially derived, although a very small part of it may originate in our own personal experiences. Schutz writes:

> Our knowledge is socially derived and distributed. Only a very small part of my stock of knowledge at hand originates in my own personal experience of things. By far the greater part is socially derived, originating in the experiences of others, communicated to me by others, or handed down to me by my parents or my teachers, or the teachers of my teachers.[62]

Our language, rules for handling and manipulating practical affairs, and modes of conduct all constitute what Schutz calls the "stock of knowledge." My stock of knowledge is the sedimentation of the whole history of my life related to the past and present of the society to which I belong. It comprises what is passed on to me from my predecessors as well as what I acquire through the intercourse with contemporaries. Our life is a continuum of formation and modification of the stock of knowledge. This process is never complete; it goes on as long as I live.

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62) Alfred Schutz, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, ed. by Richard M. Zaner (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 84.

In addition to the retention and transformation of the experiences of the past, the stock of knowledge functions as the frame of reference or orientation for my dealing with things, coping with situations, coming to terms with fellow men. "The stock of knowledge at hand" is not the dead reservoir of previous experiences, but it comes into dynamic play in our perception and action. The stock of knowledge at hand is that in terms of which I act at any moment in my life and that through which I experience and interpret the lifeworld. Schutz states:

> All interpretation of this world is based on a stock of previous experience of it, our own or those handed down to us by parents or teachers; these experiences in the form of "knowledge at hand" function as a scheme of reference.[63]

Finally, the stock of knowledge makes the lifeworld a common intersubjective world. Only a small part of the totality of human experience is retained in consciousness as sedimentation. Such sedimentation is "intersubjective sedimentation" which takes place in the intersubjective world. Intersubjective sedimentation becomes a "common stock of knowledge" when it is transformed into an objective general knowledge available to all. The common stock of knowledge becomes the "collective stock of knowledge" when the former is transmitted from one generation to the next, and from one collectivity to another. The common collective stock of knowledge is rendered possible when shared experiences are objectivized in a sign system of one kind or another. Language is the decisive sign system.[64]

(c) We have observed that the stock of knowledge functions as the frame of reference or direction for our manipulation of practical affairs in the lifeworld. Furthermore, our judgment and decision have to do with the whole system of social conditions. We shall investigate this matter by considering Schutz's analysis of the problem of "relevance." It is, however, necessary to consider Schutz's notion of "biographical situation" before we go into his analysis of the problem of relevance. For Schutz, biographical situation is: "the sedimentation or outcome of my personal history, of all the experiences I have had and which are preserved in my memory or are available within my present stock of knowledge at hand." He continues to say: "Included in the latter are not only what I have myself experienced firsthand, but also my socially derived knowledge, which points to the experiences of others."[65] If we consider Schutz's definition of biographical situation in the light of our observation of him thus far, it is not hard to see that our perception, judgment, choice,

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63) Schutz, *Collected Papers*, I, 7.
64) Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality*, pp. 67–68.
65) Schutz, *Reflection on the Problem of Relevance*, p. 2. Schutz also calls the "biographical situation" an "autobiographical situation" or a "biographically determined situation."

and action all take place within the frame of our biographical situation. Schutz's analysis of relevances also necessarily involves the function of biographical situation since the primary concern of the former is the selective function of interest, action, and project or plan in our everyday life. We might go further and say that his study of the problem of relevance is nothing more than a penetrating analysis of the interaction between biographical situation and multiple social realities in our selection of interest, action, and project.

Let us now examine Schutz's notion of biographical situation. At any moment of my life, I find myself in the midst of the surrounding world of nature and within a certain socio-cultural circumstance. I am born into a preexisting world, more specifically in this place, at this specific moment of history, into this particular socio-cultural enviromnent. Thus I find myself located in an already existing world, a situation not of my own making. My situation, which is thus imposed upon me, determines my life in many respects. We shall consider first the spatial location of man and then move on to the temporal, i.e., socio-cultural situation.

I find my position "Here," in this very place. "Here" is the place where I am in the outer world, i.e., the place of my body in the physical universe. "Here" is the starting point from which I take my bearing in space. Relative to the position of my body, the objects of the outer world appear in certain specific distances and perspectives; and they are arranged and organized in a certain order. Schutz calls this "the center O of the system of coordinates."

> The space thus experienced through the intermediary of the body is, first of all, a space of orientation. My body is, so to speak, the center O of the system of coordinates in terms of which I organize the objects surrounding me into left and right, before and behind, above and below.[66]

I also find myself in a particular socio-cultural world. I am born of my parents who are unique to me and who play, in their own unique ways, significant roles in the formation of myself, especially in the early stage of my life. I am also born into a particular social structure and socio-cultural circumstance. The family and socio-cultural situation become, by means of sedimentation, the integral elements of my internal consciousness through my own interpretation. Thus it constitutes my biographical situation. My constituted biographical situation is the condition for the subsequent interpretation of new events and activities. As I order and organize the objects of the outer world relative to my spatial position "Here," I interpret what I encounter in the social world from my own perspective based on my biographical situation. This implies that although the social world is given to us as a common universal world each individual interprets what he encounters in the common

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66) *Ibid.*, p. 173.

sense world within the framework of his unique biographical situation.

The process of our life in everyday life is not limited merely to the interpretation and organization of the natural and social world. We must come to terms with the selective function of interest, action, and project. The lifeworld is not a mere object for thought nor for knowledge but a field of working actions. The lifeworld is an immensely complicated network of dimensions, relations, and an infinite number of plans or projects. We are not and cannot be equally interested in all the strata of the lifeworld at every moment. This makes us attend to "this" rather than "that" at a given moment in our life.

The typification and the attitude of taken-for-grantedness enable us to anticipate the results of our action in the routines of everyday life. This possibility of anticipation enables us to make major or minor plans and projects in our daily life. But this is only half the story of our planning and anticipation. What I am planning with anticipation is one thing. It is another matter why I attend to this specific project rather than others. In fact, our everyday working world is the continuum of the selective function of minor or major projects, plans, and interests. If this is the case, there must be some underlying principle of selection which accounts for the concrete choice, attitudes, decisions, and commitments the individual makes. This is what Schutz calls the "problem of relevance" with which he was engaged during the last decade of his life. He could not work out thoroughly the theory of relevance. But he posed its fundamental questions clearly and precisely in this study.[67]

As we have mentioned above our choices and decisions take place in the interaction between biographical situation and multiple social realites. Our analysis of this matter can be best begun with Schutz's notion of "attention to life" (*attention à la vie*).[68] The lifeworld is an immensely complicated network of multiple realities in which various realms of realities are interconnected. In the lifeworld as multiple realities, we live simultaneously in various dimensions and in different degrees of the intensity of consciousness since we cannot give an equal degree of attention to all of these realms of realties. We focus our attention on one of them making the other problems or realms appear unreal. In other words, we bestow the accent of reality on one of these problems or realities making it the paramount reality.[69] In short, our attention is exclusively paid to one of the problems or realms of the lifeworld. For Schutz, *attention à la vie* is the basic regulative principle of our consciousness which defines the realm of our world which is relevant.[70]

Our endowment of the accent of reality by *attention à la vie* is merely the preliminary step

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67) The manuscripts of his unfinished study of the problem of relevance were edited and published by Richard M. Zaner under the title *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance* (Yale University Press, 1970).
68) Schutz, *Reflection on the Problem of Relevance*, p. 6; *Collected Papers*, I, 212.
69) *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.
70) Schutz, *Collected Papers*, I, 212.

toward our choice of action or project. But our choice of action or project is not given all at once, not created out of nothing. Its determination has to do with a whole system of relevances. "Our every action, thought, and deed in the lifeworld . . . is guided by and founded on a 'whole system of relevances.'"[71] Schutz distinguishes relevance into the "topical," "interpretative," and "motivational" relevance. They are interrelated to each other in interdependence and interaction. The selection of an act or project is guided by and founded on the interplay of these systems of relevances.

Let us suppose that a person comes home and finds something looking like a pile of rope or a serpent in the dark corner of his room.[72] This kind of object does not belong to the type of things he may expect in the room. It stands out by its unfamiliarity within a typically familiar, anticipated surrounding. He must interpret it in order to decide whether it is a pile of rope or a serpent. In other words, it becomes problematic to him and therefore thematic. His whole attention is given to the object and it is now thematically given to him for interpretation. This is the first form of relevance which Schutz calls the "topical relevance."[73]

Here it must be noticed that the function of the stock of knowledge preserved in biographical situations comes into play already on the level of this first form of relevance. His awareness of the unfamiliarity of the object in the room is possible only insofar as he draws upon his previous experience of the familiar things in the room. Furthermore, it also has to do with his stock of knowledge at hand that he can know the object is either a pile of rope or a serpent distinguished from other objects, say, a table or a dog.

The solution to the question, whether it is a pile of rope or a serpent, is a new task the man must perform. In a word, he must interpret it. To do so, he has to submit it to his examination referring to his previous experiences which are retained as the textures of his biographical situation. But not all previous experiences are used to interpret the object. Only a few of them relevant to the task at hand are used as a scheme of interpretation since there are many other previous experiences which have nothing to do with the interpretation of the object. And the set of previous experiences relevant to the interpretation is quite different from the topical relevance. Schutz proposes to call this new set of previous experiences the "interpretative relevance."[74]

As the foregoing brief description of the interpretative relevance shows, the establishment of the interpretative relevance is possible only with reference to the stock of knowledge at hand. We constitute a set of previous experiences relevant to the interpretation out of

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71) Schutz, *Reflection on the Problem of Relevance*, p. xx.
72) This example is taken from Schutz's *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*.
73) Schutz, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, p. 26.
74) *Ibid.*, p. 36.

the totality of our stock of knowledge at hand. Moreover, the function of the stock of knowledge at hand is more dynamic on this level than on that of the topical relevance.

The diagnosis of the nature of the object involves a third kind of relevance which Schutz calls the "motivational relevance." He distinguishes this kind of relevance into the "in-order-to relevance" and "because relevance." If we ask the man "Why do you want to interpret the object?," then he may answer "I want to interpret it in order to remove it without danger." If we ask him further "Why do you want to remove it?," then he may answer "I want to remove it in order to sleep in the room without danger."[75] This implies that the diagnosis of the object involves the idea of the state of affairs to be brought about. In other words, it involves a project goal to be attained by our subsequent act. This kind of relevance is neither topical nor interpretative. This leads Schutz to propose to call it "in-order-to relevance."

The man may answer another way the question why he wants to remove the object. That is, he may answer "Because I fear that the object is a serpent." This is quite different from the in-order-to relevance. His fear of a serpent impels him to project the removal of the object. And his knowledge that a serpent is dangerous is derived from his previous experience of a serpent. Schutz calls this sort of relevance the "because relevance."[76]

Our analysis of the problem of relevance reveals that the aforementioned three kinds of relevances are not isolated but interrelated. As Schutz says: "There are no such things as isolated relevances. Whatever their type, they are always interconnected and grouped together in systems, just as the various systems of relevances within any one category."[77] From the interplay of the system of relevances and the interaction between biographical situation and these systems, it follows that the mode of the individual's existence, including perception and judgment, and the selection of interest, action, and project, has to do with the vast complexities of social conditions.

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75) In ordinary language, "I want to interpret it *in order to* move it without danger" is often expressed as "I interpret it *because* I want to remove it without danger." Schutz holds that the *because* sentence is another form of *in order to* sentence in its actual meaning. Schutz calls this sort of *because* motive, "spurious because motive" distinguishing it from "genuine because motive" which means the past tense of because.

76) Schutz, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, pp. 45–52.

77) *Ibid.*, p. 43.

III. AN EXPOSITION OF THE DIALECTICAL RELATION-SHIP BETWEEN HUMAN INTENTIONALITY AND SOCIALITY

Our analysis of man's sociality has left out intentionality, although we have mentioned that an adequate ethical approach should be based on a balance between intentionality and sociality. No analysis of morality can be complete without taking into consideration intentionality since man is not simply a product of social process but also a responsible subject.[1] Emphasis upon man's sociality does not necessarily have to reject intentionality. The truth of the matter is to seek a balanced relationship between intentionality and sociality. It follows that intentionality must be expounded in the light of fundamental sociality, and the positive ethical function of sociality must be in turn assessed in terms of intentionality.

In this chapter we shall seek first a balanced relationship between intentional self and social self. Secondly, we shall discuss the intentionality of the moral agent as his answerability to communal values in the light of fundamental sociality. Thirdly, we shall examine the sustaining function of sociality and its limit in the light of the intentionality of the moral agent. Finally, we shall analyze the nature and function of relative moral norms in their relation to universal moral norms as the generalized formulas of fundamental human values.

A. A Balance Between Intentionality and Sociality and its Impact upon the Intentionality of the Moral Agent

1. A Search for a Balance Between Intentional Self and Social Self

Intentionality is already presupposed in the key notions of our analysis of man's sociality such as: biographical situation, the interaction between the stock of knowledge of the individual and the common-collective stock of knowledge of society, the establishment of a set of relevances adequate to the problem involved, and the projection of action toward the future. The formulation of biographical situation involves more or less the function of

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1) By "intentionality" we mean the moral agent's free decision in relation to fundamental human values which conforms to, changes, and creates the situation and moral norms. Even these fundamental human values are shaped by the moral agent's religious or philosophical belief as the ultimate ground of his self-understanding, although this shaping takes place within a given socio-cultural tradition.

intentionality although it is in a greater measure determined by one's personal and social situation. The judgment and selection which take place in the interaction between the biographical and social stock of knowledge in decision making cannot be considered apart from the function of intentionality. The establishment of an adequate set of relevances and the projection of action toward the future also necessarily involve the function of intentionality. We have postponed the consideration of intentionality only to analyze man's sociality with greater clarity.

Those scholars in terms of which we have analyzed man's sociality do not disregard intentionality although they differ in the degree of their emphases. However, there is a problem in their treatment of intentionality. The problem is that they do not fully develop the impact of the socio-cultural world upon the fulfillment of human freedom as intentionality. The notion of the social self means the socially determined self, but it also points to the intentional self's appropriation of the socio-cultural world as the vehicle of the actualization and enrichment of human freedom. The socio-cultural world in relation to which the self is constituted is the limitation of human freedom, but it is also the form and content of the self. Moreover, society and its process can be occasions for the intentional self's transcending projection to new possibilities.

We shall first consider Mead. The idea of the socially determined self is predominant in his theory of the social self. But this does not mean that he is unaware of the significance of the "I." Taking the "I" as the subject of creativity and the "me" as representing social values, he holds that the individual is not willing to live under the conditions which would involve "a sort of suicide" of the creative self, just as there could be no individual consciousness except in a social group. He goes further and argues that the action of the "I" cannot be calculated and involves a reconsideration of the society as well as the "me."[2]

Judging from his later work, Mead was far more sensitive to the problem of the intentionality of the "I" than those who borrowed his ideas for their development of the social self. In his *The Philosophy of the Present,* he deals with the problem of the emergence of novelty in social process. Let us consider the basic notion of his discussion regarding the emergence of novelty in this work. The present arises out of the past. The past is no doubt a determinate condition of the present, since the occurrence of the latter is made possible by the former. But that the past conditions the present does not imply that the former is completely determined by the latter. Mead argues that the present is always in some sense novel. He puts it this way:

> We live always in a present whose past and whose future are the extension of the field within which its undertakings may be carried out. This present is the scene of that emergence which gives always

2) Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society,* p. 214.

new heavens and a new earth, and its sociality in the very structures of our time.[3]

The determining conditions of the past will of necessity be different because the present is accompanied with emerging facts which were not contained in the past. "The social character of the universe," Mead says, is "the situation in which the novel event is in both the older and the new which its advent heralds. Sociality is the capacity for being several things at once."[4] In its dynamic aspect the novel event also adjusts the relation of the past and present. It carries over its relations to the past, yet in its emergent novelty interprets the old world from the angle of the uniqueness of its new situation. Mead says:

> However, I have defined emergence as the presence of things in two or more different systems, in such a fashion that its presence in a later system changes its character in the earlier system or systems to which it belongs.[5]

The new interpretation of the past in terms of the novel event in the present is rendered possible by man's rationality. Man as a rational being can criticize his values through his relation to others and make his own values in which he is involved through those undertakings in which the community of all rational beings is engaged.[6] Our relation to the past and future is relative to our rational undertakings in the present. "We determine what the world has been by the anxious search for the means of making it better."[7] Thus for Mead, "our values lie in the present, and past and future give us only the sehcdule of the means, and the plans of campaign for their realization."[8] The subsequent appropriation of Mead's ideas was much less influenced by his rationalism considered above than by his notion of the socially determined self.

As our foregoing consideration of Mead shows, he is not only aware of the significance of the "I" subject but takes seriously man's rationality as intentionality which brings novelty into social process. Despite these elements of intentionality, his behavioristic background leads him to place an unbalanced stress upon the socially determined self in his theory of the social self. Consequently, his theory of the social self does not develop the creative aspect of the social mediation of the self, although it contains insights into the form and content of the self which society furnishes. Moreover, his tendency to reduce the "I" to the "me" causes those who appropriate his ideas to obscure easily the significance of the "I."

Let us now turn to Schutz. His phenomenology of the social world on the whole focuses

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3) George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of the Present,* ed. by Arthur E. Murphy (Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co., 1932), p. 90.
4) *Ibid.,* p. 49.
5) *Ibid.,* p. 69.
6) *Ibid.,* p. 90.
7) *Ibid.*
8) *Ibid.*

on the sociality of man insofar as his view of man is concerned. Nevertheless, he recognizes that at least a small portion of human knowledge originates in the individual's own experience.[9] Moreover, his notion of "in-order-to motive" and his analysis of relevance presuppose intentionality although he does not expound it explicitly.

He also makes some reservations even on the function of typification, which for him is the fundamental principle of man's life in the everyday world. He holds that imposed typifications can destroy the integrity of the personality when they force the individual to identify his whole personality with them. To be sure, man is frequently willing to identify himself with some imposed typifications if they are considered an integral element of his situation. For instance, individuals are defined by law as taxpayers and draftees and forced to do the duties which these social categories impose upon them. They may consider these categories merely as differentiations within the domain of relevance constituting law-abiding citizens which is an integral element of total self-realization. This leads the individual to acknowledge these typifications as being relevant to him. The individual may take these duties as imposed by law without finding any relevancy to him. Even in this case, such imposed typifications do not annihilate his personality since only a small or superficial part of his personality is impinged upon.[10] The situation, however, is entirely different if imposed typifications force the individual to identify his whole personality with them. Then he is deprived of his freedom and dignity. Schutz states:

> But if he is compelled to identify himself as a whole with that particular trait or characteristic which places him in terms of the imposed system of heterogeneous relevances into a social category he had never included as a relevant one in the definition of his private situation, then he feels that he is no longer treated as a human being in his own right and freedom, but is degraded to an interchangeable specimen of the typified class. He is alienated from himself, a mere representative of the typified trait and characteristic. He is deprived of his right to the pursuit of happiness.[11]

All the points considered above no doubt show Schutz's awareness of the significance of intentionality. But what is most important about the intentional element of his social phenomenology is his notion of the "pure We-relationship" and the "We-relationship." We have observed that in the pure We-relationship the "I" experiences the ongoing process of the consciousness of the partner in its vivid present, and that in the We-relationship the I-Thou relation occurs in various degrees of concreteness.[12] What is to be noted about the We-relation is the face-to-face sharing of ideas, feelings, and concern in the "lived" encounter of self and other. Most of social life takes place through the "They-

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9) See above, p. 54.
10) Schutz, *Collected Papers*, II, 256.
11) *Ibid.*, pp. 256–57.
12) See above, pp. 52–53.

relationship," but the world of they in turn arises from the direct and immediate encounter of person with person which Gibson Winter describes as "the 'lived' primary world of immediate encounter" or "the primary level of social experience."[13] Taking seriously the intentionality of the "I" subject, Winter contends that the intersubjective experience of self and other in the We-relation provides a foundation for overcoming the defect of Mead's notion of the social self, i.e., an unbalanced stress upon the socially determined self.

As our foregoing consideration of the elements of intentionality in Schutz shows, he is aware of the significance of intentionality, and his notion of the We-relation can provide even a foundation to reformulate Mead's theory of the social self. But he also does not expound the creative aspect of the social mediation of the self.

Let us now consider Berger. His central concern is the exposition of the social conditioning of man. But he shows quite serious concern for man's intentionality. In *Invitation to Sociology*, he contrasts the Weberian emphasis on intentionality and the Durkheimian stress on social determination. Then he goes on to argue that neither the Weberian approach nor that of Durkheim can give the whole picture of the truth. The truth of the matter, he says, must be sought in the dialectical relationship between the two approaches because society defines man but is in turn defined by him.

Berger seeks a dialectical relationship between the Weberian and the Durkheimian approach by bringing together the sustaining function of man's sociality and the innovating and changing function of intentionality. Although Berger places strong emphasis upon the sustaining function of man's sociality, he sees its negative function as well. He says that there is an uncanny resemblance to Heidegger's *das Man* in Mead's generalized other.[14] In his system of thought Heidegger's concept of *das Man* denotes man's inauthentic existence which means to lose oneself in the anonymity of "they," surrendering one's uniqueness to "publicness." Berger recognizes the relevancy of Heidegger's concept of *Man* insofar as the negative bearing of sociality upon the individual's existence is concerned, but he, in the same measure, sees the positive sustaining function of sociality. "Society," Berger says, "provides for the individual a gigantic mechanism by which he can hide from his own freedom."[15] Viewed in this perspective, "every social institution can be an alibi, an instrument of alienation from our freedom."[16] Despite this negative aspect of sociality, he sees also the sustaining function of society saying that the taken-for-granted structures serve to protect us from chaos, terror, and anxiety. He states:

13) Gibson Winter, *Elements for a Social Ethics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 87.
14) Berger, *Invitation to Sociology*, p. 146.
15) *Ibid.*, p. 145.
16) *Ibid.*

Society provides us with taken-for-granted structures . . . within which, as long as we follow the rules, we are shielded from the naked terrors of our condition. . . . Society gives us names to shield us from nothingness. It builds a world for us to live in and thus protects us from the chaos that surrounds us on all sides.[17]

Berger goes further and contends that neither authentic existence nor inauthentic existence can be considered apart from society.

The walls of society . . . function to protect us from terror, to organize for us a cosmos of meaning within which our lives make sense. But it is also true that authentic existence can take place only within society. All meanings are transmitted in social process. One cannot be human, authentically or inauthentically, except in society.[18]

Despite his strong emphasis upon the importance of the sustaining function of man's sociality, Berger also recognizes the significance of intentionality which brings about social innovation and change. He discusses this in terms of Weber's theory of charisma. According to Weber, the charismatic leader brings new meanings into the establishment and radically redefines the assumptions of human existence. Berger recognizes the limit of the function of charisma in terms of its emergence and length of survival. Charisma also, Berger says, emerges in relation to the social context since nothing in history can happen without reference to the past:

Charisma is not to be understood as some sort of miracle that occurs without reference to what has happened before or to the social context of its appearance. Nothing in history is free of ties with the past.[19]

Moreover, a charismatic movement only rarely survives for longer than one generation. Charisma becomes sooner or later what Weber calls "routinized," that is, becomes re-integrated into the structures of society. Berger says: "Prophets are followed by popes, revolutionaries by administrators."[20]

Berger sees the limit of charisma but takes seriously the Weberian emphasis on intentionality because it can explain social innovation and change which the Durkheimian stress on sociality can not do. Berger writes:

Since all social systems were created by men, it follows that men can also change them. Indeed, one of the limitations of the aforementioned views of society . . . is that it is difficult to account for change within their frame of reference. This is where the historical orientation of the Weberian approach redresses the balance.[21]

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17) *Ibid.*, pp. 147–48.
18) *Ibid.*, p. 149.
19) *Ibid.*, p. 127.
20) *Ibid.*
21) *Ibid.*, p. 128.

Berger's approach is much closer to a balanced relationship between intentionality and sociality than that of Mead and Schutz. He even touches on the idea of society as the occasion for the self-realization of the intentional self when he says that "the same social situations that can become traps of 'bad faith' can also be occasions for freedom."[22] In his later works, the same view has been developed further although it is by implication rather than explicitly. Let us consider this matter further.

Berger discusses the dialectical relationship between man's sociality and intentionality in terms of the human organism and the socio-cultural context in which the human organism unfolds itself. He argues that, "unlike the other higher mammals who are born with an essentially completed organism, man is curiously 'unfinished' at birth."[23] The immense plasticity of the human organism enables man to produce himself as well as the world. On the other hand, man's self-production and the world-building activity can be carried on only in the particular social context. In summary: "*Society is a human product . . . Man is a social product.*"[24] This leads Berger to interpret man's world-building activity in terms of the interaction between the externalization of man as social reality and the internalization of society in man.

Berger's notion of man as a social product contains some elements of the intentioanal self's appropriation of the socio-cultural world for its actualization and enrichment. However, he does not expound this matter explicitly. His governing concern is to demonstrate that the formulation of the self and the world is molded and determined by the socio-cultural context through the dialectical interaction between the externalization of the self and the internalization of the social world. It seems that his insufficient development of intentionality is due to his limited notion of intentionality, i.e., the unfinished human organism. To be sure, man's intentionality must mean more than this. For instance, when we speak of the intentionality of the moral agent it implies valuing and choosing. Thus Berger's notion of man as a social product stops short of a full grasp of the creative aspect of the social mediation of the self.

Let us now turn to a balance between intentional self and social self, and the impact of the socio-cultural world upon the fulfillment of human freedom as intentionality. It is Winter who gives a succinct account of these problems. We shall consider these matters in line with Winter's exposition of them. Let us consider first a balance between intentional self and social self. Winter seeks this balance by a reformulation of Mead's theory of the social self in terms of Schutz's notion of the We-relation. Mead's basic model of the

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22) *Ibid.*, p. 145.
23) Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, p. 4.
24) Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 61.

social emergence of the self is the triadic structure of the relationship between the self and the other: (1) the gesture of the self; (2) the adjustive response made by the other; and (3) the perception of the gesture through the response on the part of the self. Of these three elements of the triadic structure, only the latter two elements come to expression in the social self. Winter ascribes this instability of the triadic structure to the two deficient points inherent in Mead's theory of the social self: Mead bypasses the relatedness or sociality which underlies the notions of gesture and response and passes over the centrality of the "I" in the emergence of the "me."[25]

Mead's triadic structure presupposes sociality, i.e., the relatedness of "I" and "other" which is already present. "The 'I'-who-gestures opens a process in consciousness which is already present as the substratum of the relatedness between 'I' and 'other.'"[26] The triadic structure presupposes the initiation of gesture by the "I" and its understanding and interpretation of the gesture of the other. "The 'I'-who-gestures and the 'I'-who-inter-prets-the-gesture in his response are both presupposed in the account of the emergence of mind, self, and society."[27]

In Schutz's We-relation Winter finds a corrective to the instability of Mead's triadic structure. That is to say, Winter finds a solid foundation of the first element of the triadic structure in the We-relation which contains the intentionality of the "I" subject—the mutual understanding and interpretation of ideas in the direct and immediate encounter of self and other. Winter stresses especially the significance of Schutz's notion of a "mutual tuning-in relationship" between the communicator and the addressee of the communication which Schutz develops in his essay "Making Music Together."[28] In this essay Schutz founds the communicative process on a sharing of inner time and a vivid present claiming that all possible communication presupposes the "mutual tuning-in relationship."[29] Winter argues for a balance between intentional self and social self in terms of the We-relation. This leads him to reformulate the triadic structure in such a way as to protect both creativity and determination. Let us consider how he deals with this matter by analyzing his development of the social mediation of the self, i.e., the impact of the socio-cultural world upon the fulfillment of human freedom as intentionality.

Winter regards the socio-cultural world as both the limit of and occasion for human freedom. He puts it this way in terms of Mead's notion of the social self: "Mead's insight into the social mediation of the self points to the content of the self which is the objective

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25) Winter, *Elements for Social Ethics,* p. 27.

26) *Ibid.,* p. 26.

27) *Ibid.,* p. 25.

28) Schutz, *Collected Papers,* II, 159–78.

29) *Ibid.,* pp. 177 f.

correlative of intentional being-in-the-world."[30] Here it is to be noted that the bearing of society upon the self is taken not merely as the mechanistic determination of the self but as the occasion for human freedom. It is true that human existence is in a great measure socially determined. Therefore, an adequate understanding of man's valuing and choosing has to take account of the social determination of the self. But if we consider the social self in terms of intentionality, society turns out to be the vehicle of the actualization and enrichment of the "I" subject.

To reiterate, society defines the individual but is in turn defined by him. However much the self may be determined by social process, it also reshapes that process according to its interests and commitment to human values. If the self is more than a product of social process and if the intentional self uses the socio-cultural world as the vehicle of the actualization and enrichment of its freedom, then society should be taken as providing the substance of the self and furnishing the cultural and social milieu in which the self actualizes its freedom and fulfillment.[31] Viewed in this perspective, the self's conformity to society turns out to be its appropriation of the socio-cultural world as the form and content of its actualization. Winter says: "What had seemed a domination of alien forces—the society and its prices—can now be reinterpreted as domination by the structures appropriate to the self, since the form and content of the self are culturally determined."[32]

2. An Exposition of the Intentionality of the Moral Agent as His Answerability to Communal Values in the Light of Man's Fundamental Sociality

The essential characteristic of moral conduct is that it takes place according to the moral agent's interests and his commitment to values. In other words, moral conduct consists of valuing and choosing. This characteristic of moral conduct leads us to the question: what can be said about the moral subject "I" in reference to the ultimate horizon of meaning in which valuing and choosing take place? The self reflects its search for the integrated, harmonious, and enriching self-realization in human interdependence. To put it in terms of Winter's phrasing, "The self . . . reflects a thrust toward wholeness both in its self and in the harmony of the world in relation to which it is constituted."[33]

This general notion of man's self-realization includes two elements: man's claim for his self-realization which is endemic to his being, and the harmonious and enriching fulfillment of man's possibilities in his relation to others and society. Although these two elements are interacting and therefore inseparable in actual life, it is useful to distinguish

30) Winter, *Elements for Social Ethics*, p. 108.
31) *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.
32) *Ibid.*, p. 30.
33) *Ibid.*, p. 107.

them in order to analyze the problem of self-realization with greater clarity. We shall consider first the former and then move on to the latter.

It is impossible to speak of moral conduct without presupposing man's claim for the actualization and fulfillment of his freedom which is endemic to his existence as a rational being. This can be well illustrated by considering Paul Tillich's analysis of the unconditional character of man's demand to become his essential self in terms of an ontological anthropology. He regards the demand to become what man essentially is as unconditional. He demonstrates this by an ontological analysis of man's essential nature. For him, man is a "centered person" who is "the bearer of the spirit, its creativity, and its self-transcendence."[34] He often calls this centered person a "centered self." Man as a centered self is a potential being to be realized in his relation to the ultimate ground of his being. To put this in terms of Tillich's notion of "power," man as a centered self is the power of being which strives for self-affirmation in his relation to the ground of his being. Seen in this way, man's life is a process of the actualization of what he is essentially.

Man's self-transcendence or freedom enables him to respond to the world in accordance with his own free decision. He can respond to the stimuli from the world after deliberation and decision rather than through determined compulsion. This means that he responds "responsibly" to the world to which he belongs. Thus, man's life is the process of the self-actualization of the centered self in his relation to the world through free responsible decision. For Tillich, the actualization of man's essential self in his relation to the world is the fundamental form of all moral acts. Every moral act is an act in which an individual self achieves his self-realization in his relation to the world.[35]

Thus, for Tillich the fundamental form of the moral imperative is the demand to become actually what man essentially is. He asks "Why is the moral imperative unconditional?" His answer is: "Because it is our own true or essential being that confronts us in the moral command."[36] Since that which commands us in the moral demand is our own essential self, we violate our own essential being if we act against it. On the contrary, if the command comes from any external authority, it cannot be unconditional because it denies the autonomy of will without which man is no longer a centered person.

Tillich expounds the unconditional character of the moral demand to become man's essential self in terms of his idea of "theonomy" as distinguished from "heteronomy" and "autonomy." He holds that the will of God is precisely man's essential being. Therefore, "God's will is given to us in the way we are created, which means it is given through our

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34) Paul Tillich, *Morality and Beyond,* Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 27.
35) *Ibid.,* pp. 19–20.
36) Paul Tillich, *My Search for Absolutes,* ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 95.

true nature, our essential being."[37] Thus, a divine command is not imposed on us arbitrarily from outside, but it is the essential nature of our own being that speaks to us in the moral command. This is succinctly expressed in Tillich's own definition of "theonomy":

> Theonomy asserts that the superior law is, at the same time, the innermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which is man's own ground: the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his own.[38]

When Tillich argues for the unconditional character of the demand to become man's essential self, he means the form of the demand and not its content. The command is distorted in the process of actualization and changes according to the situation. Despite the relativity of the concrete moral decision, the formal absoluteness of the moral imperative itself remains intact. Tillich says: "The unconditional character does not refer to the content, but to the form of the moral decision."[39]

But one may still raise the question "Why is the command to become one's essential self unconditional?" For man's freedom can refuse to choose his essential self. Tillich holds that the answer to the question can be given only on a religious dimension that transcends man's own finite freedom and his ability to affirm or negate himself. Tillich says: "So I maintain my basic assertion that the unconditional character of the moral imperative is its religious quality."[40]

This implies that the command to become one's self becomes unconditional when the aim of life is considered something above finitude and transitoriness whether it is understood religiously or philosophically. When Plato, for instance, understands the *telos* of man as becoming as much as possible similar to God, such a telos gives unconditional character to the moral imperative to become what man essentially is. For the fulfillment of this aim is infinitely significant and unconditional. The same holds for Aristotle. For him, man's highest aim is participation in the eternity through the "theoretical" life. To reach this goal is an unconditional imperative.[41]

By man's self-realization Tillich does not mean the actualization of the isolated individual but man's self-realization in his relation to others. In the process of his self-realization, man is not only related to the world but encounters other persons. Tillich formulates this as: "The moral imperative is the command to become what one potentially is, a *person* within a community of persons."[42] There is no limit to man's dealing with the

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37) *Ibid.*, p. 96.
38) Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, trans. by James Luther Adams, Phoenix Books (Chicago: University of Chcago Press, 1957), pp. 56–57.
39) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 23.
40) *Ibid.*, p. 25.
41) *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.
42) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

world as nonpersonal nature. He can subject nature to his knowledge and action. He can use everything for his purpose transforming it into an object. Nothing can limit his dealing with nature except his finitude. But even this limit can be reduced infinitely. No one can actually establish man's limit since he can transcend any imaginable limit in his encounter with the universe.[43]

There is, however, a limit for man which is definite and which he always encounters. It is the other man as person. Man can realize his essential being only through his encounter with other persons. This is what Tillich means by "a *person* within a community of persons." He says: "Man becomes man in personal encounters. Only by meeting a 'thou' does man realize that he is an "ego.""[44] The other person as a person is essentially different from nature as non-personal reality in the sense that man cannot use the other person as an object or a means. He must acknowledge the other man as a person or an end. He must treat the other person as a centered self. "The other one, the 'thou', is like a wall which cannot be removed or penetrated or used."[45] We have seen that the moral imperative to become man's essential self is unconditional. We must say the same thing to every other person. The other man's claim to be treated as a person is intrinsic in his being.

Man can disregard the other man's claim to be a person. He can remove or use him. He can turn a human being into a mere object. This means that he destroys the dignity of the other man as a person. But he who tries to do so, destroys his own person as well since he becomes a person only in personal relationship with other persons. "If one uses a person one abuses not only him but also one's self."[46] To take the slave for an example, "the master who treats the slave not as an ego but as a thing endangers his own quality as an ego."[47] "He who turns a human being (in the psychological sense) into a mere object suffers the distortion of his own personal center."[48]

The foregoing discussion of man's unconditional demand to become his essential self has referred to the fact that human self-realization takes place in relation to others and society. This has touched already on the second element of man's self-realization, i.e., the harmonious and enriching fulfillment of man's possibilities in relation to others and society. However, our notion of others and the world has been limited to isolated individual others and the outer world. To be sure, much more must be said about the

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43) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 36; Paul Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 78.
44) Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice*, p. 78.
45) *Ibid.*, p. 78.
46) Tillich, *My Search for Absolutes*, p. 95.
47) Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice*, pp. 78–79.
48) Tillich, *Morality and Beyond*, p. 38.

implications of others and the world. The self's relations to others must imply inter-dependent, intersubjective human relationships as related to social systems and structures. It follows that an adequate approach to man's self-realization must take into consideration the impact of the socio-cultural world upon it. What has been said about a balance between intentional self and social self or creativity and determination applies to the relationship between man's freedom for his self-realization and the socio-cultural world. Let us consider this matter in greater detail.

When we speak of man's unconditional claim for his self-realization, it implies that all moral conduct must presuppose man's ultimate commitment to the actualization of his possibilities. However, this is a formal and general definition of the ultimate horizon of meaning in which all moral conduct takes place. The intentional self appropriates the socio-cultural world as the vehicle of the integrated, harmonious, and enriching fulfillment of self-realization. On the one hand, the intentional self understands the truth of human existence in terms of his religious faith or philosophical conviction. On the other hand, the intentional self interprets, orders, and grounds the meanings of self-realization in a given social and cultural milieu. This means that the intentionality of the moral agent shapes the form and content of his self-realization through the mediation of the socio-cultural world. Thus, the fundamental meanings of man's self-realization are specified and shaped through the interaction between the intentionality of the moral agent and the socio-cultural world. These fundamental meanings given to man's self-realization are expressed as the funda-mental or core values of the society. We propose to call such values "fundamental human values" or "core communal values." Fundamental human values represent the key meanings of man's self-realization in human interdependence within a given social tradi-tion. Each society has its own fundamental human values in which the society is grounded. In the Western Christian tradition, "love," "freedom," "justice," and "order" can be regarded as fundamental human values.[49]

That fundamental human values are historically shaped from human moral experience in corporate life can be well illustrated with reference to Winter's interpretation of "free-dom," "equality," "power," and "love" as the historical expressions of justice in the Western tradition. According to him, there are two fundamental themes in the Jewish and Christian traditions which are affirmed by the biblical tradition and which function as the principles of the truth of human existence.[50] These two themes are: "the disclosure

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49) These four basic values of Christianity are suggested by Gustafson's essay "Christian Ethics and Social Policy," in *Faith and Ethics*, ed. by Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). In this essay he mentions these values in the discussion of Christian social ethics.

50) Winter, *Elements of Social Ethics*, p. 223.

of the Holy One in the events of creative work, taking up nature into the whole course of creative work," and "man's calling within the sphere of history—the place of his fulfillment."[51] The general structure of the Western moral tradition, Winter says, has been formed basically by these two principal themes. "Freedom," "equality," "power," and "love" form the ingredients of the historical expressions of justice in that tradition.[52] Since fundamental human values are shaped from human moral experience which takes place in communal life, they are relative to the socio-cultural context. But their formal validity in a given society persists although they are reinterpreted in the course of fundamental social changes.

Thus far our discussion has been limited to the social emergence of fundamental human values which implies that they are shaped by man's intentionality in his search for his self-realization in human interdependence within social systems and structures. Let us now turn to the social nature of these values. "They have value not in and of themselves but as relations among persons and institutions."[53] The relational nature of values is succinctly expounded by H. Richard Niebuhr in his celebrated essay "The Center of Value." He has noted that the recent value theorists "usually employ a relational theory of value which defines good by reference to a being for which other beings are good" when they deal with concrete ethical problems.[54] Against the objective, essential theory of value which regards value as transcendental essence existing in and by itself, Niebuhr insists on a relational value theory that regards value as an attribute or function of being-in-relation-to-being. His relational value theory defines value as "the good-for-ness of being for being in their reciprocity, their animosity, and their mutual aid."[55]

However, it is to be noted that Niebuhr distinguishes his relational value theory from a subjective "psychological relativism" for which "there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so."[56] He contends that every ethical theory rests at last upon a "center of value" from which all ethical reasoning proceeds. He calls such a presupposition of a center of value a "dogmatic starting point."[57] He states:

> Though relational value theory is not psychologically relativistic it is evidently dogmatically relativistic since it is necessary to take one's standpoint with or in some being accepted as the center of value if one is to construct anything like a consistent system of value judgments and

51) *Ibid.*
52) *Ibid.*
53) Gustafson, "Christian Ethics and Social Policy," in *Faith and Ethics,* p. 130.
54) H. Richard Niebuhr, *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture,* Harper Torchbooks, (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1943), p. 100.
55) *Ibid.,* p. 107.
56) *Ibid.,* p. 111.
57) *Ibid.,* p. 110.

determinations of what is right.[58]

To consider fundamental human values in terms of Niebuhr's relational value theory, they are more relational than substantive, and they are meaningful not as independent entities but as relations in communal life. The social nature and function of fundamental human values is succinctly expressed when Gustafson defines freedom and justice as "parts of moral experience, occurring in common life, and not independent entities divorced from relations between persons, institutions, and nature."[59] Fundamental human values become meaningful and significant socially and personally when they are understood as relations between persons within social systems and structures. This view is clearly expressed when Gustafson says that "freedom in social life and action is freedom for persons in a network of given social, economic, and political processes and institutions."[60]

Moral conduct takes place not only in relation to fundamental human values, but it has to do with relative moral values. The formal values are persisting core values in which a society or cultural tradition is grounded; whereas the latter values are contingent values relative to the needs of society in a particular time under given social systems and structures. Relative moral values come into being in order for fundamental human values to meet the needs of complex concrete situations. Consequently they pass away when they become irrelevant.

To summarize our discussion so far, all moral conduct presupposes man's ultimate commitment to his self-realization in human interdependence within given social systems and structures. Man's intentionality specifies and shapes the principal meanings of his self-realization from the moral experience of man's social existence. These specifications and shapes given to the meanings of man's self-realization are expressed as fundamental human values. Here it must be emphasized that the intentional self understands the truth of human existence in terms of his religious faith or philosophical conviction. The religious faith or philosophical conviction as the ultimate ground of the moral agent is highly important because it affects his formulation of fundamental human values as well as his reinterpretation of them in the course of social changes.

The moral agent's relation to these fundamental human values or core communal values constitutes the ultimate horizon of meaning in which moral conduct takes place with the aid of the mediatory function of relative moral values. This can be well illustrated by the case of H. Richard Niebuhr's ethics of responsibility which he develops in terms of the moral agent's relation to core communal values which he understands in terms of the

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58) *Ibid.,* p. 109.
59) Gustafson, "Christian Ethics and Social Policy," in *Faith and Ethics,* p. 129.
60) *Ibid.,* p. 130.

"causes" of the larger community. Niebuhr borrows the notion of "cause" from Josiah Royce's philosophy of loyalty. Niebuhr is so impressed by Royce's idea of "cause" that he appropriates it for the development of his ethics of responsibility. Let us consider this in more detail.

"Cause" is a central idea of Royce's philosophy of loyalty. Cause, Royce says, binds individuals to one greater community. Taking cause seriously, he contends that man comes to selfhood by virtue of committing himself to a cause. Niebuhr interprets the significance of Royce's idea of cause this way: "When a person is able to say 'For this cause was I born and therefore came into the world,' he has arrived at mature selfhood."[61]

What is cause for Royce? He defines it as: "The cause . . . is some sort of unity whereby many persons are joined in one common life."[62] Thus, for Royce cause is that which binds many individuals into one common life. What is it then that binds many persons to this common cause? It is, Royce asserts, loyalty to the common cause. Royce says: "Loyalty shall mean . . . the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause."[63] For Royce, one's loyalty to a cause is essentially social because a loyal man is tied in loyalty on the one hand to a cause, and on the other to his fellow servants of the cause. Royce puts it this way:

> Loyalty is social. . . . You can love an individual. But you can be loyal only to a tie that binds you and others into some sort of unity, and loyal to individuals only through the tie. . . . It binds many individuals into one service.[64]

Royce also interprets Christianity in terms of his idea of cause and loyalty to it. Christ is the symbol of loyalty to one common Christian life. "The name of Christ has always been, for the Christian believers, the symbol for the Spirit in whom the faithful—that is to say the loyal—always are and have been one."[65] What is then the cause to which the Christians are loyal? Royce says that it is the divine universal community to be realized.

> Whatever Christology Paul, or any later leader of Christian faith taught, and whatever religious experience has been used by the historical church, or by any of its sects or of its visible forms, as giving warrant for the Christological opinions, *the liberal and historical fact has always been this, that in some fashion and degree those who have thus believed in the being whom they called Christ, were united in a community of the faithful, were in love with that community, were hopefully and practically devoted to the cause of the still invisible, but perfectly real and divine Universal Community.*[66]

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61) Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self*, p. 83.
62) Josiah Royce, *William James and Other Essays*, quoted by Gabriel Marcel, *Royce's Metaphysics*, trans. by Virginia and Gordon Ringer (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956), p. 111.
63) Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), pp. 16–17.
64) *Ibid.*, p. 20.
65) Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1913), II, 426.
66) *Ibid.*, p. 425.

Niebuhr not only puts Royce's idea of cause into his ethics but develops his own unique triadic form of human life. He expounds the triadic form of human life against the Buberian dichotomy which tends to take the "I-Thou" and "I-It" relationship as two separate spheres. Niebuhr understands the triadic form of human life in two ways. One is the triadic interrelationship of the self, society (or the other), and nature (or natural events). He contends that Buber's dichotomy does not exist in actual life. For I respond to natural events as a social being; on the other hand I respond to my companions as those who are in relation to nature.

My interpretation of natural events is never the result of my encounter with them alone. I understand them as they have been interpreted in my society. That is, I am introduced to "the *system* of nature as systematized by society."[67] On the other hand, my relation to my companions involves my relation to nature. For instance, we have to try not to pollute air and water in our highly industrialized age in order to love our companions. This means that our relation to our companions also involves our relation to nature.

The other way of the triadic form of human life is the dialectical interaction of the self, other selves, and the causes of the community. Niebuhr argues that a third reality always comes into play in our relation to our companions. For instance, the soldier's loyalty to his fellow soldiers involves, at the same time, his loyalty to the causes of his country. To take another example, when I become involved in a question of legal responsibility, I am in relation to the administrator of my society's justice and the justice to which my society refers as lying beyond it.[68]

The causes of the community represent a certain universal cause. My relation to my companions goes beyond them to the causes of the community. The causes of the community in turn represent a certain cause which goes beyond the community to humanity as in the case of democracy. Niebuhr holds that the ultimate human cause goes beyond a particular human community to a universal community.[69] Thus, Niebuhr's loyalty to cause at its final phase moves toward a universal community based on the universal cause. He understands the universal community based on the universal cause in terms of his concept of God as the "Universal One." God as the Universal One is the ultimate ground of the universal community. Christ is the symbol of universal loyalty or responsibility to God as the Universal One.[70]

Niebuhr interprets man's relation to God in terms of the response in trust or distrust,

67) Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self*, pp. 79–80.
68) *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.
69) *Ibid.*, p. 85.
70) *Ibid.*, pp. 161–78.

which for him means faith, to "the radical action whereby we are ourselves in the here and now, as thus and so."[71] The response in trust or distrust to the radical action by which we are is one's decision of trust or distrust in God. What is to be noted in Niebuhr's idea of the response in trust or distrust to the radical action is that it qualifies all our particular interpretations and actions. He writes:

> The response in trust or distrust to the radical act of the self's and its world's creation qualifies all particular interpretations of finite actions upon the self and therefore all its reactions. . . . the response of faith to the radical action by which the self is, is present as a qualifying element in all interpretations and reactions to the movements of that finite world of particular beings in which the I is involved.[72]

Neibuhr's notion of God as the universal cause and one's commitment to it has two significant ethical meanings. First, his notion of God as the universal cause, which he interprets as the center of value, enables him to develop his contextual, relational ethics without falling into the trap of relativism. As we have observed, he argues that every ethical theory rests upon a "dogmatic starting point." To take some examples, the center of value of utilitarianism is the happiness of the individual and that of the society. For evolutionary ethics, the "good-for-life" is the value-center. Thus these theories take one finite reality such as man, society, or life as the value-center, the dogmatic beginning of their ethics. Niebuhr calls such dogmatism "dogmatism of a relativism."[73] The center of value of Christian ethics is God, the transcendent One.[74] God as the center of value, Niebuhr says, goes beyond the "dogmatism of a relativism" that takes one finite reality as the value-center and consequently confines the discussion of the good to an arbitrarily chosen field.[75]

The same view can be seen in *The Responsible Self* as well. Here he defines man as "man-the-answerer" who is responsive to, interpreter of, and accountable for others and the world.[76] He constitutes his "ethics of responsibility," distinguishing it from both "deontology" and "teleology." Teleological ethics tries to answer the moral inquiry "What shall I do?" by asking "What is my goal, ideal, or telos?" Deontological ethics tries to answer the question by asking "What is the law and what is the first law of my life?" The central concern of ethics of responsibility is "What is going on?" To put these three different approaches in value terms, teleology is concerned for the good, whereas deontology

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71) *Ibid.,* p. 115.
72) *Ibid.,* p. 121.
73) Niebuhr, *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture,* p. 112.
74) *Ibid.,* pp. 110–12.
75) *Ibid.,* p. 112.
76) Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self,* p. 56 and cf. p. 51.

seeks the right. But the concern of ethics of responsibility is the "fitting" action that fits into the situation. Niebuhr puts it this way: "For ethics of responsibility the *fitting* action, the one that fits into a total interaction as response and as anticipation of further response is alone conductive to the good and alone is right."[77] Despite this relative approach, his ethics is ultimately grounded in God as the universal One or the center of value.

Secondly, Niebuhr's notion of the response in trust to the radical act points to what we have referred to as the significance of the moral agent's religious faith or philosophical conviction as the ultimate ground of the intentional self. We have already observed that Niebuhr's response in trust to the radical act is one's decision to trust in God, i.e., faith. We have also seen that for Niebuhr the self's faith in God qualifies all his particular interpretations of finite actions upon him and therefore all his reactions to them. This means that the self's faith in God functions as the ultimate principle of his life which governs all his relations to others and the world. From Niebuhr we may go further and say that man's commitment to God as the center of value qualifies his formulation of the causes of the society and his reinterpretation of them in the course of fundamental social change.

B. The Impact of the Intentionality of the Moral Agent Upon the Sustaining Function of Man's Sociality and Moral Norms

1. The Sustaining Function of Man's Sociality and Its Limit Considered in Terms of the Intentionality of the Moral Agent

We have already seen that the function of man's sociality is both negative and positive in the discussion of the balance between intentionality and sociality. The social determination of the individual can prevent him from making free decisions. Viewed in this respect, sociality no doubt functions negatively. But sociality also functions positively. We referred to this positive function when we described civil laws, moral norms, institutions, customs, and manners as the sustaining patterns of life.[78] Especially, we have often referred to the sustaining function of sociality when we have defined the positive social function of moral norms in terms of their sustaining function of corporated moral life. That is to say, we have often argued that corporate moral life is maintained by continuity and generality of morality secured by moral norms. Man's moral conduct on the social level takes place in relation to communal values, and the form of his action is in a large measure governed by the sustaining patterns of life which represent these values. Thus, it is through the

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77) *Ibid.*, p. 61.
78) See above, p. 8.

sustaining function of sociality that communal values are preserved and continue to govern corporate moral life.

Our exposition of the intentionality of the moral agent and its relation to man's fundamental sociality necessitates an examination of the limit of the sustaining function of sociality. We have already touched on this matter in our discussion of Berger's analysis of the dialectical relationship between the Weberian emphasis on intentionality and the Durkheimian stress on social determination. Berger's recognition of the relevancy of the Weberian notion of charisma for the explanation of social changes which are brought into the taken-for-granted routines of social process touches on the limit of man's sociality. Although human community can be maintained by the sustaining function of man's sociality, the intentionality of the moral agent sets some limits on it. The same holds for the sustaining function of the social systems. Man's corporate moral life is maintained by the sustaining patterns of life and social systems. But an adequate approach to the function of these patterns and systems must take into consideration the limit of their function set by man's intentionality.

The central problem of the limit of the sustaining function of man's sociality is that the sustaining patterns of life and social systems are relevant only insofar as they function as the vehicle of the effective and harmonious actualization of communal belief and core values in response to the needs of society. Emphasis upon the positive importance of the sustaining patterns of life for the maintenance of human community does not imply that they cannot be perverse and run counter to the realization of the belief and fundamental human values of the society. The sustaining patterns of life which served as the means of the actualization of communal belief and core values can prevent men from responding to the belief and values when they become irrelevant due to social change. Social systems and structures also can be oppressive and destructive when fundamental social change takes place. This means that the sustaining patterns of life and social systems need to be subject to continuous critical reassessment in order to keep them relevant. Human community is maintained by the continuities and generalities of communal belief and core values that the sustaining patterns of life provide for, as well as by the creative perceptions which reassess the validity of these patterns and reformulate new patterns in response to the changing socio-cultural context.

The sustaining patterns of life and social systems can become ineffective or even run counter to the realization of communal belief and core values by human selfishness. Moreover, unjust laws and social systems can magnify the effects of human selfishness. This view is well expressed when Gustafson says:

To suggest the positive ethical importance of institutions and civil arrangements in the human

community is not to deny the existence of unjust laws, or the magnifying of the effects of human selfishness through the use of economic and social power over workers, or over a nation.[79]

Human relations are a realm of both rationality and selfishness, creativity and destruction. The same holds for the sustaining patterns and social systems as well. They function as the means of preservation and transmission of communal belief and core values and provide for the generalized patterns of these values through which we participate in social process with an economy of effort and without danger and anxiety. But they may prevent us from responding to communal belief and core values when they are no longer relevant because of the discrepancy between them and the new needs of the changed society. They may also become ineffective or even the perverse instruments of human selfishness. It follows that they are in need of continuous reassessment and reformulation in the intentional self's sensitive reference to communal belief and fundamental human values in response to the changing socio-economic environment.

2. The Sustaining Function of Moral Norms and Their Limit Considered in Terms of the Intentionality of the Moral Agent

All moral decisions are by implication the affirmation of communal core values. In this respect, all moral conduct takes place in relation to communal core values. It is, however, fallible and ambiguous to make concrete moral decisions with the direction of these comprehensive values alone. In everyday moral life, moral conduct takes place relying on moral norms which provide general patterns of what can or cannot be ethically justified according to communal values. This is the sustaining function of moral norms to which we have often referred. Our expositions of intentionality necessitates an examination of the limit of this sustaining function of moral norms. We shall examine this by considering the relationship between fundamental human values and the formulation and function of moral norms.

We have mentioned "love," "justice," "freedom," and "order" as the fundamental human values in the Western Christian tradition insofar as the discourse of social ethics is concerned. We shall expound the relationship between fundamental human values and moral norms by examining the relation of these four central Christian values to the formulation and function of moral norms.

Love, justice, freedom, and order are taken as universally valid moral principles in the discourse of Christian ethics. Love is taken as the law of love which is regarded as the ultimate ground and fulfillment of all moral conduct and norms. Justice and freedom are taken as the principle of justice and the principle of freedom or liberty. The latter principle

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79) Gustafson, "A Theology of Christian Community," in *The Church as Moral Decision-maker*, p. 71.

is generally included in the principle of justice together with the principle of equality. In any case, these two principles of justice are regarded as universally valid. The universal validity of these two principles is well demonstrated by the limited natural law theory of Reinhold Niebuhr and Tillich. Both of them regard the two central principles of natural law—the principle of equality and the principle of liberty—as universally valid although they give merely limited endorsement to their universal validity. They hold that only *agape*-love brings these principles of natural justice to their perfection, but it does so without abrogating their universal validity recognized by man's natural moral capacity.[80]

80) For Niebuhr's account of the limited natural law theory, see Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), I, Chapter X; *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, II, Chapter IX; *Love and Justice*, ed. by D. B. Robertson, Meridian Books (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1967), Part I (1, 2. 5); *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1935); Paul Ramsey, *Nine Modern Moralists* (Englewood, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), Chapter 5. For Tillich's account of the limited natural law theory, see Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice; Morality and Beyong*, Chapter II; *My Search for Absolutes*, Chapter III; Ramsey, *Nine Modern Moralists*, Chapter 7.

Niebuhr expounds a limited natural law theory in terms of a critical and affirmative reconstruction of natural law. He recognizes the "remnant" or "residual" element of the "original justice" in man's natural moral capacity which he regards as the precondition to receive the law of love. He holds that there are some general principles of justice known by natural reason which define the right order of life in a community. He goes so far as to say that there are no living communities which do not have some notion of this sort of general principles of justice. He regards the principle of equality and liberty recognized in Stoicism as universally valid. However, according merely limited endorsement to the validity of these principles of natural jutice, Niebuhr reconstructs them in terms of their relation to Christian love. He holds that although man possesses by nature some capacity to sense justice, the implications of justice can be fully grasped only when justice is understood in its relation to Christian love. Justice, in Niebuhr's view, has a positive as well as a negative relation to love. In its positive relation to love, justice finds its fulfillment in love. In its negative relation to love, justice discovers that all its actual embodiments stand in contradiction to love. "Love is both the fulfillment and the negation of all achievements of justice in history" (*The Nature and Destiny of Man*, II, 246). Niebuhr seeks a limited natural law by steering between the two opposing traditional views of natural law: the Roman Catholic optimistic and the Protestant negative view of natural law. On the one hand, he rejects the undue confidence of Roman Catholicism in the ability of an uncorrupted natural reason to arrive at definite standards of natural justice. On the other hand, he disavows the Protestant denial of natural law that does not recognize any abiding structure and natural law norm.

Tillich calls for the need for "a new foundation of natural law" to prevent ethics from falling into relativism which is predominant in our time. He finds the safeguard against positivistic, relativistic theories of ethics in the doctrine of natural law which presupposes justice as valid for everything in every period. Although he recognizes the universal validity of natural justice, he finds the final fulfillment of justice in a unique Christian concept of justice anchored in *agape*-love. He holds that *agape*-love affects natural justice in two ways. First, love makes justice dynamic and creative. That is to say, love sensitizes justice to unique claims of the particular situation. In other words, love makes us listen to unique demands of the particular situation; whereas justice can remain an external act that is performed with legal detachment or cool objectivity. Tillich describes this function of love as "listening love." Secondly, love creates a "non-proportional justice" by transforming proportional justice based on the natural notion of justice, the *suum cuique*. Tillich calls this, "transforming or creative justice." He holds that proportional justice cannot include those who do not deserve to share the given proportion. It, he says, is "transforming" or "creative" justice that raises to higher status him who does not deserve to share a given system of proportion. Thus, Tillich also expounds a critical and affirmative reconstruction of natural law in terms of the relation of natural justice to *agape*-love.

Order also can be regarded as a universally valid principle of ordering of human existence in communal life. We have observed that Gustafson uses the term "ordering" instead of "order" to avoid the wrong identification of an existing historical pattern with the divine order.[81] Rejecting an uncritical, conservative acceptance of status quo, Gustafson takes the meaning of order as the continuous ordering of human existence in accordance with the providence of God's order, the purpose of which is to fulfill humanity through community.[82] Thus, although the particular patterns of historical orders are relative, the formal principle of order in human community remains universally valid.

We have argued that each society has its own fundamental human values which persist, although they are reinterpreted in the course of social changes. But even these fundamental human values are relative to the unique socio-cultural context of a particular society, since they are the interpretations and shapes of man's self-realization within a given social and cultural environment. This is evident from the different interpretation of love and justice in the Greek and the Western Christian tradition. Plato's *eros* and Aristotle's *philos* are different from Christian love as *agape*. The Aristotelian notion of proportional justice is different from the Christian concept of justice which elevates and transforms proportional justice as Tillich, for instance, expounds the latter in terms of his notion of "transforming or creative justice." However, it seems that the aforementioned four Christian values or moral principles are by implication common to all of human experience when they are understood and interpreted in comprehensive human language in terms of what they imply in human relations within social systems and structures. This is merely a comprehensive hypothesis rather than an established generalization. But it seems that Christianity in our time of the global village of the world is in need of the interpretation of its central values in such a way as to make them relevant to all of human experience.

These fundamental Christian moral values or principles do not offer answers to particular moral problems, but rather illumine the source and ultimate fulfillment of morals. In other words, the significance of these principles lies in their heuristic or symbolic function. The historical actualization of these values is in a great measure affected by the historical social context and therefore relative. All historical achievements of these principles fall short of realizing the ideal of these principles. For the historical embodiments of all these principles are inevitably affected by the given social context as well as by selfish human egoism. There is no universal reason in history which is free of the effect of the social context, and no impractical perspective upon the whole field of man's rational adjustments of conflicting interests and contending claims. Hence, no historical achievement

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81) See above, n. 9, p. 8.
82) Gustafson, "A Theology of Christian Community," in *The Church as Moral Decision-maker*, pp. 70–71.

of justice will ever arrive at the perfect realization of these principles. Despite the rel-
ativity of the historical actualization of these principles, their formal or symbolic validity
as the moral ideals remains universal. This symbolic function of these principles is to be
taken seriously since it can save ethics from falling into relativism for which there is nothing
either good or bad but the individual's subjective judgment.

However, these principles are formal and therefore rather too abstract to apply directly
to particular practical problems. They require some "subordinate rules" which relate them
relevantly to particular social situations. We propose to call these subordinate rules "re-
lative moral rules." From now on, we use the term "moral rules" when it is necessary to
distinguish relative moral rules from universal moral principles. We use "moral norms"
when we do not make the distinction between these two categories of norms.

Considered in terms of the relation of the moral agent to these two kinds of norms,
universal moral principles are "vertical" norms; whereas relative moral rules are "horizon-
tal" norms. Vertical norms are universal principles which all human moral conduct and
norms are derived from and point to. They illumine and direct all our moral decisions
through our commitment to them. Apart from our relation to these universal principles,
all our relative moral rules lose their ground and claim for imperative authority. On the
other hand, relative moral rules are horizontal norms because they arise from and are
recognized by the needs of society, although under the illumination of universal moral
principles. The "under the illumination of universal moral principles" must be emphasized.
For when moral rules are entirely cut adrift from universal moral principles, morality
slides into relativism and subjectivism.

The relation of vertical and horizontal norms shows that our moral life is a mixture of
the universal and the relative. On the one hand, all moral decisions must be ultimately
founded in the absolute, unchanging universal ground which prevents them from falling
into willfulness and caprice. It is vertical norms that stand for this universal element of
ethics. On the other hand, moral decisions must be relative to respond to the concrete situa-
tion in its all concreteness. It is horizontal norms that enter into the concrete situation.

When we view universal moral principles and relative moral rules in terms of their func-
tion, the former are "formal" norms; whereas the latter are "operational" norms. The
function of universal moral principles is to maintain the universal element of ethics. They
are the abiding stars which prevent us from falling into willfulness and contingency.
Although they do not provide answers to the particular problems of the concrete situation,
they are the ultimate ground and perspective of all moral decisions. Relative moral rules
are operational norms which relate relevantly universal principles in their abstract form
to the relative situation of social reality. They are general patterns and channels through

which universal formal principles take shape for their application to the concrete situation. They function as guidance for us to handle innumerable large and small practical problems in accordance with universal moral principles.

The validity of operational norms is relative since they are formulated in accordance with the needs of society. Moreover, the validity of these rules must be relative because when absolute validity is accorded to them they can become destructive. Viewed from this perspective, operational rules are relevant only insofar as they function as the vehicle of the effective and harmonious actualization of fundamental human values. When these norms are absolutized we fall into legalism which prevents us from responding creatively to the unique demands of changing social situations in accordance with fundamental human values. In this situation, it is necessary to modify existing norms to keep their validity alive or formulate new norms by drawing on fundamental human values in response to the new needs of the changed social situation.

IV. A CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS OF THE SITUATION ETHICS DEBATE IN THE LIGHT OF MAN'S SOCIALITY

We have analyzed man's sociality and its ethical implications. We have also expounded a balance between intentionality and sociality, which elucidates the limit of the positive ethical function of sociality. Man's sociality and the balance between intentionality and sociality can function not only as good conceptual tools for a critical investigation of the principal problems of the situation ethics debate but also as a constructive corrective to these problems.

In this chapter we shall investigate further the principal problems of the situation ethics debate and seek to develop constructively these problems in the light of man's sociality and the balance between intentionality and sociality. First, we shall expound the social aspect of the situation and criticize further the notion of the situation of the situationists and Ramsey. Secondly, we shall analyze the social formulation and function of moral norms and criticize further the understanding of moral norms of the situationists and Ramsey. Finally, we shall analyze the ethical significance of social systems and structures and expound the implication of their ideological function for developing constructive social ethics.

A. The Problem of the Situation

1. The Social Aspect of the Situation

Our analysis of man's sociality provides three useful conceptual schemes for a development of the social notion of the situation. They are the individual's "biographical situation," the "common-collective stock of knowledge" of society, and the interaction between these two kinds of stock of knowledge. The common-collective stock of knowledge suggests that moral values represent the common-collective stock of moral knowledge sedimented in the course of man's search for the integrated human self-realization in the common social world. In other words, value language is the depository of the common-collective stock of moral knowledge of society. Moral norms are the generalized patterns of what can or cannot be justified according to such communal moral values. Each situation is the focusing point of these social values and norms rooted in the common-collective sedimentation of moral experiences of society. Viewed in this respect, the injunctive demand of the past and present of society is the ingredient in the claim of each concrete situation. From these points it follows that the situation is more than each decision-making moment: It involves the total social situation including the past and present of society.

Our analysis of Schutz's notion of biographical situation and Berger's concept of man's socialization reveals that no moral knowledge and judgment can be immune to the effect of the social context in which they take place. The effect of society upon the individual's moral concept and judgment happens through the sedimentation of social values and norms in his interior moral structures. That is to say, those communal values and norms which are relevant to the individual are personalized and become integral elements of the stock of moral knowledge of his biographical situation.

We have seen that one's judgment and decision are carried on in the interaction between one's biographical situation and multiple social realities. One's moral judgment and decision also take place in the interaction between one's biographical situation and multiple moral realities of society such as social values and norms, customs and manners, and social institutions and systems. All these realms of morality are the common-collective stock of moral knowledge. Thus the individual's moral judgment and decision take place in the dynamic interaction between the stock of moral knowledge of his biographical situation and the common-collective stock of moral knowledge of society.

Let us consider further the interaction between these two categories of stock of moral knowledge in terms of Schutz's analysis of relevance. The "topical relevance" reveals that the constitution of something as a thematic moral problem does not take place out of nothing. This primary step of moral conduct already presupposes that the moral subject per-

ceives a certain segment of the lifeworld as a moral issue by means of the stock of moral knowledge at hand preserved in the biographical history which in turn has been formulated in the social context. The ''because relevance'' comes into play in his choice of the moral action since the action has been motivated by his past experiences, personal and social. The ''interpretative relevance'' suggests that his moral judgment is carried on with the guidance of a set of moral knowledge relevant to the problem involved. The establishment of this set of moral knowledge involves the interpretation and selection of the common-collective stock of moral knowledge of the society ot which the moral agent belongs. Finally he ''in-order-to relevance'' suggests that the actor performs the moral action to bring about a future state of affairs. Thus his moral action is also connected to the future in anticipation. Viewed from those points we have made, it follows that our moral conduct is related not only to the social world of our contemporaries but includes that of our predecessors and successors. Thus, our moral decision is related to the totality of the social world of the past, present, and future.

The individual's moral life is merely a segment of the unbroken continuum of the moral experiences of his society which is connected both to the past and the future. Considered thus, the situation includes the entire history of the society as well as its future. Sellers is quite right when he says that the situation is one's world:

> The situation is thus one's history and his space and his engagement with others in his community. It is his 'world.' It is his greater community with its own peculiar pilgrimage, tradition, memory of crises, and sets of rules that have kept men on the right road in the past.[1]

2. A Further Criticism of the Defect of the Understanding of the Situation Inherent in the Situation Ethics Debate

We have argued that both situationism and Ramsey's criticism of it tend to take the situation as an isolated decision-making moment, neglecting the social aspect of the situation. The exposition of the social aspect of the situation gives a clear picture of what our criticism implies.

We have observed earlier that Robinson's concern for the social aspect of the situation remains a formal assertion that the validity of morality and moral norms is relative to the change of the social situation.[2] We have also noted that he does not fully develop his awareness of the historical continuity of morality although he touches on it when he claims that the new morality cannot but rely on the cumulative moral experience of the individual and society.[3] Our exposition of the social aspects of the situation demonstrates that a full development of Robinson's notion of the social aspect of the situation and the historical

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1) Sellers, *Public Ethics*, p. 207.
2) See above, p. 14.
3) See above, p. 15.

continuity of morality needs to account for the stock of moral knowledge of the biographical situation and the common-collective stock of moral knowledge as well as the interaction of these two kinds of stock of knowledge as understood in our own terms. If this notion of the situation had accounted for these social aspects of the situation, he could have treated in a balanced way his situational approach to moral innovation and the emphasis of the old morality upon the continuity of morality.

Fletcher would have treated more carefully his initial recognition of the role of moral norms if he had given careful attention to the social aspects of the situation as understood in terms of our exposition of them. If he had taken seriously the injunctive demand inherent in the immediate imperative of each concrete situation, he could have avoided the tendency for act-agapism. To be sure, the ethics of norms has seldom accorded due appreciation to the fact that moral rules are never fully beyond being in the service of a particular community. Fletcher's situationism is a good corrective to the legalism of the ethics of norms, but he goes too far in the opposite direction. No matter how urgent the unique claim of a concrete situation may be, it does not annul the moral agent's commitment and accountability to the larger community. Then the point of the matter is to seek an adequate treatment of the validity of moral norms in the basis of a dialectical tension between the immediate imperative arising out of the unique claim of each concrete situation and the moral agent's moral obligation to the larger community.

We have observed that Lehmann's ethics not only regards the church community as the social matrix of the Christian's moral life but also seeks an ethics of social change. We have argued that his ethics of social change needs to account for the useful function of social systems and structures as well as the critical assessment of their validity.[4] Our analysis of man's sociality shows that neither the reassessment nor the transcendence of social systems and structures can be successfully carried on without taking into consideration the interaction between the individual's moral life and social systems and structures. This leads us to point out the two insufficiently developed aspects of Lehmann's search for the common ground between believers and unbelievers.

First, Lehmann's search for the unity of church and society faces an initial difficulty on the level of the formal principle. The believer and unbeliever may disagree in their concept of "humanity" or "humanization" because of the different value systems which reflect the influence of the social realms to which they belong. This may be especially true of the non-Christian culture. Even if they agree in their formal definition of "humanity" or "humanization," they still have to seek a common model of society and social systems to realize it. Lehmann's search for the unity of church and society needs to be developed

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4) See above, p. 25.

further by taking account of the common social systems between believers and unbelievers.

In addition to this problem on the level of the formal principle, the social dimension of humanization necessarily involves the humanization of social conditions. For it is hardly possible to bring about social change simply by the individual's ethical conviction and courage since the individual's moral life is in a great measure determined by society. Indeed, this is why Lehmann's *koinonia* ethics seeks social change. However, the humanization of the society requires a thoroughgoing understanding of the interaction between the individual's moral life and social systems. We cannot reassess or transcend the social systems which have become irrelevant until we can possess them in clear awareness. Our analysis of man's sociality can function as a good conceptual instrument to unmask the effect of these irrelevant systems upon the individual's moral consciousness.

Finally, we have observed that Ramsey argues for the ethical importance of generality and continuity in moral conduct, but stops short of a full development of these ideas. We have also argued that a full development of his idea of the generality and continuity requires a thoroughgoing analysis of the function of the sustaining patterns of life.[5] This task involves a penetrating analysis of the preservation and transmission of fundamental communal values and norms through the interaction between the individual's stock of moral knowledge and the common-collective stock of moral knowledge of society. If Ramsey were careful enough to take account of the social aspects of the situation as understood in our own terms, he could have drawn a more adequate conclusion in line with his idea of the generality and continuity in moral conduct.

B. The Problem of Moral Norms

1. The Social Formulation and Function of Moral Norms

Berger's analysis of man's world-building activity and Schutz's notion of "typification" are useful tools to expound the social formulation and function of moral norms. Our analysis of the social formulation and function of moral norms shall be carried on by considering: (a) the social formulation of moral norms and (b) the social function of moral norms.

(a) The chief purposes of our analysis of the social formulation of moral norms are the demonstration that man's corporate moral life necessarily involves the formulation of norms and an analysis of the process of their formulation. These matters can be well analyzed with the aid of Berger's penetrating examination of man's world-building activity. He analyzes the fundamental process of man's world-building enterprise in terms

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5) See above, p. 30.

of three moments: the "externalization" of man, its objectivation as the external social reality, and the internalization of the social world inside the subjective structures of man's consciousness.[6]

What Berger means to say by externalization is that man, being an "unfinished" being to be developed ceaselessly, continues to express himself to the world both in his physical and mental activity. Man's relation to the world is not a biologically prefabricated one as is the case with animals but an open world to be fashioned by man's own activity.[7] In the process of his world-building activity man shapes tools, invents language, and produces culture.

The externalized products are not only derived from man, but they become an objective reality which stands outside their producer as something "out there." The externalized objective reality now attains the status of objectivity or "facticity" outside the producer. This is what Berger calls "objectivation." Thus, the humanly produced world acquires the character of external reality.[8] The objectivated social world affects the individual in two ways. On the one hand, it exerts control over the individual as external reality. On the other hand, the social world becomes a part of the subjective structures of man's consciousness through the internalization process.

Here it should be mentioned that Berger's analysis of man's world-building activity does not exclude man's initiative. He understands the relation of man's intentionality and the socialization of the individual in terms of the dialectical tension between the two. Although society functions as the formative agency for the individual existence through internalization, this by no means implies that the individual is molded simply passively by society as if he were an inert thing. The social world is not passively absorbed by the individual, but actively appropriated by him.[9]

What is important in Berger's analysis of the process of the world-building activity is that he interprets it in terms of man's "ordering" activity. He holds that the world-building activity is carried on through an "ordering" or "nomizing" of our experiences.[10] For him this ordering activity is endemic to man's activity of producing the socio-cultural world. Berger puts it this way:

It may now be understandable if the proposition is made that the socially constructed world is, above all, an ordering of experience. A meaningful order, or nomos is imposed upon the discrete experiences and meanings of individuals. To say that society is a world-building enterprise is to

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6) Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969), p. 4.
7) *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
8) *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
9) *Ibid.*, 18.
10) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

say that it is ordering, or nomizing, activity.[11]

For Berger, it is man's distinctive nature of "unfinished being," i.e., his immense plasticity due to the unfinished character of the human organism, that makes the ordering activity possible. Since man's relation to the world is not prefabricated, he is compelled to impose order upon his experiences.[12]

What, then necessitates the ordering of our experiences? This matter has to do with our own notion of "typification" or generalization. As we have seen earlier, Mead holds that the influence of social process upon the individual is possible only through the generalized other asserting that the individual can take toward himself the attitudes of society only by generalizing them.[13] We have also argued that it is principles, generalities, and schemes which I and my fellow men share that makes the common subjective world possible. For the common social world is possible only under the taken-for-granted presupposition that my fellow men think and act in the same way as I do. What makes me and my fellow men think and act in the same way is that I and they follow the same principles and generalities, i.e., typificatory schemes.[14]

From these points it follows that man's fundamental sociality entails the generalization or ordering of our experiences. Our working together with others and communicating with each other are possible only through generalizing or ordering our experiences. In short, the ordering of experiences is endemic to any kind of social interaction, and the common social world is rendered possible through this nomizing activity. Berger puts it this way:

> Man's sociality presupposes the collective character of this ordering activity. The ordering of experience is endemic to any kind of social interaction. Every social action implies that individual meaning is directed toward others and on-going social interaction implies that the social meanings of the actors are interpreted into an order of common meaning.[15]

Language is a paradigmatic case of the imposition of order upon experiences. Language cannot be considered apart from the rules pertaining to its syntax and grammar. We can use language only by participating in these generalized rules. The same holds for all the facets of man's social world. To participate in the society is to live an ordered and meaningful life, that is, to co-inhabit its nomos.[16]

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11) *Ibid.*
12) *Ibid.*
13) See above, p. 42.
14) See above, p. 52.
15) Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, p. 19.
16) *Ibid.*, p. 21.

What we have considered regarding social process as a whole holds true for our moral life as well. Our moral life does not consist of the discrete experiences of the isolated individual. It takes place in the scene of the intersubjective social world. Our moral conduct is directed toward others and therefore entails social interaction. The nomizing of experiences being endemic to any kind of social interaction, our moral life also necessarily involves this nomizing activity. Considered in terms of the typification, our moral life on the social level is carried on by means of typically interpreted patterns of conduct.

Moral experiences are transformed into a generally available object of knowledge by the imposition of a meaningful order upon them. By virtue of this imposition of order, they come to attain an objectivated order of common meaning, i.e., the status of moral norms. Man's moral life on the social level is rendered possible by relying on moral norms. We will look more closely at the social function of moral norms presently. For the moment it is merely important to point out that man's moral life necessarily involves the formulation of moral norms and that the intersubjective moral world is possible only through moral norms.

The formulation of moral norms is an ongoing process which takes place in the dialectical tension between man's intentionality and sociality. Past moral experiences were embodied in moral laws and norms and passed on to us. We in turn modify and enrich old norms and formulate new norms. Our successors will also continue to do so. The formulation of new norms is carried on with reference to the stock of moral knowledge at hand corresponding to the new demand of the changed social reality. Moreover, our reevaluation of old norms and formulation of new norms take into consideration the future state of affairs to be brought about by them. Thus corporate moral life is sustained by moral norms although they are modified and newly formulated in accordance with communal values corresponding to the demand of each social situation.

(b) We have asserted that moral norms are the generalized patterns of what the larger community sanctions and prohibits in accordance with its moral values. This implies that the formulation and function of moral norms have to do with communal values. Since we have already considered the social formulation of norms, we shall now analyze only the positive social function of norms in the light of Schutz's notion of typification.

It is evident from our analysis of man's sociality that no moral judgment and decision can be considered without reference to the larger community to which the moral agent belongs. No matter how limited and specific the immediate demand of a given situation, the moral agent's response is not merely the immediate context but implicitly transcends it to the communal ideas and values. His action in a response to the immediate claim of

a given concrete situation is at the same time an affirmation of communal values and ideas.

It is through the mediation of moral norms that the moral agent's relation to communal values takes place in normal situations. Speaking in purely theoretical terms, it may be possible to assume that we can relate ourselves to communal values apart from moral norms. Moreover, there are occasions when we must draw on the core values and ideas of our society in order to reassess the validity of existing norms or formulate new norms. But this must not lead us to overlook the ethical importance of the social function of moral norms. Communal values themselves are too abstract and formal to handle the practical problems in our complicated moral life. It is confusing and risky to handle practical moral affairs with these communal values alone. In fact, these values are formulated in legal systems, moral norms, and social conventions. In our daily moral life we can handle moral problems without confusion and risk by following these typificatory schemes. Anyone who does not follow these schemes risks danger and tragedy. We can go further and say that man's corporate moral life cannot be considered apart from the general patterns of moral conduct that moral norms provide for.

Moral norms can be perverse and run counter to communal ideas and values. Indeed, it often happens that existing moral norms threaten the individual's independent moral decision. This is especially true in times of radical social change. In such a situation, existing norms can be oppressive, functioning as an idol that prevents men from responding to communal ideas and values. But we cannot deny the positive ethical importance of moral norms for the reason that they can be perverse and destructive. They are the depository of the moral experiences and wisdom of mankind. Without the guide of norms we may become lost over a limitless ocean of innumerable possibilities and decisions. Without relying on moral norms, we may fall into willfulness and contingency. Paul Tillich puts the importance of moral rules this way:

> They [the moral laws of Christianity and other religions] represent the ethical wisdom of the ages, and one should not disregard them easily. Only if one recognizes the inadequacy of the law for a concrete situation can one feel justified in disobeying it.[17]

Thus moral norms guide our moral life and save us from the danger of risk in every moral decision.

Let us develop further the positive social function of moral norms focusing our discussion on the following two functions of moral norms: the economy of effort in moral judgment and decision which moral norms provide; and the function of moral norms as

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17) Tillich, *My Search for Absolutes,* p. 110.

the channel through which we gear into the moral process of the society. We shall consider first the economy of effort in moral judgment and decision which moral norms provide. Schutzian analysis of the function of typification is useful to illustrate this function of moral norms. We have observed earlier that Schutz regards typification as "cook-book knowledge" or "recipes" for practical affairs in our daily life. They are typical ways of dealing with our day-to-day works in the mundane world. This holds true of moral norms as well. They are recipes and formulas for handling moral affairs. They have proved to be valid in handling moral problems and therefore are generally approved in our society. Thus, they provide generalized rational patterns of what can and cannot be morally justified in accordance with communal values. Consequently they free us from making risky ad hoc rational judgment in every decision. They can easily tell us what we ought to do in normal situations.

These norms are reflected in the subjective structures of the agent's moral consciousness through the internalization process. Internalized moral norms make possible the agent's moral judgment and discernment. In summary, norms free the moral agent from the burden of complicated decision-making by narrowing choices. Moral norms also carry with them an important psychological gain. They relieve us from the accumulation of tension that results from undirected drive by providing the direction and the specification of activity which is lacking in man's biological equipment. Thus, moral norms provide for an economy of effort in our moral discernment and decision.[18]

Let us move on to the function of moral norms as the channel through which we gear into the moral process of the society. We have seen earlier that typification functions as the channel through which we gear into social process. The same holds true for our moral life. Since moral norms represent social values, we share these values through moral norms. This implies that we can handle our practical moral affairs in accordance with social values through the mediation of moral norms. Moral norms enable us to gear into the moral process of the society without drawing directly upon communal values in every moment of decision.

Speaking in purely theoretical terms, it may not be impossible to participate in the moral process of the society without relying on moral norms. We may make each moral decision by drawing directly upon the values of the society. But this is improbable in our practical moral life. In our everyday moral life, it is through the channels of moral norms that we participate in the affirmation and realization of communal values with fellow men.

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18) Our discussion of the function of moral norms is carried on in line with Peter L. Berger's analysis of the function of "habitualization" in his *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 53.

2. A Further Criticism of the Defect of the Understanding of Moral Norms Inherent in the Situation Ethics Debate

In our earlier criticism of Robinson's understanding of moral norms, we have pointed out that he falls short of a full grasp of their positive social function although he is considerably aware of it. We have also argued that a full development of his notion of "guiding norms" or "working rule" requires a thoroughgoing analysis of the continuity and generality of morality that moral norms provide for.[19] Schutz's "typification," Berger's "nomization," and our exposition of the interaction between biographical situation and the common-collective stock of knowledge are all useful conceptual tools to develop fully Robinson's notion of guiding norms and working rules. The same holds for his argument for the relativization of moral norms as well. The relativization of norms must be carried on giving due appraisal to their mediatory and transmitting function of core communal values. This means that Robinson's examination of the validity of norms must take account of the fact that they are formulated and modified in accordance with communal core values in response to the changing needs of society.

We have already seen that although Fletcher formally recognizes the need for moral norms, his actual ethical discourse tends to move away from this recognition. His over-emphasis upon the relativity of moral norms frequently causes him to approach act-agapism which implies that one has to make moral decisions in each concrete case directly drawing upon the principle of love without relying on norms.[20] Considered in terms of Christian ethics, all moral norms are no doubt grounded in the principle of love. But this must not lead to the false conclusion that the moral agent has to make each moral decision only with the direction of love. The ultimate principle of love alone is too formal and abstract to handle practical moral problems. As our analysis of the social formulation and function of moral norms has demonstrated, our corporate moral life necessarily involves the formulation of norms and can be maintained by these norms. If Fletcher had taken account of these matters, he could have treated more adequately the positive function of norms. Our analysis of the positive social function of norms also suggests that the relativization of moral norms is carried on only by drawing upon the principle of love. That is, one can obey or break moral rules according to whether or not conduct embodies love in the situation. But no proper relativization of moral norms can be considered without taking seriously the social function of norms which sustains the continuity and generality of morality.

19) See above, pp. 14–15.
20) See above, pp. 20–21.

Lehmann's governing concern for the Christian's imaginative and behavioral sensitivity to God's on-going humanizing activity makes him pay insufficient attention to the positive function of moral norms. Moreover, his strong emphasis on the personal nexus between God's ongoing humanizing work and man's creative response to it at times tempts him to move away from his formal recognition of the need for moral norms. He gives some formal definitions of moral norms. He takes the function of norms as "maxim" or "the direction of humanization." The former implies the relative nature of norms; whereas the latter refers to God's humanization.[21] These definitions of the function of norms do not give any serious consideration to the positive function of norms as understood in our own terms. Man's practical moral life on the social level cannot be carried on only with his imaginative sensitivity to God's humanizing activity. It is like a voyage to a special destination without navigation charts. Lehmann's notion of "direction of humanization" is too abstract to be useful in practical moral life.

We have earlier observed that Ramsey's argument for the validity of moral norms is carried on in purely logical terms. We have also seen that his penetrating analysis of exception to rule does not account for the relation of the validity of norms to the larger social situation.[22] Although he clearly grasps the ethical significance of the continuity and generality of morality, he fails to draw a more adequate conclusion in line with these instructive ideas.[23] Again our analysis of the social formulation and positive function of norms can serve well to develop fully his notion of the continuity and generality of morality and their importance for corporate moral life.

C. The Problem of Social Ethics

1. The Ethical Significance of the Sustaining Function of Social Systems and Structures

We have argued that the defects of the understanding of the situation and moral norms inherent in situation ethics and Ramsey's critique of it lead them to neglect or insufficiently treat the social dimensions of ethics. We have summed up these dimensions in two major points: the ethical impact of social systems and structures, and social policy.[24] Our constructive development of the social aspect of the situation and the function of moral norms has laid a groundwork to expound these matters. We shall consider these two problems in order.

The requirement of social morality is governed not only by an inward form of morality

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21) See above, pp. 25–26.
22) See above, pp. 30, 33.
23) See above, p. 30.
24) See above, p. 9.

but by social systems and structures. We have mentioned that communal ideas and core values are the shaping principles of the moral process of society. The realization of these ideas and values on the social level is possible only through social systems and structures. Thus any proper approach to social ethics must take seriously the ethical impact of economic, social, and political systems and structures. This means that social ethics requires some knowledge of economic, social, and political systems and structures.

The realization of communal ideas and values on the social level is possible only through social systems and structures, but the dynamic operation of these systems and structures is rendered possible through social policies. Social systems and structures are the basic framework for the social realization of communal ideas and values; whereas social policies are the expressions of these ideas and values which are adequate to a given situation within existing systems and structures. Thus social systems and structures cannot function effectively without the formulation and practice of social policies which can meet the needs of concrete social situations and express them in harmony and generality. The values of Christianity also are not so socially significant without implementing them in social policies. The formulation of social policies must come to terms with economic and social facts. "Every policy decision is both moral and technical."[25]

It is sound enough to take seriously moral innovation in times of radical social change. But we err if we see only the relative, changing aspect of ethics without giving due appreciation to the ethical importance of the continuity of morality in corporate life. In the time of a new morality that comes into being under Christian auspices, it is important for Christian ethics to see the significance of the continuity of morality in communal life. It is also to be noted that any careful development of the continuity of morality must take seriously the positive ethical importance of social systems and policies as well as moral norms.

The situationists' emphasis upon moral innovation tempts them to deal with particular moral issues by drawing directly on the ultimate principle of love or God's humanizing work without giving due appreciation to the useful function of moral norms and the important ethical impact of social systems and structures. In times of radical social change it is sound enough to give serious attention to the relativity of morality and to exceptional cases. But we make a grave mistake if we do not give respect to the sustaining patterns of morality and the ethical importance of social systems and structures.

The same holds for an ethics of social change. There is no question that existing social conditions need to be changed if they are inadequate or run counter to human self-realization. But what an ethics of social change seeks is not the absence of social systems and

25) James M. Gustffson, "Christian Ethics and Social Policy," in *Faith and Ethics*, p. 126.

structures but better systems and structures. The effective operation of these systems and structures must rely on the formulation and practice of adequate policies. Thus even an ethics of social change must take seriously social systems, structures, and processes.

2. The Ethical Significance of the Ideological Function of Social Systems and Structures

Thus far, we have considered the positive ethical function of social systems and structures. But they also function negatively. That is, they exert ideological effect upon the individual. One of the most important ethical implications of the sociology of knowledge is that it can lead us to the critical examination of the irrelevancy of given social systems and structures, and their effect upon the individual. This means that the sociology of knowledge, as well as the phenomenology of the social world, can serve to disclose the ideological effect of social systems and structures upon the individual. As Mannheim's analysis of "ideology" reveals, the individual's moral concept and judgment are affected in a great measure by systems and structures of the society to which he belongs.[26] In Christian ethics, H. Richard Niebuhr's analysis of Christian denominationalism makes a case in point. He contends that denominational Christianity fails to realize the universal ethic of Christ and the Gospels. The churches adjust themselves to local interests and needs of social classes, races, or nations instead of devoting themselves to the common interest of mankind and the realization of the kingdom of God. Thus Niebuhr demonstrates well that even the Christian's moral concept is under the enormous effect of the social group to which he belongs.[27] The values which represent the social group involved are personalized and are incorporated in the individual's moral consciousness. These personalized values in turn affect his moral discernment and judgment.

Thus, the ideological function of social systems and structures exerts a negative effect upon the moral agent. But our clear grasp of the ideological function of social systems and structures can serve to develop a constructive social ethics. We cannot transcend the ideological effect of social systems until we possess it in clear awareness. We are ruled by ideologies until we make them our own. The sociology of knowledge can serve to disclose the ideological function of social systems as is the case with Berger's investigation of Protestant fundamentalism in the American South.

The disclosure of ideological falsity, deception, and distortion can lead us to discover the irrelevancy of given social systems and structures. This unmasking and transcending function of the sociology of knowledge has a highly important implication for social

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26) See above, n. 36, p. 45.
27) See H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (10th ed.; Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1976), esp. pp. 17–25.

ethics. Berger puts it this way:

> To repeat, society defines man, and is in turn defined by man. This paradox touches essentially on the human condition as such. It would be very surprising indeed if this perspective had no ethical import at all, an assumption that could be made only if ethics is taken as a domain utterly divorced from the empirical world in which men live.[28]

Berger illustrates the ethical significance of the debunking function of sociology by considering three concrete examples: racism, capital punishment, and the persecution of homosexuals.[29] He argues that racism, capital punishment, and the persecution of homosexuals are rooted merely in mythological beliefs, groundless assumptions, or idiosyncrasies of a culture, to which ontological status cannot be accorded. Berger calls these beliefs and assumptions "bad faith" in Sartre's terminology. The unmasking function of the sociology of knowledge can lead us to correct the irrelevant aspects of given systems and structures or even to seek better systems and structures.

V. A REFORMULATION OF THE NORM-CONTEXT RELATIONSHIP

We have analyzed the three principal problems inherent in situationsim and Ramsey's criticism of it. We have ascribed these defects to the neglect or insufficient treatment of man's sociality by the situationists and Ramsey. We have critically examined and developed constructively these problems in terms of our exposition of man's sociality and its ethical impact. Despite our emphasis upon the positive ethical importance of man's sociality, we have, in the same measure, stressed the significance of the intentionality of the moral agent. This has led us to take the position of a balance between intentionality and sociality, the creativity of the intentional self and the determination of the social self. In the light of this balanced relationship between intentionality and sociality, we have examined the limit of the sustaining function of man's sociality and moral norms. To summarize these points, corporate moral life must rely on the sustaining function of man's sociality, but, in the same measure, intentionality brings new meanings and changes into routinized social process, appropriating the given social world as occasions for human freedom.

Man's sociality and a balance between intentionality and sociality provide a foundation to reconsider the norm-context relationship. In this chapter we seek a reformulation of

28) Berger, *Invitation to Sociology*, p. 155.
29) *Ibid.*, pp. 155–63.

the norm-context relationship in the light of man's sociality and a balance between in-
tentionality and sociality. First, we shall develop a typology of situations taking into
consideration the impact of both intentionality and sociality upon the situation. This
typology of situations will include three types of situation: the normal situation, the
borderline situation, and the radically changing situation. Secondly, we shall examine
the function and validity of moral norms under each of these three types of situations.

A. A Typology of Situations

1. The Normal Situation

We have mentioned earlier that since the actual content of the situation is complex,
we may respond to it in various ways.[1] We may live in conformity with routines of given
social processes, which we take for granted. We may have to act against the situation in
order to respond to the unique demand of the immediate moment. It may be necessary
for us to create a better social situation by destroying the old one. There may be occasions
when we have to establish or restore the normal situation. It follows that the situation
should not be taken indiscriminately as the same and, therefore, that certain distinctions
between situations should be made. This kind of distinction is crucial for the analysis of
the ethical impact of the situation as well as the investigation of the validity of moral norms
which we shall consider later.

We propose to divide the situations into the moral "normal situation," the "borderline
situation," and the "radically changing situation." Let us consider first the normal
situation. What we mean by the normal situation is the social situation in which the ex-
isting social order, including moral rules, civil laws, and social systems, can function
relatively smoothly. In the normal situation, our social life takes place in accordance with
the sustaining patterns of life without facing any difficulty. It is true that some segments
of these patterns may be brought into question to be modified and even abolished. How-
ever, existing patterns, taken as a whole, may remain unquestioned and continue to func-
tion effectively at least for a certain period of time. To put it in terms of the key notions
of Schutz's analysis of the lifeworld, our social life takes place in conformity with typifi-
catory schemes and the taken for-granted social structures.

To limit this view to moral life, moral conduct takes place in accordance with existing
moral rules without facing any problem. We handle practical moral problems in ac-
cordance with existing moral rules. It is true that neither relative moral rules nor the
concrete applications of universal moral principles could be complete. For the application

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1) See above, pp. 5–6.

of universal moral principles and the formulation of relative moral rules inevitably involve some degree of perversion and dishonesty. Moreover, some changes occur as society moves forward, and there are some changes in moral rules as well. Therefore, moral life more or less involves some critical reflection on moral conduct and some moral change even in the normal situation. But all these occur gradually within the frame of the existing moral order, since they do not annihilate the function of the given moral system. Furthermore, these adjustments keep the function of the existing moral system alive and contribute to its effective and extensive function by correcting and eliminating its irrelevant segments. The individual may take the modification and elimination of some segments of the existing moral system as differentiations within the domain of relevance constituting its effective function.

To consider the moral impact of the normal situation in terms of intentionality and sociality, it is sociality rather than intentionality that plays the major role in the normal situation. This means that in the normal situation, stress is placed on the significance of the continuity and generality of morality which moral rules provide for, since moral life can be maintained successfully by following exitsing moral rules. The moral life in the normal situation is carried on in terms of the sustaining function of man's sociality rather than intentionality which brings about moral innovation. Moral innovation may rarely be brought into the routines of the established moral system. But the emergence of innovative elements of morality may not be welcomed and rejected as threats to the smooth function of the established moral system.

To apply this category of situation to the theologians, it seems that Ramsey's ethical discourse is carried on basically under the presupposition of the normal situation. This leads him to take more seriously the continuity and generality of morality secured by moral norms than moral break-through and innovation. This may not be limited merely to Ramsey but holds for all legalistic norm-ethicists. The virtue of emphasis upon the continuity and generality of morality is that it underscores the positive ethical significance of the sustaining function of moral rules. To be sure, no moral life on the social level can be considered without taking seriously the sustaining function of norms, but the problem of norm-ethics is that it cannot come to terms with moral break-through and innovation.

2. The Borderline Situation

The term "borderline situation" (*Grenzsituation*) itself derives from Karl Jaspers. For him "borderline situations are those in which I cannot live without conflict and suffering, in which I take upon myself unavoidable guilt, in which I must die."[2] According to him,

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2) Helmut Thielicke, *Theological Ethics,* trans. and ed. by William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), I, p. 580.

it is only from "guilt," "suffering," and "death" as the outermost limit—border or boundary—of my existence that I can see my being as a whole. In the present context our adaptation of the term "borderline situation" does not mean to take over all that Jaspers has said about it. We use the word in line with Helmut Thielicke's further exposition of Jaspers' notion of the "borderline situation." Thielicke extends the Jaspersian notion of the "borderline situation" which has been expressed in respect only of individual existence to the theological concept of the qualitative border of the world. That is to say, he applies the Jaspersian borderline situation to the two bounderies of the world: on the one hand the ultimate possibilities given to the world by God at creation by which it should attain its authentic being actualizing God's original plan: and on the other hand the extreme possibility of the decline, destruction, and chaos of the fallen world by misappropriation of that wherewith it was endowed at creation. Thielicke goes further and takes also specific crisis situations derived from the latter boundary of the world as borderline situations. In this case, he means by borderline situations situations in which we face the extreme limit of free moral choice and decision as is the case with the underground movements of the Second World War or unjust, perverse regimes.[3] This is what we mean by the "borderline situation" in the context of our present analysis of situations.

Hitler's totalitarian regime makes a good case in point of the borderline situation. Under such a borderline situation, injustice has taken a structural form and therefore it is not just a marginal possibility.[4] Life under such a borderline situation inevitably involves the breach of existing civil laws and moral rules established to justify and maintain the unjust regime, since these laws and rules are nothing but codified injustice and immoral norms. Life in the borderline situation is forced to break divine laws, just civil laws, and rational moral rules as well. The breach of laws and moral rules takes place in the wartime situation as well. In the wartime situation, we are very often forced to become involved in lying, deception, falsehood, and even killing, especially in actual engagement in combat. Under such an abnormal situation, we are impelled to follow an illegal and even immoral method of action almost routinely. The same holds for the underground movements of the Second World War in Holland and France.

There are three possible ways to respond to the borderline situation. The first is to accept the borderline situation and act in conformity with it. In the case of unjust regimes, this sort of submission to injustice must be rejected because it is an inescapable duty of humanity to fight inhuman regimes. In the case of a war, the situation is considerably different. If the war is a just war, we cannot but accept it unless one is a pacifist in a

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3) *Ibid.*, pp. 578–83.
4) *Ibid.*, p. 579.

country in which pacificism is allowed. If the war is an unjust war, uncritical conformity with the war must be rejected at least in principle, although the degree of putting the rejection into practice can be different according to the socio-political situation of countries. Since man is the free responsible subject, it is his duty to resist the unjust war as much as he can in a given situation.

The second way is to destroy the borderline situation in order to establish the normal situation or to restore the previous normal situation. That is, we fight the existing oppressive crisis situation to establish or restore the normal situation in which rational laws and moral norms can function relatively smoothly. Let us examine this point in more detail by a critical and affirmative assessment of the ways Bonhoeffer and Thielicke deal with the borderline situation.

With regard to the breakability of God's commandments, Bonhoeffer says:

> For the sake of God and of our neighbor, and that means for the sake of Christ, there is a freedom from the keeping holy of the Sabbath, from the honoring of our parents, and indeed from the whole of the divine law, a freedom which breaks this law, but only in order to give effect to it anew. The suspension of the law can only serve the true fulfillment of it. In war, for instance there is killing, lying and expropriation in order that the authority of life, truth and property may be restored.[5]

In the quotation above, Bonhoeffer admits the freedom to break the divine law in order to restore its normal function. He thus regards the wartime situation as the borderline situation in which the breach of moral rules and God's commandments is admitted. However, it is to be noted that even in the wartime situation the moral agent as the subject of intentionality does not break moral rules and divine laws simply as a blind slave of the perverse situation, but he commits the breach of these rules and laws with his own freedom in order to restore their normal function.

Thielicke analyzes the borderline situation in greater detail in theological terms.[6] To summarize his major points, the borderline situation is God's judgment upon the accumulation of our communal guilt which is ultimately rooted in man's sinfulness in the fallen world. When I stand in the borderline situation as in God's presence, I become aware of my guilt and the need of forgiveness. The illegal methods and means for a struggle against the borderline situation should be used with the awareness that they stand in need of God's forgiveness. God's grace secures us against our becoming blind slaves of the borderline situation and frees us from the law of progressive ethical decline, because we

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5) Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, trans. by Neville Horton Smith (4th ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 261.
6) Thielicke, *Theological Ethics*, I, pp. 578–647.

have the ultimate standard by which we can see it for what it is if we have our allegiance to the Lord. Thielicke says:

> The borderline situation may offer no avenues of escape. But if that ultimate standard [in the Lord] is present, I am protected against the leveling out of alternatives, I shall not despise the nuances, and I shall never reach the state of indifference which allows me to say that in the blackness of this world's night, in darkness of the borderline situation, all cats are gray. The Christian will always draw back from this downward plunge that looms before him.[7]

Thielicke's analysis of the borderline situation expounds in greater detail that the moral agent as the subject of intentionality does not break moral norms and God's commandments simply as a blind slave of the perverse situation. Thielicke, like Bonhoeffer, also holds that the illegal and immoral methods of action in the borderline situation are admitted in order to preserve morals and the dignity of humanity:

> . . . the struggle against the blatant representative of injstice is not a personal struggle against a personal enemy but a struggle to preserve orders, values, and the lives of men from external destruction and internal perversion; to make this struggle is thus an inescapable duty.[8]

As the foregoing observation of Bonhoeffer and Thielicke show, both of them recognize the breakability of God's commandments and moral norms for the sake of the restoration of the normal function of these commandments or norms or the preservation of orders, values, and the lives of men. From their analysis of the borderline situation, we can go further and claim that the primary task of the fight against the borderline situation is to eliminate the situation itself rather than to justify the breach of norms. This is evident from our analysis of the ethical impacts of man's sociality. Man's sociality can function as the means of the preservation of communal values and the maintenance of order, but it also can be the instrument of human selfishness as in the case of unjust social systems and perverse regimes. In the latter case, it is an inescapable duty of men to eliminate these evil systems and regimes as Bonhoeffer's life of resistance against Hitler's totalitarian government shows. In fact, this has been expressed implicitly when Bonhoeffer refers to the restoration of the authority of life, truth, and property and when Thielicke talks about the preservation of orders, values, and the lives of men.

The third way to respond to the borderline situation is to regard the breach of moral rules as the "exceptional case" since no available rules can give the answer to the unique claim of the concrete critical and unusual situation. This response to the borderline situation places weight upon the changeability and breakability of the existing moral rules rather than the necessity to abolish the borderline situation itself. Whereas the second way

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7) *Ibid.*, p. 607.
8) *Ibid.*, p. 587.

to respond to the borderline situation is concerned for the critical social situation as a whole, the third way is preoccupied with individual critical cases to which no existing moral rule can provide the answer.

Fletcher's treatment of exceptional cases provides a good illustration of the third way to respond to the borderline situation. He pays utmost concern to exceptional cases. We have considered earlier that he is eager to demonstrate the relativistic nature of moral rules by various exceptional cases such as killing and lying in wartime, committing adultery for family love or patriotic espionage and so on. He takes the breach of moral rules in these cases as the exceptional case to which no existing moral rules can give the answer. It is, Fletcher says, only the principle of love that can justify these exceptional cases. In the discussion of exceptional cases, he is preoccupied with each concrete case apart from its relation to the critical social situation as a whole. He fails to see that exceptional cases are very often specific manifestations of the crisis of the whole society. This failure prevents Fletcher from stressing the ethical significance of the elimination of the borderline situation, while simply indulging in the justification of the relativistic validity of moral rules by means of exceptional cases. We have observed that in *Situation Ethics* Fletcher tends to neglect the social aspect of the situation, which is due to his insufficient attention to man's sociality. His treatment of exceptional cases reveals that it is also affected by the same defect. If he had paid sufficient attention to the ethical importance of man's sociality, his treatment of exceptional cases would have traced back to their original cause, i.e., the critical social situation itself from which specific cases stem.

Robinson at times seems to take the situation as the borderline situation, although it is shown merely by implication. He refers to "circumstances" in which stealing and lying can be right.[9] This can probably imply exceptional cases under the borderline situation, and he seems to approach these cases in terms of our third way. But he does not go into any substantial analysis of the far-reaching ethical implication of the exceptional cases.

The problem of Fletcher's and Robinson's response to the borderline situation is that they simply seek to justify the breach of moral rules for the reason that existing rules cannot give answers to exceptional cases. Their position can be right if exceptional cases are those which occur apart from the oppressive social situation such as radically new cases emerging out of the change of society or specific cases which existing rules cannot cover because of their imperfectness. If exceptional cases arise out of the oppressive social situation, their position can be justified only for the reason of man's right of survival. But the primary ethical task in the oppressive situation is to eliminate the situation itself rather than to justify the breakability of rules.

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9) Robinson, *Christian Morals Today*, p. 16.

3. The Radically Changing Situation

We now turn to the "radically changing situation." What we mean by the radically changing situation is the rapid, radical, or revolutionary social change. Any society more or less changes as history moves forward. We have mentioned that society changes even in the normal situation although it is gradual. But social change is sometimes rapid and radical as in socio-political revolution. Religious, philosophical or technological revolutions also often bring with them radical social changes. This sort of radical social change brings about the discrepancy between existing social systems and moral rules and the new social reality. The discrepancy can be the occasion for both creation and destruction.

The characteristic of the radically changing situation becomes clear when it is contrasted with the borderline situation. Both of them can be described as the crisis situation. But the borderline situation is a destructive crisis situation; whereas the radically changing situation can be taken as the creative crisis situation in view of the fact that it can be an occasion for creating a more human society and more adequate moral rules if we creatively respond to the challenge of the changing social situation. It is true that the challenge of the changing situation can be an occasion for destruction and chaos when we fail to respond creatively to it. When we define the radically changing situation as the creative crisis situation, we mean that the radically changing situation can be an occasion for human freedom and creativity if we respond creatively to it.

In the radically changing situation or the crisis situation, what is important is the creativity of the intentional self which responds sensitively to the challenge of changing social reality rather than the sustaining patterns of morality which maintain the exisitng social system. The radically changing social situation calls for the reassessment of the existing rules and the formulation of new rules striving for the enrichment and extension of a given moral system. An example of taking the crisis situation as an occasion for moral creativity can be seen in Sellers' notion of the crisis situation. He distinguishes the "saving tradition" and the "unsaved tradition," contending that moral rules are the outcome of the confrontation of these two situations. For him the unsaved situation, which he takes as the crisis situation, calls for the formulation of new rules. He states:

> The two primary elements in any ethical issue are the *saving tradition* that has nourished the making and observance of rules in the past, and the unique *unsaved situation* of new crisis that may call into question the old rules. Rules are . . . the outcome of the mutual confrontation of tradition and situation.[10]

We have mentioned that Robinson at times seems to take the situation as the borderline situation. But his basic notion of the situation seems to belong to the radically changing

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10) Sellers, *Public Ethics,* p. 205.

situation. His "new morality" starts with an awareness of the crisis of the "old morality" which is no longer relevant to the needs of our rapidly and radically changing time. Viewed in this perspective, the chief task of his "new morality" is to overcome the conflict between traditional legalistic ethics and the changing social reality of our time. This reveals that his ethical discourse is carried on in the context of the radically changing social situation which calls for establishing "new morality." This sort of situation comes under the category of the radically changing situation.

Lehmann's notion of the situation belongs to the category of the radically changing situation. We may go further and say that his notion of the situation is a typical example of the radically changing situation. This is evident from the characteristic of his *koinonia* ethics. The central theme of his *koinonia* ethics is the Christian's continuous response to the on-going process of God's humanizing work. He takes ethics as being dynamic and innovative rather than being static and sustaining. He emphasizes the creativity of the moral agent's intentionality which transforms humanity and the world through his participation in God's on-going activity of humanization. That he takes the situation as the radically changing social situation is explicitly expressed when he entitles his lecture on the relationship between Christianity and Marxism to which we have referred earlier, "Christian Theology in a World in Revolution."

Considered in terms of our position of a balance between intentionality and sociality, Lehmann tends to place stress upon the intentional aspect of morality. His ethics emphasizes the moral agent's creative response to the unique claim of a particular moment rather than his conformity with existing moral norms and a given moral system. This leads him to characterize his *koinonia* ethics as contextual. Moreover, his ethics seeks the transformation of humanity and the world. In fact, his ethics can be characterized as an ethics of social change.

We have observed that Fletcher takes the situation as the borderline situation in his discussion of exceptional cases. There is another aspect of his notion of the situation. That is, he tends to take the situation as the changing social situation in his essays collected in *Moral Responsibility*, most of which were published before *Situation Ethics*. In these essays, he contends that such ethical issues as sex, taxation, and stewardship must be reconsidered in order to make them relevant to the new social situation of our time. Thus, he seeks to change the traditional legalistic ethics in order to create a new ethics which is relevant to the new social situation of our time. In fact, this is the initial purpose of his situationism in *Situation Ethics*, although his actual ethical discussion fails to develop constructively his initial concern for moral innovation.[11]

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11) See above, pp. 19, 16–17.

The merit of those ethicists who are sensitive to social change is that they seek to make ethics relevant to the needs of changing social reality. Their creative insights bring about moral innovation by going beyond ethical legalism. Despite this merit, they tend to neglect the positive ethical importance of the continuity and generality of morality for corporate moral life.

In contrast with legalistic norm-ethics, the innovative situationists fail to accord due appreciation to the positive ethical importance of the continuity and generality of morality secured by moral norms in the normal situation. It is the merit of the situationists that they emphasize creative response to the unique claim of the concrete situation or to the new demand of the changing social situation in order to come to terms with exceptional cases or to cope with on-going social process and radically changing social reality. But they err when their emphasis upon creative moral decision neglects the importance of the sustaining function of moral norms. A proper understanding of the situation must take account of the normal situation as well. Consequently, a correct understanding of the role of moral norms must not neglect their sustaining function in the normal situation.

B. A Reconsideration of the Function and Validity of Moral Rules in the Light of a Typology of Situations

1. The Validity of Moral Rules in the Normal Situation

We have defined the normal situation as that in which existing moral rules can function relatively smoothly. We have also observed that in the normal situation moral conduct takes place in accordance with existing moral rules. We can make our decisions without any difficulty by relying on existing moral rules because they can function satisfactorily in the normal situation. Through the channels of moral rules we can participate in the moral process of society without any difficulty and confusion. But this by no means implies that there are no marginal or exceptional cases of existing moral rules. That there are exceptions to moral rules means that their validity is relative. In what follows, we shall analyze the validity of moral rules in the normal situation by examining exceptions which occur in the situation because of their incompleteness.

Tillich ascribes the relativity of moral rules to three main reasons: the absoluteness of every situation in which a moral decision is to be made, changes in the temporal dimension through the flux of time, and differences in the spatial dimension through differences of place.[12] The third reason involves the cross-cultural elements of ethics or the problem of ethics in a pluralistic society in which different groups, cultures, and religions are united

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12) Tillich, *My Search for Absolutes,* p. 97.

within a single political framework. This problem is beyond the scope of the present study. Only a thoroughgoing comparative study of ethics can deal with this matter. We shall examine the validity of moral rules by considering the first and second reason for the relativity of rules. The first reason has to do with the validity of rules in both the normal situation and the borderline situation. The second reason has to do with the validity of rules in the radically changing situation. We shall consider the validity of rules in the borderline situation and the radically changing situation later.

No moral rule can be complete because it cannot include every possible concrete case. Therefore, there will always be some exceptional cases which rules cannot cover. Tillich puts it this way: "No moral system was ever completely safe, and the first reason for this is the uniqueness of every concrete situation. Laws . . . are . . . too abstract to cover any concrete situation."[13] He tends to emphasize too strongly the uniqueness of each concrete moral situation. He goes too far when he says that theologians' commentaries on the ancient laws cannot provide real answers to actual problems because none of the writers of such commentaries were in the exact situation you and I are in at this moment.[14] Doubtless, each concrete moral situation has its own uniqueness. Moreover, there are unique cases to which no existing moral rule can give an answer. But this does not necessarily have to mean that our moral decisions cannot rely on existing moral rules. On the contrary, moral rules work quite well as typical patterns of action in our ordinary moral life. Indeed, Tillich also takes quite seriously the guiding function of moral rules. This is expressed when he says: "Moral commandments are the wisdom of the past as it has been embodied in laws and traditions, and anyone who does not follow them risks tragedy."[15] In his discussion of the relativity of moral content, Tillich tends to weaken the guiding function of moral rules by overemphasizing the uniqueness of each concrete moral situation. However, the intention of this emphasis is not to deny the useful guiding function of rules but to save them from becoming absolute moral codes which lead to legalism.

Tillich's analysis of the uniqueness of each concrete moral situation rightly points out the relative validity of moral rules, although he goes too far. Moral rules are too abstract to cover all concrete cases. The Mosaic law, for example, forbids killing, but it does not say which kind of killing is forbidden. The law does not provide an answer to the question how such cases as judicial and military killing, or killing in self-defense are to be dealt with. Among these cases, military killing and killing in self-defense belong in exceptional cases in the borderline situation as we shall see later. Judicial killing is neither an excep-

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13) *Ibid.,* p. 99.
14) *Ibid.,* pp. 99–100.
15) *Ibid.,* p. 110.

tional case that occurs in the borderline situation nor a qualitiatively new case that takes place in the radically changing situation. It is an exception that the rule which prohibits killing cannot cover because of tis incompleteness. To take another example, medical men often face the choice between truth and compassion toward critically ill or dying patients. To tell these patients truth is cruel; not to tell it to them offends the dignity of man.[16] The rule which forbids telling a lie does not answer this problem.

Such exceptions to rules raise the question, how do we retain the validity of rules while admitting these exceptions? We shall consider this matter by considering Hare's analysis of the validity of moral rules. He holds that exceptions to the rules by no means lessen their validity but define them more precisely. In order to understand his view of the relation of exceptions to the rules, it is necessary to consider briefly his notion of "decisions of principle." He asserts that when we make a decision, whatever kind of decision it may be, we do not choose simply an isolated case in an arbitrary manner, but we start to form a principle that I will make a decision of the same kind under the same circumstances. Our doing and deciding, Hare contends, involves starting to form a principle on which we will act. Hare expounds this by means of the following example. Let us suppose that a man, who has clairvoyance so that he can know everything about the effects of all the alternative actions open to him, chooses a set of effects of what he does. Let us also suppose that he chooses this set of effects not in an arbitrary manner but with a certain standard of choice avoiding certain effects and seeking certain results. Then this involves starting to form a principle for himself. For to choose certain effects because of specific qualities is to begin to act on a principle that certain effects are to be chosen.[17]

The same holds for the choosing of effects of ordinary men who do not have such clairvoyance as the man mentioned above. They start without any knowledge of the future at all. When they acquire some knowledge of the future effects of their actions it is not of the intuitive kind of the man previously mentioned since they rely on principles which they possess already. Hare says: "The kind of knowledge that we have of the future . . . is based upon principles of prediction which we are taught or form for ourselves."[18] Hare goes on to say: "Principles of prediction are one kind of principle of action; for to predict is to act in a certain way."[19] Thus, "although there is nothing logically to prevent us from doing entirely without principles . . . this never in fact occurs."[20]

This is also true of our learning and teaching. "What is taught is in most cases a prin-

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16) *Ibid.*, p. 100.
17) R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 58–59.
18) *Ibid.*, p. 59.
19) *Ibid.*
20) *Ibid.*

ciple. In particular, when we learn to do something, what we learn is always a principle.''[21] Even to learn a fact (like the names of the five rivers of the Punjab) involves starting to form a principle that when one is asked ''What are the names of the five rivers of the Punjab?'' he answers ''The Jhelum, the Chenab and so on.''[22]

It is noteworthy that there is a parallel between Schutz's typification and Hare's decisions of principle. Hare not only argues that our choosing and learning involve the decisions of principle, but that the decision of principle itself is based on our previous principles. To put it in terms of Schutz's notion of the stock of knowledge, the ''decisions of principle'' are based on previous principles which we have as our stock of knowledge at hand.

For Hare, what we have considered so far holds true of moral decision as well. He maintains that when we make a moral decision we make not an isolated decision but a decision of principle. That is, he contends that when we make a moral decision, we do so under the principle that we ought to make a decision of the same kind under the same circumstances. He states:

> To ask whether I ought to do A in these circumstances is (to borrow Kantian language with a small though important modification) to ask whether or not I will that doing A in such circumstances should become a universal law.[23]

He analyzes exceptions to a rule in terms of his notion of ''decisions of principle.'' He contends that exceptions do not make a rule less valid but on the contrary, they define precisely the range of its function. He states:

> Thus, with rules of this kind, even exceptions are what I shall be calling decisions of principle, because in making them we are in effect modifying the principle. There is a dynamic relationship between the exceptions and the principles. . . . For what we are doing in allowing classes of exceptions is to make the principle, not looser, but more rigorous.[24]

Hare does not make explicit distinctions between situations, and, therefore, between categories of exceptions. But his ethical discourses reveal that he makes implicit these distinctions. His exceptions include those in both the normal situation and the borderline situation. That his exceptions include those in the borderline situation is clear from the fact that he takes lies told in war-time to deceive the enemy as an exception to the rule which forbids telling a lie.[25] Hare's discussion of exceptions is insufficient to deal with

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21) *Ibid.,* p. 60.
22) *Ibid.*
23) *Ibid.,* p. 70.
24) *Ibid.,* p. 52.
25) *Ibid.*

all possible cases of exceptions which occur in the borderline situation. This will become clearer as our discussion proceeds. In the present context, we apply his analysis of exceptions only to the validity of moral rules in the normal situation. There are exceptions which rules as formal principles cannot cover. Despite these exceptions, moral rules remain valid because they can be built into rules.

Our emphasis upon the validity of moral rules despite exceptions does not imply that there is no change in the validity of rules in the normal situation. Any society more or less changes, and therefore the general alteration of morality takes place as history moves forward. Some moral rules may be modified or even abolished and new rules may be formulated in the course of the gradual change of historical process. But this kind of gradual moral alteration takes place without any serious conflict between moral rules and social reality.

The same holds for Hare's notion of moral rules as well. That is to say, his "decisions of principle" does not imply that he regards the validity of rules or "principles" as absolute. There are situation relative elements in his notion of "decisions of principle." This is revealed when he argues that the moral agent must make his own independent "decisions of principle" relevant to a new environment in which existing principles are no longer relevant.[26] We shall consider further this matter later[27].

The relative validity of moral norms raises another problem to be clarified. We have argued that the modification of existing moral rules and the formulation of new rules take place gradually even in the normal situation. This leads to the question, what is the basis of this modification and formulation of rules? We shall consider this problem in the analysis of the validity of moral rules in the radically changing situation[28].

We have argued that Ramsey's moral discourse seems to be carried on in the framework of the normal situation. The same holds true for his discussion of the validity of moral rules. He strongly argues for the validity of moral rules against the situationists' tendency to neglect their significance. It is true that there are other aspects of his understanding of the function of moral rules. This is revealed when he says that his ethical position belongs to Frankena's fourth type of agapism, i.e., a combination of act-agapism and rule-agapism. Here act-agapism implies that one can act apart from moral rules referring to the principle of love alone. This view is more explicitly expressed when he suggests that the freedom of *agape* can act without principles.[29] But this is merely a formal recognition

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26) *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.
27) See below, pp. 117–19.
28) See below, pp. 114–20.
29) It should be noted that there is a difference between Hare's "decisions of principle" and "rule-agapism." Whereas the former means creating a principle in a moral decision, the latter is to choose a

of the possibility that his rule-agapism can build into its system act-agapism. Nowhere does he develop further this position. Hence, it seems safe to say that he basically understands the validity and function of moral rules in terms of the normal situation.

If this is the case, it is quite reasonable that Ramsey tends to be preoccupied with the general validity of moral rules. This makes him eager to maintain the general validity of moral rules by building exceptions into them. His position is quite acceptable insofar as the function of moral rules in the normal situation is concerned. But he does not take seriously enough the fact that there are situations in which we have no choice but to act against existing moral rules in order to respond to the new demands of changed social reality. This is particularly true in our age of rapid and radical social change. Ramsey's concept of moral norms does not provide useful help as we face the moral issues of the changing world.

The situationists' creative ethical approach corrects the defects of the ethics of norms. But, like most correctives, it is pushed too far in the other direction. The situational approach errs when it neglects the positive ethical importance of the sustaining function of moral norms in the normal situation as we have already pointed out. We can go further and say that even the ethics of social change which stresses creative morality must not neglect the sustaining function of moral norms. A good many existing rules remain valid and therefore must be kept in the course of social change. In fact, the ethics of social change does not seek the absence of norms but the modification of old norms and the formulation of new rational norms. Viewed in this perspective, Robinson's awareness of the sustaining function of norms despite his strong emphasis upon situational decision is salutary. But his ambiguous notion of the situation makes him stop short of a full exposition of his idea of "guiding" or "working" rules.

2. The Validity of Moral Rules in the Borderline Situation

We have defined the borderline situation as that in which we face an extreme limit of free possible ways to respond to the borderline situation has shown that we may fight the situation to eliminate it or admit the breach of moral rules under the situation as exceptional cases. We shall consider the validity of moral rules in the borderline situation by examining further these two ways of responding to the situation. In order to discuss with

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rule among existing rules. If Hare's argument for "decisions of principle" is universally valid, it rules out "act-agapism" as understood in the situation ethics debate. But there is another possibility that "act-agapism" can be interpreted in such a way that it does not exclude Hare's notion of "decisions of principle." To be sure, there can be "act-agapism" which does not rely on existing rules. But it can be argued that even a moral decision in terms of "act-agapism" creates a certain moral criterion. In other words, the moral agent creates a new rule when he makes a moral decision according to "act-agapism." If this is the case, "act-agapism" can be reformulated in such a way that it does not contradict Hare's notion of "decisions of principle."

greater clarity, we propose to distinguish the borderline situation into the "broader borderline situation" as the crisis situation of society at large and the "narrower border-line situation" as the particular critical situation which originates from or occurs apart from the broader borderline situation. We shall examine the validity of moral rules in the borderline situation by considering their validity in these two kinds of borderline situations.

We shall consider first the validity of moral rules in the broader borderline situation. We have argued that the primary task of ethics in this borderline situation is to destroy and eliminate the borderline situation itself which prevents the normal function of moral rules. That is to say, we break moral rules not because they are invalid but because we are forced to do so by the threat or pressure of the perverse, abnormal situation of society. Therefore, what is needed is to establish or restore the normal situation by abolishing the borderline situation itself. However, our emphasis upon the elimination of the broader borderline situation does not deny the legitimate recognition or justification of the break-ability of moral rules under the borderline situation. We have to face individual narrower borderline situations originating from the broader borderline situation until we can eliminate it, and the breach of moral rules in these particular critical situations must be admitted because the individual's right of survival cannot be denied.

The individual's right of survival needs to be defined more precisely. The survival of the individual may at times mean merely the physical survival as is the case of self-defense. It may also involve one's right to live in accordance with one's beliefs and values as is the case of resistance against a perverse regime or the underground movements of the Second World War. To put the latter case of survival in terms of Tillich's notion of man's unconditional demand to become his essential self, the individual's right of survival means the unconditional right of his selfrealization in accordance with his beliefs and values. When we speak of the breach of moral rules for the sake of the individual's right of survival, we mean the physico-spiritual survival. Let us come back to the validity of moral rules in the broader borderline situation. The breach of moral rules takes place and must be admitted for the sake of the individual's right of survival as long as the borderline situation exists. However, we err if we neglect the ethical significance of the elimination of the borderline situation, while one-sidedly emphasizing the breakability of moral rules and their relative validity for that reason.

We now turn to the validity of moral rules in the narrower borderline situation. We have defined this borderline situation as particular critical situations which originate from or occur apart from the crisis situation of society at large. In these cases, the problem is how to treat the particular critical situations to which existing moral rules cannot give

answers. The answer is either to regard them as exceptional cases according relative validity to moral rules or to build exceptions into rules, so that they can include these exceptional cases as well. Fletcher takes the former position while Hare and Ramsey take the latter position. We need not spend time on these two positions since we have already considered them in greater detail. At this point it is merely important to point out that in the former case the recognition of exceptions can be justified only if the breach of moral rules occurs for the sake of the individual's right of survival or the realization of love to put it in terms of Fletcher.

The foregoing distinction between the broader borderline situation and the narrower borderline situation helps us to assess with greater clarity Fletcher's analysis of exceptional cases. Most exceptional cases in *Situation Ethics* can be regarded as belonging to the category of the narrower borderline situation which originate from the broader borderline situation. Such cases as a lie in wartime, patriotic espionage by means of sex, the practice of abortion in a Nazi concentration camp, and Mrs. Bergmeier's sacrificial adultery for family love all originate from the borderline situation as the perverse, abnormal situation of society as a whole. All these problems are solved when such a perverse and abnormal external social situation as a war or an unjust, inhuman regime is abolished. The primary task of ethics in such a situation is to condemn the inhuman treatment of war refugees and the unjust regime's torture and oppression of the minority race. Moreover, the ethicist must call for the abolition of such evil situations and contribute to the establishment of the world's peace. The value of argument for the legitimacy of the breach of moral rules lies in the recognition of the individual's right of survival or human right to struggle for the establishment of the normal situation. Considered in this perspective, Fletcher's argument for the justification of exceptional cases and the relative validity of moral rules for the reason of exceptions is legitimate only as addressing the individual's right of survival or on the ground of love in Fletcher's own terms.

Some cases of the narrower borderline situation also can be seen in Fletcher's ethics. For instance, such cases as a lie out of pity, euthanasia to relieve a patient from his incurable suffering, the abortion of an unwanted baby, and the abortion to save a mother's life all occur apart from the broader borderline situation. His argument for the breakability of moral rules in these cases is legitimate. Ramsey's analysis of exceptional cases also belongs in this category.

3. The Validity of Moral Rules in the Radically Changing Situation

There is gradual moral alteration even in the normal situation, and some moral problems emerge in the course of moral change although it is gradual. But these problems can be solved relatively smoothly. There may emerge even some unique cases to which existing

moral rules cannot give answers. These cases may be solved by building them into existing rules as in the case of Hare's treatment of exceptional cases. In the borderline situation, exceptional cases are solved by the elimination of the situation or by regarding them as exceptions to existing rules.

In the radically changing society, exceptional cases arise out of the conflict between existing moral rules and the unique demands of new social reality. Exceptional cases brought about by the radically changing social situation cannot be solved by the gradual change of morality because the urgency of serious conflicts in moral life does not allow time for gradual solution. Neither can they be solved by building them into existing moral rules because they are qualitatively new problems which are beyond the scope of the answerability of old moral rules. They cannot be solved by the elimination of the new social situation because the situation, unlike the borderline situation, is that which we have to accept and in which we have to live. They also cannot be solved by taking them as exceptions to rules because they are to be sanctioned by rules. How, then, are we to respond to these exceptional cases arising out of the radically changing social situation? We may respond to them in two different ways: we may transform existing moral rules by creatively reinterpreting them in such a way that they can be congruous with exceptional cases; or we may have to formulate new moral rules which can validate these exceptional cases. Let us consider these two ways in more detail.

We shall first consider the transformation of existing moral rules by a creative reinterpretation of them in order to make them relevant to the demands of the changed new social reality. Let us examine this case taking the individual's right of ownership of private property. This right has often been taken as the individual's inviolable right to possess private property and to use it for himself and his family at his disposal. In this context, Christian stewardship has been understood and practiced mainly as philanthropy. We have observed that Fletcher proposes to reinterpret Christian stewardship in terms of "macroethics" in the present American society which has graduated from scarcity to abundance.[30] His reinterpretation of Christian stewardship involves the transformation of the traditional notion of the ownership of private property. He notices two contrasting problems in the American economy of plenty-by-technology. One is the increase of unemployment due to mass production by technology which causes the job loss of unskilled manual workers. The other is the illness of mass consumption to keep the industry of mass production functioning. In order to solve these two problems, Fletcher proposes that the distribution of income must find some other way than job employment, and that consumerism must be corrected by putting back an adequate share of income to the welfare

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30) See above, pp. 19–20.

of the public.[31] It is, Fletcher says, corrective taxation that can put into practice these two ideas.[32]

His proposal of corrective taxation leads Fletcher to reinterpret Christian stewardship. He understands the notion of stewardship adequate to the American society today as taxation. He says that "taxation is stewardship."[33] He justifies his interpretation of stewardship as taxation by the transformation of the notion of the ownership of private property in terms of what he calls "the principle of the divine *patrimonium.*"[34] He holds that God is the only landlord and owner of our natural resources and their products since "the earth and the fulness thereof" is the Lord's according to the creationist doctrine. This leads him to claim that God turns our property over to us for the use of all, not some.[35] Fletcher cites the words of Nels Ferre:

> All property [i.e., wealth] belongs to God for the common good. It belongs, therefore, first of all to God and then equally to society and the individual. When the individual has what the society needs and can profitably use it is not his, but belongs to society, by divine right.[36]

Fletcher goes further and says:

> Ferre should not have said wealth is 'equally' society's and the individual's, for he promptly and properly denies it by giving society's claim a higher order than the individual's.[37]

To take another example, the commandment to honor one's parents which was formulated in the Old Testament age cannot be applied as it is to the liberal democratic situation of our time. The commandment needs to be reinterpreted in order that it can be applied relevantly to the new social situation of democratic society. This kind of reinterpretation of the ownership of private property and the commandment to honor one's parents does not invalidate these norms but transforms them to make them relevant to the context of the new social reality.

Let us turn to the problem of the formulation of new moral rules which can validate exceptional cases arising out of the radically changing situation. This case can be well illustrated by Stephen Toulmin's notion of "test case." In his *Reason in Ethics,* Toulmin distinguishes between the "rightness of action" and the "justice of social practice." By the former, he means the justification of moral actions by particular moral codes accepted within one society. By the latter, he means the justification of moral principles by the

31) Fletcher, *Moral Responsibility*, pp. 207–09.
32) *Ibid.*, p. 214.
33) *Ibid.*, p. 211.
34) *Ibid.*, p. 210.
35) *Ibid.*
36) *Ibid.*, p. 209.
37) *Ibid.*

practice of society. For instance, to have only one wife is allowed to a Christian; whereas to have up to four is permissible to the Muslim. He argues that it is not possible to decide "which of these is really right?" because the difference in the marriage system is due to the difference of social practices.[38]

Thus Toulmin makes the distinction between the rightness of individual action which can be justified by a moral code accepted within one society and the justice of social practices. But the distinction between the two categories, Toulmin days, vanishes when we face a case which questions the justice of a principle itself. Such a case is brought about by social change. Toulmin writes:

> If a society has a developing moral code, changes in the economic, social, political or psychological situation may lead people to regard the existing practices as unnecessarily restrictive, or as danger- ously lax. If this happens, they may come to ask, for instance, 'Is it right that woman should be debarred from smoking in public?', or 'Would it not be better if there were no mixed bathing after dark?'; in each case questioning the practice concerned *as a whole*.[39]

When social change brings into question an existing principle itself, we are forced to act against the justice of a principle itself. However, the same situation also can be an oc- casion for the creation of a new moral norm which can validate the case. This is expressed when Toulmin says:

> In justifying the action concerned, one no longer refers to the current practice: it is the injustice of the accepted code, or the greater justice of some alternative proposal, which is now important. The justification of the action is made ,a matter of principle' and the change in the logical criteria appropriate follows accordingly.[40]

He calls such a case as can be an occasion for the creation of a new moral norm a "test case."[41]

The modification and formulation of moral rules raise a crucial question, "On what basis do we modify old rules and formulate new rules?" In our discussion of Hare's "de- cisions of principle," we have postponed the consideration of his view on one's own in- dependent decisions of principle relevant to a new environment. This problem also has to do with the ground of the modification and formulation of moral rules and therefore has to be clarified here. We have reiterated our position that relative moral rules have their relevancy only insofar as they function as the vehicle of the realization of fundamental human values, which we have taken also as universal moral principles. This implies that

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38) Stephen Toulmin, *Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 144–53.
39) *Ibid.,* pl 149.
40) *Ibid.,* p. 151.
41) *Ibid.*

the modification and formulation of moral rules must be carried on in accordance with these fundamental human values. The modification and formulation of rules are nothing else than adjustments to relate fundamental human values relevantly to the needs of changing social situations.

Let us now turn to Hare's notion of one's independent decisions of principle which one has to make in a new environment. Hare discusses the problem of the modification and formulation of rules in terms of parents' moral education of their children. The central problem of the discussion is what kind of moral education parents are to give to their children in order to help them to live their moral life successfully in their own new social conditions which are different from those of their parents.[42] According to Hare, there are three possible ways of moral education. First, parents may try to inculcate into their children such fixed comprehensive moral rules—or ''principles'' in Hare's own term—that he would never have to make independent decisions. This kind of moral education fails, because the moral rules that children learn from their parents will not work in their new environment which is different from that of their parents. Furthermore, they can neither modify old rules inherited from their parents nor create new rules to face the new environment, since they are not used to making their own decisions of principle. This kind of moral education which teaches only principles without giving the opportunity of subjecting them to the learner's own decisions of principle is like teaching science exclusively from textbooks without entering a laboratory. Secondly, parents may lack confidence and may not be sure enough what they themselves think to impart to their children any moral principle. The children of such a generation have to make individual decisions without any basis of principles learned from their parents. Hare says that this kind of moral education is like putting a student into a laboratory and saying ''Get on with it.'' Finally, parents may impart principles to their children, but at the same time give them opportunity to make their own decisions. Hare recommends this as an adequate moral decision.[43]

To put these three kinds of moral education in common moral terms, the first is a legalistic moral education; whereas the second is an antinomian moral education. The last is a creative moral education. With regard to the last kind of moral education, Hare says:

> What we do, if we are sensible, is to give him [someone] a solid basis of principles, but at the same time ample opportunity of making the decisions upon which these principles are based and by which they are modified, improved, adapted to changed circumstances, or even abandoned if

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42) Hare, *The Language of Morals*, pp. 74–78.
43) *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76.

they become entirely unsuited to a new environment.[44]

Thus, Hare recognizes that moral rules are to be modified and even formulated anew in accordance with the change of social conditions.

What, then, is, for Hare, the ground of the modification and formulation of moral rules? It is the moral agent's "way of life." He refers to the moral agent's way of life in his discussion of the justification of a moral action. He says that a complete justification of a decision requires a complete account of the principles which the decision observed and the effects of observing those principles. If we are "pressed to justify a decision completely, we have to give a complete specification of the way of which it is a part.[45] In practice it is, Hare says, impossible to give this complete specification. Religions may give the answer by presenting historical persons who carried out the way of life in practice. But the inquirer can still ask "But why should I live like him?" The only answer is that one has to decide one's own way of life. Hare says:

> We can only ask him [the inquirer] to make up his own mind which way he ought to live; for in the end, everything rests upon such a decision of principle. He has to decide whether to accept that way of life or not; if he accepts it, then we can proceed to justify the decisions that are based upon it; if he does not accept it, then let him accept some other, and try to live by it.[46]

The same seems to hold for the modification and formulation of moral rules, although he does not relate them directly to his earlier discussion of "way of life."

His notion of "way of life" is too broad and even ambiguous to discuss the formulation and function of moral rules on the basis of it alone. But what is important about his notion of "way of life" is that moral discourse is in the end grounded in a certain ultimate pre-supposition, i.e., the moral agent's view of life. We have interpreted this ultimate presupposition in terms of fundamental human values. From Hare we might go further and say that the formulation and modification of moral rules go in the end beyond the changes of social conditions to the moral agent's ultimate commitment to some fundamental human values.

Considered in this connection, it is noteworthy that even an analytical ethicist holds that moral discourse must in the end presuppose concern for human welfare. In his criticism of the anti-naturalist philosopher's notion of "independence of description and evaluation," G. J. Warnock contends that moral debate must presuppose the general area of concern with "the welfare of human beings." He takes G. E. Moore's notion of "the naturalistic fallacy" as implying that

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44) *Ibid.,* p. 76.
45) *Ibid.,* p. 69.
46) *Ibid.*

. . . *evaluation* is not reducible to description; that there is an insurmountable difference of principle between the activities of evaluating something and describing it, between just 'stating the facts' and passing any sort of judgment upon them.[47]

Warnock goes further and argues that the anti-naturalist philosopher seems to suggest "not merely that description and evaluation are different, but that they are in an important sense *independent*.[48] Against this view, Warnock contends that the independence of description and evaluation does not imply that: "just anything can function as an (intelligible) criterion of evaluation." He goes on to say: "But now, is it not even more plainly the case that not just anything can function as a criterion of *moral* evaluation?"[49] This leads him to propose to set certain limits to the anti-naturalistic ethical discourse. He sees a possible limit in "the general area of concern with the welfare of human beings":

> Could we say, perhaps, vaguely enough for present purposes, . . . that the limits are set somewhere within the general area of concern with the welfare of human beings? To say this is not, indeed, to say very much; but it is not to say nothing. For it is to say, in fact, at least this: that the *relevance* of considerations as to the welfare of human beings *cannot*, in the context of moral debate, be denied.[50]

As Warnock himself says, his notion of "concern with the welfare of human beings" is a vague definition of the final criterion of ethical discourse. This may be true particularly from the viewpoint of analytical ethics. But the notion can function well as the heuristic principle of ethics. We would go further and suggest that there is a parallel between our notion of the enriching and harmonious realization of the self in human interdependence and Warnock's notion of "concern with the welfare of human beings."

Let us now consider the situationists' understanding of the validity of moral rules in the radically changing situation. We shall first consider Lehmann. We have observed that his notion of the situation belongs to the category of the radically changing situation. As we have seen, in the radically changing situation stress is placed on moral innovation rather than on the maintenance of existing moral rules. This is precisely the case with Lehmann's understanding of moral rules and exceptions.

Lehmann distinguishes the authentic norm of ethics from the logical norm. Whereas the latter is subject to its logical generality, the former is a dynamic norm which acknowledges exceptions ad occasions for its transformation. He states:

> It could be that the authentic norm of ethics is one which expresses the disjunction of the particular from its logical subordination to the general. Such a norm, however, would also take account of the

47) G. J. Warnock, *Contermporary Moral Philosophy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 63.
48) *Ibid.*, p. 64.
49) *Ibid.*, p. 67.
50) *Ibid.*

congruence of the general with the dynamics of concrete particulars.

He continues:

> The congruence of a general ethical claim or judgment with particulars would be indicated by the recognition of a given concrete particular as a transvaluational exception. The authentic norm of ethics is one which validates behavior in terms of transvaluational concreteness. The norm takes the form of validating judgment, the ethical force of which is not its logical generality but its acknowledgement of the transforming power of a concrete exception.[51]

Lehmann's distinction between the authentic norm and the logical norm leads him to distinguish between the exception as the suspension of the logical norm and the exception as the transformer of the accepted norm. He makes this distinction according to whether the exception is significant because it suspends the rule or because it breaks fresh ethical ground. The former is simply disposed of with penalties for the reason of the violation of logical norms; whereas the latter achieves a transvaluation of accepted norms by breaking fresh ethical ground. He writes:

> An exception that proves the rule falls securely under the normative generalization and can be neatly disposed of with commensurate penalties. In this way its ethical significance is reduced from an exception to that of a deviation.

He continues:

> An exception that suspends the rule challenges previously accepted ethical judgments and patterns of behavior and breaks fresh ethical ground. It breaks fresh ethical ground because it requires a transvaluation of accepted norms and values, in order to take account of what has concretely occurred.[52]

Thus, for Lehmann the exception functions as the transforming power of morality by breaking fresh ethical ground. It is obvious that his notion of the authentic norm and the exception as the transformer of the accepted norm is useful in the situation of radical social change rather than in the normal situation.

We have observed that Lehmann's notion of the authentic norm of ethics regards exceptions as the transformers of accepted norms. For instance, the man healed on the Sabbath day and the woman taken in adultery break God's commandments to keep the Sabbath day and to prohibit adultery. But these exceptions transform the laws involved, so that the latter validate the former. The transformation of the accepted norms can be valid only when we presuppose the ultimate principle on the basis of which the transformation takes place. For Lehmann, this ultimate principle is "What God is doing in the world

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51) Lehmann, *Ethics in a Christian Context*, p. 242.
52) *Ibid.*, p. 243.

to make and to keep human life human," which is the pivot of his ethics around which all his ethical discussions move. His notion of the authentic norm of ethics which "take account of the congruence of the general with the dynamics of concrete particulars" seems to imply that the transformation of the accepted norms by exceptions takes place for the sake of a greater achievement of this ultimate principle. This is revealed when he says:

> . . . Christianity specializes in the exception. The man healed on the Sabbath day, the woman taken in adultery, the 'good Samaritan,' the 'prodigal son' are only the more vivid instances of this specialization.[53]

Viewed in our own terms, Lehmann seems to mean by the transformation of the accepted norms that moral norms are valid only insofar as they function as the means of the achievement of God's humanizing work in the world. In other words, he seems to argue that moral norms can be reinterpreted by transforming exceptions for the sake of a greater achievement of God's humanizing work in the world. If this is the case, a full consideration of the transformation of norms by exceptions must clarify the validity of norms in their relation to the ultimate principle of his ethics. But his neglect of the sustaining function of moral norms leads him to place weight upon the transforming power of exceptions rather than on the validity of moral norms in their relation to the ultimate principle of his ethics. We may benefit from Hare and Toulmin to develop his insights further.

Finally, let us consider Fletcher and Robinson. We have said that their basic notion of the situation belongs to the category of the radically changing situation, although they at times take the situation as the borderline situation. We have observed that Fletcher's initial concern is to seek a new ethics relevant to our time by overcoming traditional ethical legalism. This leads him to seek the relativization of moral rules in terms of exceptional cases in order to respond creatively to the needs of the radically changing situation of our time. He deals with exceptions under the presupposition of the ultimate principle of ethics which for him is the principle of love. In other words, what distinguishes his notion of the exception from that of Lehmann's is that his central concern is to demonstrate the relative validity of moral rules for the reason of their breakability; whereas Lehmann seeks the transformation of norms in terms of the transvaluational exception. Fletcher emphasizes the negative aspect of the exception; whereas Lehmann stresses its creative function. However, it is Fletcher's merit that he discusses the exception relating it more explicitly to the ultimate principle of his ethics than Lehmann.

Fletcher's situational ethical approach is highly useful to cope with the radically changing social situation. Despite this merit, we must point out that he gives insufficient at-

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53) *Ibid.,* p. 242.

tention to the positive importance of the sustaining function of moral rules and that love alone is too abstract and formal to deal with the function and validity of moral rules. In order to overcome the former defect, he may have to benefit from Hare to develop the relative validity of moral rules retaining their sustaining function. With regard to the latter problem, other Christian values such as justice, freedom, and order also must be taken into consideration for the full development of his creative ethical insights. This holds for Lehmann's notion of God's humanization — the fundamental principle of his ethics — as well.

Robinson seeks to establish a new morality relevant to the new social reality of our time by overcoming the old morality. To do so, he relativizes the validity of moral rules, claiming that love is the only absolute principle which is both more flexible and more demanding than any moral code. For him, it is love that determines the moral validity of actions. Thus, Robinson also holds by implication that moral rules are valid only insofar as they function as the means of the actualization of love. His search for the new morality breaks fresh ethical ground which helps us to construct an ethics relevant to the changing social reality of our time. Despite this virtue, his ethics reveals the same defects as those of Fletcher's. It is true that he is more aware of the ethical importance of the sustaining function of moral rules than Lehmann and Fletcher. But Robinson also fails to develop it fully because of his ambiguous notion of the situation, as we have already pointed out. He discusses the function and validity of moral norms on the basis of love alone taking it as having a "built-in compass." But love alone is not enough to deal with all the problems pertaining to the validity and function of moral norms.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Our study has started with two basic theses. One is that the situation ethics debate has raised important ethical issues, but these issues contribute little to social ethics because of the three principal problems of the debate, which we have ascribed to its failure to treat man's sociality. The other is that the issues raised by the debate can make positive contribution to social ethics if these principal problems are developed constructively and the norm-context relationship is reformulated in terms of man's sociality and the balance between intentionality and sociality.

We have developed constructively the three principal problems of the debate and reformulated the norm-context relationship in the light of these two conceptual models. The situation is not an isolated decision-making moment but the whole system of social conditions, since the injunctive demand of the society at large is an ingredient in the claim

of each particular situation.[1] Therefore, moral conduct must be considered to be the moral agent's decision in his responsible relation to his society grounded in its core communal values. Moral rules are the generalized rational patterns of what can or cannot be justified in accordance with communal values. This means that moral norms function as a sustaining pattern of moral life which secures the continuity and generality of communal values, although their validity is relative. It is through the continuity and generality of communal values that corporate moral life is maintained.

Our exposition of the social aspect of the situation and the function of moral norms has illuminated the positive ethical function of social systems and policies, while setting due limits to it. In other words, we have demonstrated that no search for constructive social ethics can be successful without taking seriously the enriching and harmonious actualization of fundamental human values in interdependent, intersubjective human relationships. We have also reformulated the norm-context relationship in such a way that the sustaining function of moral rules can be retained without falling into the trap of legalism and heteronomy.

The aforementioned major points of our study help us not only to develop constructively the principal problems of the situation ethics debate but also to reformulate the debate. It is the virtue of the ethics of situations that it emphasizes the significance of the moral agent's free, independent decision which enables him to respond creatively to social change. However, the situationists err when they neglect the sustaining function of moral norms. Our study has reintroduced the function of norms in such a way that the situationists' argument for the relative validity of moral rules can be maintained without neglecting the sustaining function of rules. It is the merit of Ramsey's ethics of norms that it takes seriously the function of moral norms. However, he errs when he does not give due appreciation to the significance of the situational approach to ethics. Moreover, his argument for norms in logical terms insufficiently develops the social function of norms. Our exposition of the sustaining function of moral norms retains Ramsey's insistence on norms, while giving due appreciation to the situationists' argument for the relative validity of rules.

Finally, our study throws fresh light upon the norm-context relationship. The situationists start with the impact of the situation upon morality and moral norms, but they are never careful to get into the clear definition of the situation. This leads them to treat insufficiently the relationship between the situation and the function and validity of rules. Our reformulation of the norm-context relationship provides a clearer picture of the

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1) As we have seen in our analysis of the validity of moral rules under the borderline situation, there can be some exceptional cases which can occur apart from the social situation at large.

relationship between the situation and moral norms. Moreover, our exposition of the social notion of the situation, the positive social function of moral norms, and the ethical function of social systems and policies opens up a way to make the situation ethics debate contribute to social ethics including the ethics of social change.

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